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ABSTRACT 
 
From Shocks to Waves: 
Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century 
Vsevolod Gunitskiy 
 
What causes democratic waves? This dissertation argues that sudden shifts in the 
distribution of power among major states can help explain the wave-like spread of 
democracy over the past century. These hegemonic shocks lead to bursts of regime 
change by creating unique incentives and opportunities for domestic reforms, and 
do so through three sets of mechanisms – hegemonic coercion, influence, and 
emulation. Namely, shocks produce windows of opportunity for external regime 
imposition, enable rising great powers to expand networks of trade and patronage, 
and inspire imitators by credibly revealing hidden information about regime 
effectiveness to foreign audiences.  
I find strong statistical support for the idea that shifts in hegemonic power have 
shaped waves of democracy, fascism, and communism in the twentieth century. 
The statistical analysis is supplemented by case studies of three hegemonic shocks: 
World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II. The First World War 
produced the century’s first democratic wave by demonstrating democracy’s 
effectiveness to rulers on the battlefield and the factory floor, creating new states on 
the ruins of autocratic empires, and increasing the organizational power of women 
and working-class men. The wave also sowed the seeds of its own demise as rulers 
and coalitions, swept up in the postwar momentum, adopted liberal institutions in 
countries that lacked the social cohesion, political pre-conditions or economic 
stability necessary for democratic consolidation. Pro-reform coalitions that 
welcomed the reforms dissolved as the crisis passed. The economic rise of Nazi 
Germany and the crisis of liberal capitalism in the Great Depression inaugurated a 
fascist wave in the 1930s. In this period, fascist institutions penetrated the 
governments of many self-proclaimed authoritarians but also left a lasting legacy on 
the structure of modern democratic regimes. Growing fascist power and influence 
inspired a number of imitators, culminating in a series of fascist regime impositions 
at the outset of World War II. The outcome of that war produced not one but two 
rising great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Reflecting this duality, 
the war’s aftermath witnessed two distinct waves of institutional reforms that 
embodied the competing visions offered by the two superpowers. Despite the 
profound differences in their content, both regime waves diffused through a 
mixture of coercion (through occupation and nation-building), influence (via the 
expansion of trade, foreign aid, grants, and newly-forged international institutions), 
and emulation (by outsiders impressed with the self-evident success of the two 
systems).  
Departing from theories that focus on the internal determinants of domestic 
reforms, this dissertation argues that regime success in the twentieth century is 
deeply tied to rapid changes in the global distribution of power, a relationship often 
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"The winds and waves are always on the side  
of the ablest navigators." 
Edward Gibbon, 1776 
  
“World history strides on from catastrophe to catastrophe,  
whether we can comprehend and prove it or not.”  
Oswald Spengler, 1932 
 
“No one copies a loser.” 
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Introduction: A Century of Shocks and Waves 
  
The nations wax, the nations wane away  
And in a brief space the generations pass,  




“Anyone desiring a quiet life has done badly  
to be born in the twentieth century.”  
 
-- Leon Trotsky2  
 
“Serious accidents are a major cause of change in safety,  
even though the change is not always sustained.”  
 




The rise and decline of democracy over the past century has been marked by 
turbulent bursts of reform that swept across many countries in a relatively short 
time – what Samuel Huntington famously called “democratic waves”.4 Moments of 
great upheaval, not steady and gradual change, have been the hallmark of 
democratic evolution. This dissertation seeks to explain the causes of these 
                                                
1
 Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, 50 B.C.E 
2 Quoted in Isiah Berlin (1958/69) Four Essays on Liberty, p.1 
3 Trevor Kletz (1993) Lessons from Disaster: How Organizations Have no Memory 
and Accidents Recur, Gulf Professional Publishing, p. 70 
4
 Samuel Huntington (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 
Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press 
  
2 
transformative waves by focusing on the role of sudden hegemonic transitions in 
the international system. While many explanations for democracy have looked at 
domestic factors like economic growth, civil society, and class relations, I argue 
that the real push for democracy comes from volatility in the international system. 
My central thesis is that periods of sudden rise and decline of great powers create 
unique incentives and opportunities for domestic reforms. These “hegemonic 
shocks” have a crucial and often-ignored effect on the spread and retreat of 
democratic reforms, and can explain the waves of democratization that have 
shaped the twentieth century.  
 Since Huntington introduced the concept to political scientists, the presence of 
waves has often been noted, but not easily explained. Huntington himself did not 
seek to provide a theory of democratic waves, but only to describe what he thought 
were the varied causes of the last bout of reforms.  As he wrote in the introduction, 
the book was “an explanatory, not a theoretical, work.”5 Though the argument is 
“enticing in its scope and seductive in its pretense,” one scholar noted, “its 
eclecticism does not give way to theoretical integration.”6 
 This dissertation builds on Huntington’s insight by proposing a theory for the 
timing, intensity, and content of democratic waves in the twentieth century.  It 
outlines specific causal mechanisms that lead to their appearance, and tests the 
argument using both statistical analysis and case studies of the first three 
                                                
5
 Huntington 1991:xiv 
6
 Gerardo L. Munck (1994) “Review: Democratic Transitions in Comparative 
Perspective” Comparative Politics 26.3, p. 357 
  
3 
hegemonic shocks of the twentieth century – World War I, the Great Depression, 
and World War II. The puzzle I seek to answer is: what explains the causes of 
democratic waves? In other words, why do democratic transitions cluster together 
in space and time? (See Figures 1.1 and 1.2) For that matter, why do regime 
transitions of all types seem to occur in waves, including communism and fascism? 
(Figures 1.3 and 1.4) And finally, why do the reforms associated with democratic 
waves often fail to consolidate, leading to democratic rollback in their aftermath? 
Why do the waves collapse?  
 The wave-like pattern of democratic development is especially prominent when 
the spread of democracy is charted over time. Figure 1.1 (following page) tracks the 
average annual level of democracy between 1900 and 2000.7 As the graph shows, 
the path of democratization is characterized by waves and counter-waves, with 












                                                
7
 Measured as an average of the Polity IV index of democracy and SIP, the Scalar 
Index of Politics, combines the executive restraint components of the Polity IV 
score with Vanhannen’s measure of popular participation See Scott Gates, Håvard 
Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Håvard Strand (2006) “Institutional Inconsistency and 
























Figure 1.2 Number of democracies as proportion of all states in the international 
system, 1900-2000 
 
 The two major alternatives to democracy in the twentieth century – fascism and 
communism – have also spread and retreated in wave-like patterns. A fascist wave 
swept Europe in the 1930s, and a wave of Communist transitions followed the 
  
5 
Soviet victory in World War II. Although non-democratic regimes lack well-
developed quantitative indices like Polity, the global spread of fascism and 
communism can be estimated by charting the percentage of world power held by 
fascist and communist states since 1900.8 
 
Figure 1.3 Communist and Fascist shares of global power.              
 
 
Figure 1.4 Number of fascist and communist states. 
                                                
8
 See Appendix 1 in Chapter 2 for classifications of fascist and communist regimes. 
The share of power was calculated using the Composite Index of National 
Capabilities, or CINC, discussed in Chapter 2.  
  
6 
 Examining the causes of these waves is essential not only for understanding 
how democracy spreads, but also for judging the efficacy of external regime 
promotion pursued by the United States and other great powers. Much of U.S. 
policy during the Cold War was guided by the fear of a Communist wave that 
would begin in Asia and eventually wash up on the shores of California. More 
recently, the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the U.S. and its allies was sparked at least in 
part by the Bush Administration’s belief in their ability to spark democratic waves 
through forced regime change.9  When domestic reforms are embedded in the 
dynamics of global or regional power shifts, it may be useless or even 
counterproductive to focus purely on the needs and preferences of pro-reform 
domestic actors inside any single country. Policies that attempt to influence 
democratization would therefore benefit from examining the spread of democracy 
as a process embedded in global cycles of democratic advances and retreats.  
 
The Argument in Brief 
 
 This dissertation makes three related arguments about the causes of institutional 
waves. First, I argue that abrupt hegemonic transitions in the international system – 
that is, the sudden rise and decline of dominant countries – create unique 
incentives and opportunities for waves of domestic reforms. These critical junctures 
                                                
9
 As George Bush said in a speech several months after the fall of Baghdad. “Iraqi 
democracy will succeed – and that success wills send forth the news, from 
Damascus to Tehran – that freedom can be the future of every nation…The 
establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed 
event in the global democratic revolution.” President’s remarks at the 20th 
Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of 
Commerce, Washington DC, November 6, 2003. 
  
7 
not only alter the hierarchy of great powers, but also shape the evolution of 
domestic regimes. Namely, a sudden shift in the distribution of relative power that 
favors a particular hegemon creates a wave of domestic reforms that reproduce the 
institutional features of that hegemon’s regime. The outcomes of these shocks have 
been powerful drivers of domestic transformations, affecting even those countries 
that have little direct contact with the great powers themselves. I find powerful 
support for this idea in both large-n statistical analysis and detailed case studies of 
twentieth-century hegemonic shocks. The waves of democracy and autocracy that 
have defined the past century are the products of these geopolitical cataclysms. 
 Second, the paper outlines three causal mechanisms through which hegemonic 
shocks create waves of domestic reforms. First, hegemonic shocks create temporary 
windows of opportunity for military interventions and regime impositions. For 
example, the Communist wave in eastern Europe in the late 1940s would not have 
been possible without a Soviet victory in the Second World War, accompanied by 
the country’s rapid increase in relative power on the European continent. Second, 
hegemonic shocks allow rising hegemons to expand their networks of trade and 
patronage and to extend their influence via the construction of international 
institutions. By contrast, countries that suffer sudden relative decline as a result of 
the shock will be diminished in their ability to exercise influence beyond their 
national borders. The Soviet collapse, for example, disrupted patronage networks in 
many African states in the mid-1990s, leading their citizens to question the 
legitimacy of their rulers. “The wind from the east,” said Gabon’s ruler Omar 
  
8 
Bongo in 1990, “are shaking the coconut trees in Africa.”10 Shocks thus create 
opportunities to significantly alter the institutional preferences and power dynamics 
of coalitions within many countries at once, even in those countries not directly 
affected by the shock. Third, hegemonic shocks reveal information about relative 
regime efficiency to foreign audiences. By demonstrating which regimes perform 
better under duress, shocks legitimize certain regimes and make them more 
attractive to would-be emulators. Hegemons whose fortunes suddenly decline due 
to a hegemonic shock will find their regimes discredited and abandoned by former 
followers or sympathizers. Success is contagious, in other words, but only failure 
demands inoculation. 
 Because hegemonic competition is a game of relative gains and losses, the rise 
in status of one great power is necessarily accompanied by the decline of another. 
Through the mechanisms described above, the rising hegemons are able to impose 
their regimes on others through brute force, to influence the institutional choices of 
these states more indirectly through patronage and trade, or to simply sit back and 
watch the imitators climb onto the bandwagon. The declining hegemons, 
meanwhile, face an equally powerful but countervailing set of factors: their 
capacity to coerce erodes, their ability to influence and maintain allies through 
trade and patronage declines, and the legitimacy of their regime as a model of 
emulation evaporates, revealed to be inadequate under duress. These are the 
mechanisms of coercion, influence, and emulation that produce waves of regime 
                                                
10




change in the wake of hegemonic shocks.  
 A third set of arguments examines why so many democratic reforms that take 
place within these waves fail to consolidate, creating anti-democratic rollbacks. All 
three waves of democracy experienced reversals shortly after their peak – a 
catastrophic reversal after 1918, a severe one after 1945, and a partial but 
persistent one after 1991. The reasons for these failed consolidations, I argue, stems 
from the dynamics that create the wave in the first place. The outcome of a shock 
in which a democratic hegemon emerges triumphant – as was the case with the 
United States in the three cases above – creates extremely strong but temporary 
incentives for democratization, including within states that would not have made 
such a transition otherwise. These states adopt democratic institutions despite the 
absence of structural conditions generally needed to sustain and consolidate 
democracy – a well-established middle class, economic stability, ethnic 
cooperation, and past experience with democratic “rules of the game”. New elites, 
driven by a spirit of prevailing optimism or misleading cognitive biases that cause 
them to over-emphasize recent and dramatic events, adopt institutions ultimately 
unsuitable for their country’s level of social, economic or political development. 
Meanwhile, extraordinary ad hoc coalitions that push for democratic reforms in a 
moment of crisis dissolve as the crisis fades away. Like a victorious international 
alliance that disintegrates once its purpose has been served, these domestic 
coalitions struggle to hold together after the initial post-shock period – as was the 
case, for example, in Germany after 1918. As a result, the shock produces a case of 
  
10 
“democratic over-stretch”, an institutional version of a stock market bubble in 
which states that are unlikely to consolidate a democracy try to adopt it regardless 
of structural domestic conditions. The causes of failed consolidation that occur 





The dissertation contributes to the literature on democratization in several 
ways.  First, it offers a theory for the temporal and geographic clustering of 
domestic reforms. Although institutional waves have been a central feature in the 
evolution of modern regimes, there are surprisingly few attempts to explain their 
causes. This omission stems partly from the way democracy has been studied in the 
past. Most theories of democratization emphasize the influence of domestic 
variables such as economic development, class coalitions, or civil society. 
Domestic factors alone, however, cannot account for the rapid and simultaneous 
bursts of reform that have shaped democratic development. Departing from 
theories that focus on the internal determinants of domestic reforms, I argue that 
regime success in the twentieth century is deeply tied to rapid changes in the 
global distribution of power, a relationship often obscured by the vivid 
particularities of local transformations. Untangling the details of this relationship 
requires a systemic theory of democratization – that is, a theory that examines how 
linkages among states and changes in the international system shape and constrain 
the incentives and opportunities for domestic reforms. Because it steps outside the 
  
11 
state to examine the influence of the international environment, the approach 
employed in this dissertation takes the form of a “second-image reversed” theory.11 
It is not my goal, however, to claim that domestic factors are irrelevant in 
explaining democratic transitions. Domestic explanations get a lot of things right, 
and in some instances they are essential for understanding regime reforms. But 
there are times when systemic pressures have important and long-lasting effects on 
the evolution of domestic regimes. At such times, the interaction of external and 
domestic factors becomes crucial for explaining regime change. It may well be 
true, as modernization theory argues, that a country’s economic development 
influences democratization. At the same time, economic development cannot 
explain simultaneous transitions unless it can be shown that a number of countries 
experienced a sudden rise in economic development at the same time. Moreover, 
economic development itself is subject to a variety of external influences, 
especially when the international system undergoes dramatic changes. My goal, 
therefore, is not to explain away internal factors but to examine how they interact 
with often-ignored external influences in creating domestic transformations. 
 No theory can explain all instances of regime reform; this is an inherent 
limitation of social science theories that operate in a complex and contingent 
world. The beginnings of the third wave in Southern Europe and later Asia and 
Latin America were not associated with sudden shifts in hegemonic capability. The 
wave of democratization in eastern Europe in 1989 was directly tied to changes in 
                                                
11
 Peter Gourevitch (1978) “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources 
of Domestic Politics” International Organization 32.4: 881-911 
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great power politics that were motivated by fear of Soviet decline and Gorbachev’s 
attempts to reverse that decline. Yet it was a precursor to the Soviet collapse rather 
than a symptom of it. Hegemonic shock dynamics are clearly visible, however, in 
the African wave of democratization after 1991. The so-called Color Revolutions in 
the post-Soviet space or the ongoing wave of popular protests in the Arab world 
also represent instances of waves that were not produced by shocks. Scholars have 
focused on various mechanisms of diffusion to explain connections among these 
protests, but the sudden rise or decline of great powers has not played a major role 
in their explanations. 
 Not all waves, then, are caused by hegemonic shocks. At the same time, every 
hegemonic shock of the twentieth century has produced a wave of domestic 
reforms. Shocks are therefore a sufficient but not a necessary cause of institutional 
waves. Moreover, the waves produced by hegemonic shocks have had an 
enormous impact on the evolution of domestic regimes. Whether it was the 
democratic waves that followed World War I and the Soviet collapse, the fascist 
wave of the 1930s, or the two waves toward democracy and communism after 
World War II – in each instance, shifts in the distribution of hegemonic power have 
produced bursts of transformation that affected many countries around the world.  
 This dissertation also contributes to the literature on democratic consolidation 
by providing a novel explanation for the frequent failures of democratic transitions. 
Many countries undergo democratic transitions, but far fewer are able to sustain the 
reforms that accompany these transitions. As Przeworski et al. (2000) have argued, 
  
13 
consolidations are easier to explain – countries are much more likely to sustain 
democratic institutions if they are wealthy, well-educated, ethnically homogenous, 
relatively equal, and have a sizeable middle class. By contrast, transitions occur in 
countries at all levels of income and education, with a variety of ethnic 
compositions, and with many different types of class coalitions.12 While there 
seems to be a magic formula for democratic consolidation, no such formula exists 
to explain democratic transitions. Transitions are easy to do, but hard to explain; 
consolidation is hard to accomplish, but easy to explain. As a result, some scholars 
have argued that factors leading to democratic transitions may be different from 
factors that sustain democracy over the long run.  
 My argument both builds upon this literature and departs from it in some ways. 
Hegemonic shocks create immense incentives for reforms, I argue, leading 
countries of all stripes and all levels of socio-economic development to attempt a 
democratic transition. This leads to institutional over-reach that creates a number of 
failed transitions. Failed transitions can thus be explained as instances of 
democratic overstretch. At the same time, I argue, the wave sows the seeds of its 
own demise, creating incentives that disappear as the shock fades. Thus the factors 
that create an artificially high number of transitions also create the failed 
consolidations that follow. The causes of transitions and consolidations are indeed 
causally linked, if counterintuitively so, rather than produced by separate causal 
                                                
12
 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando 
Limongi (2000) Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being 




 Finally, the dissertation seeks to integrate the literature on hegemonic transitions 
from international relations with the literature on democratization from 
comparative politics – two strands of theory that share common affinities but rarely 
intersect. The study of hegemonic transitions has generally neglected their 
influence on domestic transformations, focusing instead on the causes of 
hegemonic wars and their effects on war propensity and foreign policy.13 The study 
of the causes of democratization, by contrast, has traditionally been the province of 
comparativists who explore the internal dynamics of domestic political evolution.  
As I hope to show, the intersection of these fields can usefully illuminate the causes 
of domestic transformations. How democracy spreads can tell us about the nature 
of democracy itself. 
 
Defining Hegemonic Shocks 
 
The word “hegemon” is used ambiguously in the international relations literature. It 
can refer to a single paramount state, one associated with the provision of global 
public goods and control of the commons. But it can also refer to one of several  
great powers.14 I adopt the latter definition – in this dissertation, a hegemon refers 
                                                
13
 The classic texts are A.F.K. Organski (1958) World Politics, Knopf and Robert 
Gilpin (1981) War and Change in Global Politics, Cambridge University Press. For 
two more recent edited volumes, see Jonathan Friedman and Christopher Chase-
Dunn, eds. (2005) Hegemonic Declines: Present and Past, Paradigm Publishers and 
William R. Thompson, ed. (2009) Systemic Transitions: Past, Present, and Future, 
Palgrave-Macmillan. 
14
 The Oxford English Dictionary maintains this ambivalence, defining a hegemon 
as “a leading or paramount power,” where “leading” implies the possibility of 
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to a leading power, or a state that comprises a “pole” in the international system. In 
that sense a hegemon as used here is a more exclusive term than the Correlates of 
War definition of a “major power”, but more inclusive than the single-state 
definition adopted by, for example, Gilpin (1981) or Mearsheimer (2001).15 The 
salient characteristic of a “pole” is that it is not merely a major power, but a leading 
state with the capacity to impose regimes, influence other great powers, and inspire 
institutional imitators. Following the general view that the system was multipolar 
until World War Two and bipolar until the Soviet collapse,16 hegemons between 
the years 1816 and 2000 were labeled as: US 1898-2000; Russia/USSR 1816-1991; 
Great Britain 1816-1945; France 1816-1945; Germany 1871-1945; and Japan 
1905-1945. 
 I define a hegemonic shock as a sudden shift in the distribution of relative 
power among the leading states in the international system. The term expands on 
Gilpin’s notion of a “hegemonic war” to include non-military shocks such as 
economic crises or imperial collapses – any period in which the power of one 
hegemon rises or declines significantly against the others. Gilpin saw hegemonic 
wars as “the ultimate test of change in the relative standing of the powers in the 
                                                
multiple such states, while “paramount” implies a single all-powerful entity. 
15
 John Mearsheimer (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton and 
Company, p.40. Robert Gilpin (1981) War and Change in World Politics, 
Cambridge University Press, p.29. See Chapter 2 for an extended discussion. 
16
 See, e.g., Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics, McGraw-Hill 
or Paul Kennedy (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change 
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House: “The 
multipolar world of 1885 was replaced by a bipolar world as early as 1943.” 
(p.197, orig. emphasis) 
  
16 
existing system,” and the same applies to hegemonic shocks in general.17 By 
producing clear winners and losers, hegemonic shocks clarify the balance of power 
and allow opportunities for the creation of new global orders. In doing so, they also 
become the graveyards and incubators of competing regime types, as described in 
the mechanisms above. 
 Hegemonic shocks are critical junctures in the development of domestic 
institutions. They are rare and relatively brief, but they play a pivotal role in 
shaping the evolution of political and social institutions. Karl Polanyi, for instance, 
contrasts “critical periods” with “connecting stretches of time” and consciously 
focuses his attention on the former.18 The notion of critical junctures parallels the 
concept of punctuated equilibrium, introduced by Stephen Jay Gould and 
subsequently borrowed by social scientists to describe dynamics wherein periods 
of relative stasis are punctuated by bursts of sudden and dramatic changes. Stephen 
Krasner, for example, notes that political development of states often follows an 
uneven course: “Crisis situations tend to become the watersheds in a state’s 
institutional development…During periods of crisis politics becomes a struggle 
over the basic rules of the game rather than allocation within a given set of rules.”19 
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Similarly, in American politics, scholars of elections and political parties have 
underlined the importance of “critical realignments” in voting behavior, “where at 
moments of crisis deep partisan attachments are formed which persist over long 
periods of time”.20 In an analysis of the development of the American state, 
Skowronec defines such moments as "a sporadic, disruptive event that suddenly 
challenges a state's capacity to maintain control and alters the boundaries defining 
the legitimate use of coercion."21 According to this view, periods of quotidian 
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politics are periodically interrupted by crises that shape the content and likelihood 
of reforms. Like all instances of punctuated equilibrium, hegemonic shocks create 
enormous incentives and opportunities for change; in doing so they disrupt the 
flow of politics as usual and define the parameters of future reforms. As rare but 
crucial events, they have left a deep imprint on the evolution of domestic regimes 
in the past century. 
 Selecting cases of hegemonic shocks requires some measure of hegemonic 
volatility. I measured hegemonic volatility by looking at the average annual change 
in relative power among the hegemons. This was operationalized by summing the 
absolute values of annual changes in CINC (Composite Index of National 
Capabilities) scores among great powers, yielding the graph below.22 This variable 
captures hegemonic shocks by tracking how quickly the distribution of relative 
power among major states changes over time. It improves on existing measures that 
use dummy variables for pre-designated shock years.  
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Figure 1.5: Average Hegemonic Volatility, 1900-2000 
 
 
 There are three immediately visible spikes: 1917-1922, 1940-1947 (with some 
reverberations continuing into the 1950s), and 1989-1995. These represent my 
case selections of World War I, World War II, and the Soviet Collapse (a future 
case study not included in this dissertation). Although it does not appear on the 
graph above, I have also added a case study of the Great Depression, for the 
following reasons. First, due to the way the CINC index is constructed, it is likely to 
underestimate economic change in favor of military and geopolitical factors. 
Second, consistent with the demands of the theory, even when measured via CINC 
relative U.S. power begins to decline beginning in the mid-1920s and especially 
after 1929, while German power increases dramatically after Hitler’s ascent to 
power in 1933. The period of the Great Depression thus provides an important and 
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unique case of a democratic hegemon in decline, offering greater variation on my 
dependent variable.23 
 The table below identifies the winning and losing hegemons in the wake of 
each shock. Identifying their regime types also makes a prediction about what type 
of institutional wave we should expect. For example, the joint victory by the US 
and USSR in World War II would lead us to expect two waves of reforms, one 
toward democracy and another toward communism – which is indeed what 












WWI US democracy Germany monarchy 
Great 
Depression 
Germany fascism US democracy 
WWII US, USSR democracy  
communism 
Germany, Japan fascism 
Soviet 
collapse 
US democracy USSR communism 
Table 1.1: Hegemonic shock outcomes. 
 
  
 In each of the four cases the content of the waves produced by the shocks are 
consistent with the expectations of the theory. The sudden rise of a great power 
produced waves of reforms that reflect that state’s regime, while periods of sudden 
decline produced waves away from the hegemon’s regime. The outcomes of these 
shocks consecrate the regimes of wining hegemons and discredit the losing 
regimes. They do so through the mechanisms of hegemonic coercion, influence, 
and emulation - and it is to a description of these mechanisms that I now turn. 
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Mechanisms in International Relations Theory 
 
 The emphasis on mechanisms stems from the limitations of social science 
theory. Systemic theories are bound to encounter exceptions and anomalies; as 
Jervis points out, their biggest weakness is underestimating the power and 
autonomy of even weak states.24 In pursuing a systemic explanation of institutional 
waves, my goal is not to formulate a universal theory of democratization but to 
highlight the recurring mechanisms through which shocks consistently lead to 
waves. Each wave examined in this dissertation has contained common patterns 
that have recurred across time. History does not repeat itself, as Mark Twain 
declared, but it does rhyme, and these rhymes reveal themselves in the 
mechanisms that produce institutional waves. Jon Elster defines mechanisms as 
“frequently occurring and easily recognizable causal patterns” that are less general 
than laws but more general than descriptive case studies.25 Residing at the middle 
level of explanation between universal laws and descriptive case studies, 
mechanisms open up the black box of causation by providing “a continuous and 
contiguous chain of causal or intentional links”.26 As Charles Cameron puts it: 
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We are interested in something less than natural laws, because there 
aren’t any natural laws in social science - just people making 
decisions and trying to live their lives. But even if there aren’t any 
natural laws, things are not completely random. There is a logic to 
campaigning for office, voting in legislatures, directing bureaucracies, 
offering and accepting bribes, making revolutions and initiating wars, 
and so on….The causal mechanisms are the little engines driving the 
empirical regularities.27 
 
 As Gleditsch and Ward point out, “Merely attributing democratization or 
autocratization to some ‘international context’… explains little without clarifying 
the relevant international context and how this influences prospects for 
democracy.”28 Mechanisms move beyond aggregative empirics to elucidate the 
concrete ways in which hegemonic shocks produce institutional waves.  
Hegemonic Shocks and Mechanisms of Coercion 
 The first way in which shocks lead to waves is by increasing opportunities for 
external impositions. By producing stark but temporary disparities in relative 
power, shocks create windows of opportunity for rising hegemons to impose their 
regimes on other states.  By contrast, in instances of hegemonic decline shocks 
weaken the hegemon’s ability to sustain foreign regimes upheld by force. Examples 
of coercive transformations that contributed to institutional waves include the 
Soviet takeover of Eastern Europe and North Korea after World War II, or the 
American occupation of Japan and Germany until 1952 and 1955, respectively. 
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 Shocks lower the costs of occupation, in two ways. In cases of military shocks, 
when the army has already been mobilized, the fixed cost of mobilization required 
for foreign occupation has already been met. Interventions after major wars occur 
at a time when the rising hegemons are not only at their most powerful and most 
committed to changing the global order - but also when they are most able to do 
so. Second, since shocks suspend the normal rules of the international order, they 
may provide a window of legitimacy for foreign military occupations.  In his book 
Embracing Defeat, the historian John Dower has argued that the success of the U.S. 
occupation of Japan after World War II was shaped at least in part by the nature of 
the war that proceeded it, and the decisive defeat that brought the war to an end.29 
The U.S. occupation of Germany encountered no native opposition at least in part 
due to the nature of the war and the total defeat that accompanied its conclusion. 
Likewise, the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe in the early aftermath of World 
War II was legitimized in part by the nature of the Soviet victory in that conflict. 
These factors simply do not come into play with interventions that occur in the 
absence of major interstate wars.  
 Stalin’s remark about the division of Europe after World War II is a distillation of 
the coercive aspect of post-shock reforms: “Whoever occupies a territory also 
imposes on it its own social system. Everyone imposes his system as far as his army 
can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”30 
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 An obvious objection is that democracies have not always sought to impose 
their own regimes through the use of outside interventions. As Peceny puts it, “the 
practice of the liberal great powers over the past century is filled with illiberal 
behavior…The United States has backed dozens of dictatorial regimes over the past 
century and only made active efforts to promote democracy during a third of its 
20th century military interventions.”31 Likewise, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) 
have argued that democracies prefer to establish stable and friendly regimes - 
rather than democratic ones - in the countries that they have occupied.32 
 These studies, however, do not distinguish between impositions that occur in 
the wake of hegemonic shocks and those that occur in the course of “normal” 
politics. If the above arguments are correct, military hegemonic shocks should 
create a marked increase in instances of hegemons imposing their own regimes on 
other states (“mimetic” imposition). In other words, we would expect to see spikes 
in mimetic regime promotion by great powers in the closing months and 
immediately following both world wars. This effect can be tested directly by 
looking at the rate of coerced regime promotions after military shocks. As I show in 
the next chapter, the data in fact confirms that great powers act differently after 
shocks. Using a dataset by John Owen (2010), I examined the rates of mimetic 
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imposition by great powers. As Figure 1.6 shows, mimetic regime impositions by 










Figure 1.6: Mimetic regime imposition by great powers, 1900-2000. 
 
 An empirical analysis of twentieth-century interventions show great powers are 
much more likely to promote their own regimes in the wake of shocks – of the 31 
cases of hegemonic intervention during shock years, in 29 of them they promoted 
their own regimes (about 94 percent) of the time. 33 Of the 41 cases of hegemonic 
intervention during non-shock years, they imposed their own regime in 27 cases 
(about 66 percent). In other words, in an average shock year there were 4.8 
mimetic impositions by a great power, and only 0.28 such impositions in an 
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average non-shock year.34 
 In short, great powers do act differently after hegemonic shocks. They are more 
likely to impose regimes during hegemonic transitions, and when they do so they 
are much more likely to impose their own regimes than during non-shock years. 
The reasons for this, as suggested above, stem from the temporary decrease in the 
costs and changed conditions for regime impostions that occur in the wake of 
hegemonic shocks. 
 Recent studies suggest important causal links between external impositions, 
interstate wars, and systemic peace. Lo, Hashimoto and Reiter (2008), for example 
find that peace is more durable following interstate wars in which the loser 
experience a foreign-imposed regime change.35 Future studies about the 
democratizing effects of foreign interventions will benefit from distinguishing 
interventions that take place in the wake of hegemonic shocks from those that do 
not.  
Hegemonic Shocks and Mechanisms of Influence 
 
 Another mechanism by which shocks produces institutional waves is by 
changing the institutional preferences and power bases of domestic actors within 
the affected countries. Immediately after World War II, for example, Communist 
parties appeared to be gaining ground in France and Italy. The US Marshall Plan 
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shifted the institutional preferences of Western European voters away from 
communism and toward liberal democracy, so that by 1948, with the influx of 
American money and institutional infrastructure, Communist parties had lost much 
of their support. “The United States spent little of its hegemonic power trying to 
coerce and induce other governments to buy into American rules and institutions,” 
notes Ikenberry. “It spent much more time and resources trying to create the 
conditions under which postwar European governments and publics would remain 
moderate and pro-Western.”36  
 The Marshall Plan became the most prominent way in which the United States 
exercised its influence and promoted liberal democratic regimes in the years 
following the war. It was an unprecedented use of post-shock economic 
dominance to secure the democratization of west European regimes that followed 
the American institutional model. By the end of the program in 1952, the United 
States had spent $13 billion, more than all previous American foreign aid put 
together. The largest impact of the Marshall Plan resided not with the amount of the 
disbursements but with the conditions attached to them. Along with collaborators 
in western Europe, U.S. aid officials sought to prevent national politicians “from 
being tempted to fall back on state intervention, planning, and closed 
economies.”37 In doing so, Marshall aid nudged center-left parties toward social 
democracy rather than communism. It was “an economic program but the crisis it 
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averted was political,” writes Tony Judt.38 
 The impact of Marshall aid on the consolidation of democracy in western 
Europe was both immediate and long-lasting. In Austria, for example, local 
communists (supported by Soviet forces, who still occupied the eastern half of the 
country) “never made any dent in the popularity of Americans and their aid,” notes 
Judt. “[T]he latter put food in people's mouths and this was what mattered most.” In 
Greece, the $649 million in aid extended in the spring of 1948 “made the 
difference between survival and destitution.” It “supported refugees and staved off 
hunger and disease,” and provided half of the country’s gross national product in 
1950.39 Across Europe, it reduced the attraction of Soviet-style reforms and 
communist institutions by providing a means for general economic recovery. The 
democratic wave in western Europe was made possible by the rare combination of 
American influence and commitment (both political and economic) in the years 
immediately following the war.  
 The aftermath of World War II also provided a dramatic illustration of how 
rising great powers can take advantage of hegemonic shocks to advance the 
construction of global institutions which act as conduits for their influence. While 
institution-building is normally a slow and inertia-driven process, the brief period 
after hegemonic shocks facilitates the creation of new international institutions. By 
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establishing dramatic new hierarchies in international politics, shocks create 
opportunities for great powers to create new global and regional orders. Thus in the 
wake of the war, both the Soviet Union and the United States used their enormous 
power and influence to construct a new institutional architecture that helped them 
perpetuate control and influence over the states embedded within it. 
 Conversely, in cases of hegemonic decline, shocks undermine the hegemon’s 
ability to wield influence in other states through aid, patronage networks, or 
international institutions. In doing so they shifted the institutional preferences of 
domestic groups in those states. For example, the collapse of the Soviet Union led 
to the demise of communism as a viable path for state development in Africa. The 
collapse of the Soviet Union undercut the legitimacy of its institutions and its ability 
to attract fellow travelers. International financial institutions and bilateral donors 
became more interested in supporting accountable government, and the stoppage 
of Soviet patronage damaged the neo-patrimonial elite networks. Governments 
were faced with shrinking funds, and were forced to cut social spending, which led 
to an increase in popular protests, which (along with elite defection) led to political 
liberalization and multiparty elections.40  In this way, systemic and domestic factors 
interacted to produce a wave of African democratic reforms in the mid-1990s: 
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Figure 1.7: Soviet collapse and African democratization in the mid-1990s 
 
  
In other cases, shocks may produce shifts in institutional preferences even without 
direct hegemonic involvement. The very existence of a global crisis can influence 
some states to undertake serious internal reforms by mobilizing domestic groups 
and lowering the barriers to collective action. They may discredit incumbent elites, 
forcing them to bargain with the masses, or encourage states to look for new 
institutions to deal with future problems.41 In a case study that I examine in more 
detail in Chapter 3, the outcome of World War I led to organizational gains by 
women and laborers because their cooperation was essential for the victorious 
outcome, leading to a wave of suffrage expansion after the war. 
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Hegemonic Shocks and Mechanisms of Emulation 
 A third way through which shocks create institutional transformations is by 
encouraging states to deliberately imitate the domestic institutions of the winning 
hegemons. I define institutional emulation as the process whereby a state 
deliberately and voluntarily imitates particular domestic institutions of successful 
and powerful states.  
 Although emulation has long been associated with norms, institutional 
emulation is driven by the logic of competition in the international system. While 
this aspect of neorealism has rarely been explored, emulation is one of the major 
predictions of neorealist theory. Because the international system is competitive 
and anarchically structured, it will select for states that are able to successfully 
ensure their own security. Those who do not will fall by the wayside.42 In addition, 
the international system shapes behavior through socialization, and the two 
processes are mutually reinforcing – “statesmen learn because they see the 
misfortunes of those who do not conform”.43 The anarchy of the international 
system creates competitive pressures that over time select for domestic institutional 
arrangements that appear successful to other states. In a competitive world, we 
would expect to see institutions that increase the state’s chances of survival (by 
fostering economic growth, increasing internal stability, or winning wars) to spread, 
while institutions that perform poorly and endanger the state’s chances of survival 
will lose credibility. To employ Waltz’s own oligopoly metaphors: saying that the 
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insides of states don’t matter because structure dominates decisions is akin to 
saying that a firm’s internal organization does not matter because the market 
dominates decisions. When it comes to rewarding or punishing state institutions, 
the international structure will select certain institutional features of states over 
others.  
 The few materialist accounts of emulation in international relations have 
focused on military emulation. For example, Resende-Santos examines the causes 
of military emulation in South America in the 19th century. 44Starting in the 1880s, 
South American countries began imitating various elements of the German army 
system. In seeking an explanation for this imitation, Resende-Santos rejects 
domestic factors. The cultural, political, historical or institutional features of those 
states were too diverse to explain such convergence. Instead, he argues, the causes 
of military emulation can be located in the international system, specifically in the 
external security environment that all states must face. Cross-national emulation, he 
argues is “a product of the underlying nature of the international system, not the 
peculiar characteristics or aims of individual states.”45 
 Emulation is thus a strategy that can increase the adopting state’s security. It 
does so in two ways, through internal strengthening and external bandwagoning. 
(Resende-Santos focuses only on the first element and, as I will argue shortly, does 
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so for the wrong reasons.) First, emulation can be used to strengthen the state 
against both internal and external threats. Emulating states hope to repeat some of 
the rising hegemon’s dramatic success and in doing so improve their own 
institutional fitness. Discussing the adoption of free trade policies based on the 
British model during the 1850s, a deputy in the French National Assembly asked: 
"When such a powerful and enlightened nation not only puts such a great principle 
into practice but it is also well known to have profited by it, how can its emulators 
fail to follow the same way?”46 In that sense institutional emulation is a strategy of 
internal strengthening.  
 Second, imitating a more powerful peer can allow a state to curry favor with it 
and to participate in the international system that the hegemon creates and 
maintains. From that perspective, emulation is a strategy of external bandwagoning, 
though a looser one than signing treaties or forging official alliances. As Markoff 
puts it, “Weak states depend on stronger ones and may bid for favor by mimicking 
their political structures.”47 The unique advantage of emulation is that it can enable 
the adopting state to balance and bandwagon simultaneously. 
 But emulation, as the diffusion of best practices, is an ongoing fact of history. 
Why should hegemonic shocks make such emulation more likely?  Shocks 
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temporarily intensify the dynamics of emulation by removing uncertainty about 
rthe relative effectiveness of competing regime types. Despite the potential benefits 
of reforms, leaders face considerable uncertainty when choosing to rebuild their 
domestic institutions. Shocks encourage institutional emulation by dramatically 
demonstrating which regime types perform better under duress. In bargaining 
theory, war is said to reveal private information about actors' capability and 
resolve, information that cannot be credibly verified through bluffs and cheap talk 
before the fight. Similarly, hegemonic shocks reveal information about the relative 
strength of competing regime types, information not credible through cheap talk.48 
Hidden vulnerabilities become obvious; failed institutional models lose their 
legitimacy; the giant’s clay feet are revealed for all to see. 
 During the Cold War, for example, both sides extolled the virtues of their 
regimes to encourage third-world converts. But the true condition of Soviet 
domestic institutions, and the country’s ability to uphold a communist system 
outside its borders, did not become apparent to world audiences (and most 
scholars) until after the system’s dramatic collapse in 1989. Similarly, both world 
wars offered a large-scale test of war-fighting effectiveness between democratic and 
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non-democratic states. In both cases the democratic side (and in one case the 
communist side as well) triumphed, despite de Tocqueville’s oft-repeated assertion 
that democratic regimes would prove inferior to centralized ones on the theater of 
battle.49  
 Emulation does not guarantee success. As Resende-Santos puts it, “borrowed 
best practices may or may not prove effective… because of faulty copying, failure 
to copy ancillary practices, inability to integrate properly and utilize methods, or 
simply the lack of the necessary human skill and know how. 50 Another source of 
failed emulation, I would argue, is the skewed incentives that arise as a result of 
hegemonic shocks. Emulation is in some sense the least “rational” mechanism 
through which hegemonic shocks contribute to institutional waves. Institutional 
mimicry after shocks can be  driven by a number of misleading cognitive heuristics. 
Research in political psychology has repeatedly shown that statesmen and political 
actors tend to over-emphasize dramatic events (availability bias), over-estimate the 
importance of recent events in lieu of a “historical” perspective (recency bias), and 
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misjudge their own effectiveness at bringing out the desired political reforms.51 
These cognitive biases contribute to the emulation of winning regime types in the 
wake of hegemonic shocks. But they also lead to the failed consolidations that 
follow, as leaders optimistically adopt democratic regimes even when the domestic 
pre-conditions (economic development, class coalitions) are not conducive to 
democratic consolidation.52 
 The outcomes of hegemonic shocks serve as signals about the effectiveness of 
competing regimes. Whether the signals are correctly interpreted, or whether they 
accurately reflect the factors the created the outcome, is a different matter. As 
Markoff puts it, “If organizations that have done well have accounting departments, 
soon all will, even if no one is sure that accounting departments made the leaders 
do well.”53 It is in this regard that I depart from the neorealist explanations of 
emulation. Resende-Santos, for example, argues that external threats make 
emulation more likely. “In the face of major threats, military emulation is the 
quickest and most dependable way to increase power and bolster security,” he 
writes. “Timing, pace, and scale will correspond with the timing and magnitude of 
external threats…the higher and more intense the threat level, the deeper and more 
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sustained the adverse shift in the external security environment, the more rapid and 
large scale the emulation.”54 But his own evidence suggests that emulation takes 
place immediately after major wars, not in the period preceding them. “In the 
military sphere, large-scale emulation often, but not exclusively, accompanies 
major wars”, he writes.55 “Accompanies” is slippery word, but Resende-Santos 
makes clear in the next sentence that he’s talking about the aftermath of wars: 
“…such wars often trigger significant changes in the local or international balance 
of capabilities, as well as alterations in the relative standing of states.”56 If “states 
emulate on the basis of proven effectiveness”57 as he argues, then that proof 
emerges only after the crisis is resolved. The specific timing and content of military 
emulation discussed by Resende-Santos suggests that states imitate winning 
techniques. Prussia, Austria and Russia copied the French after Napoleon’s 
victories. France emulated Prussia after its victory in the Franco-Prussian wars.58 
 My argument about emulation thus rejects a purely constructivist account based 
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on persuasion or socialization, but it also takes a slightly different view about its 
causes than the standard neorealist view. It is the reduction of uncertainty and the 
demonstration effects which accompany hegemonic shocks that spur waves of 
emulation, rather than the increased competition in the international system that 
precedes them.  And while the outcomes of hegemonic shocks reveal information 
about which systems function more effectively under duress, that information may 
not be applicable to other states. Nevertheless, the dramatic nature of hegemonic 
shocks encourages emulation in cases where regime consolidation is unlikely. 
 Although democracy has been the central model of emulation in recent 
decades, states have admired and mimicked a variety of other regimes, particularly 
those that had emerged triumphant in periods of hegemonic transition. The Soviet 
Union, for instance, inspired followers after World War II because “the Soviet 
Union’s victory over Nazi Germany, a country most observers had seen in 1939 
and 1940 as an industrial giant, suggested that the Soviet system had considerable 
real-world vigor.”59 Likewise, the decline of liberal capitalism in the 1930s led 
many states, including the United States, to move closer to the statist policies of the 
national socialists, who thrived and attracted followers during this period. As 
Schivelbusch notes:  
In the wake of global economic disaster, there was no particular 
reason to prefer the political system most closely associated with 
capitalism - liberal democracy - to new systems that promised a 
brighter future. On the contrary, people were more inclined to ask 
themselves whether democracy was inevitably doomed by the 
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economic breakdown of liberal capitalism.60  
 
 The triumphant narrative of democracy’s ascent in the twentieth century ignores 
those periods when capitalist democracy really did seem destined for the dustbin of 
history. 
 
From Transition to Consolidation 
 
 Why are waves of democracy often followed by counter-waves or reversals? As 
I’ve argued, the answer has to do with the dynamics of waves themselves. The 
unique circumstances that allow the wave to occur in the first place also sow the 
seeds of the wave’s decline. Hegemonic shocks create immense but temporary 
incentives and opportunities for regime transformations. Shocks bring together 
extraordinary pro-reform coalitions motivated by the desire to imitate the rising 
power or to ingratiate themselves in the international system it creates. 
Alternatively, they may have unsteady procrustean institutions imposed upon them 
by the winning hegemon. Motivated by rhetoric, fear, or gain, leaders adopt 
democratic institutions in states that lack the socio-economic pre-requisites for a 
stable democracy. In the immediate aftermath of the shock, these domestic pre-
requisites become less important, allowing for the creation of a wave of democratic 
transformations. 
 But the relative importance of systemic and domestic factors changes as the 
new regimes move toward consolidation. The international incentives that created 
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Figure 1.8 From transition to failed consolidation . 
 
  
 As time goes on, domestic factors increasingly begin to matter in maintaining 
these institutional reforms. The nature and composition of social coalitions, the 
domestic economy, and other factors traditionally associated with democracy 
begin to play a more important role. At least some of the transformations begin to 
fail as idiosyncratic, country-specific internal factors start to take hold. Such failed 
consolidations are particularly likely in the fragile new states created by the 
hegemonic shocks. Democratizing regimes face a number of obstacles that their 
more mature counterparts do not. They lack well-established traditions of 
democratic governance and are often plagued by fragile institutions that buckle 
under the weight of political tensions. They can fall prey to ethnic violence, to 
populist unrest, to cycles of civil war or government coups. Mansfield and Snyder 
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argue that new democracies are more prone to nationalism and aggression. This 
occurs because elites in democratizing states have an incentive to use nationalist 
rhetoric to shore up the support of the masses, and the fragile new institutions 
frequently collapse under their weight.61 In new states created by World War I, for 
instance, the spirit of compromise and consensus required for parliamentary 
governance could not be sustained in an environment of quarreling ethnic and 
social groups brought together in artificially bounded territories. The initial shock, 
in short creates the institutional equivalent of a stock market bubble, a period of 
“democratic over-reach” that produces an artificially high number of transitions. 
 This dynamic appears unique to cases of democratic waves. The consolidation 
of Communist regimes in eastern Europe, for example, was made possible only by 
the continued maintenance of the threat of coercion, occasionally reinforced by 
physical occupation. As soon as the coercive grip loosened, the unwilling members 
of the Soviet bloc dismantled communist institutions. In the case of fascism, it is 
difficult to discuss failures of consolidation because the entire wave crested and fell 
so rapidly in a space of less than fifteen years. But a large number of fascist regimes 
were also created and upheld by outside coercion - namely, the creation of a 
Festung Europa by German armies and the East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere by their 
Japanese equivalents.  
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 As mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, given the vast literature on 
democratization there have been surprisingly few attempts to explicitly examine 
the causes of democratic waves. Part of the problem stems from the literature’s 
focus on domestic variables, which tends to downplay the importance of factors 
like the international system or diffusion among states in shaping regime outcomes. 
Domestic theories of regime change have at various times focused on economic 
development, elite pacts, mass movements, civil society, party coalitions, electoral 
systems, national culture, federalism, ethnic and linguistic diversity, class relations, 
and civil-military relations – to name just a few of the more prominent 
explanations. As a result, while the trend of democratization has provided much 
fertile ground for theories of institutional change, democracy’s relationship with the 
international system remains largely unexplained, even if often noted. As a result, 
proponents of systemic explanations of democracy have often charged 
comparativists with neglect the international causes of democratization - what 
Pridham called the “forgotten dimension” of democratization.62 
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 The domestic variable bias in democratization studies stems partly from the 
history of the field itself. The first comparative studies of political development 
were rooted in the early democratic experiences of a few countries in Western 
Europe, particularly England and France. A common criticism of the early 
democratization literature was its implicit treatment of Europe as the “default” 
course of long-term institutional development.63 Later scholars expanded their 
European scope or else abandoned the continent entirely and focused on 
democratization around the world after the mid-nineteen-seventies, first in Latin 
America and later in Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. But while the subject area 
expanded, the method of examining the phenomenon remained the same – 
comparativist and reductionist, breaking down the global phenomenon of 
democratization into individual cases by country, or in some cases by region, and 
then attempting to find commonalities or patterns within those cases, while at the 
same time emphasizing the differences that set their country or region apart from 
others.  
 By century’s end democratic theory had become increasingly divided even as 
the number of democracies climbed to an all-time high. A 1994 review article 
accused comparative theories of producing unclear dependent variables, making it 
                                                
Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World” World Politics, Vol. 54.2, 
January 2002, p. 212-244. Beissinger notes: “…much of the comparative politics 
literature on democratization continues to treat cases as if they were entirely 
independent of one another and has failed to probe the consequences that might 
flow from change through example.” Mark R. Beissinger (2007) “Structure and 
Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/ 
Orange/Tulip Revolutions” Perspectives on Politics 5, p.260 
63
 Munck 1994 
  
44 
hard to compare results across studies. Their efforts at causal theorizing had 
generated a number of explanatory variables but few clearly specified general 
causal models. In some cases their empirical tests relied on a small set of variables, 
raising questions about generalizability and validity of the causal claims.64 An 
acerbic 1999 review of the literature by Barbara Geddes noted that “scholars have 
greeted the increasing number of democratizations with delight, intense attention, 
and theoretical puzzlement. It seems as though there should be a parsimonious and 
highly compelling explanation of the transitions, but the explanations proposed 
thus far have been confusingly complicated, careless about basic methodological 
details, often more useful as description than explanation, and surprisingly 
inconsistent with each other.”65  
 But within the past decade, partly as a response to this theoretical 
fragmentation, a small but growing body of literature has moved away from the 
comparative method. These studies build on the assumption that “democratization 
is driven at least partly by forces originating outside a country’s borders, rather than 
being a self-contained domestic process”.66  These “systemic” theories, as I have 
called them, emphasize the influence of the international environment and links 
among states in shaping domestic reforms. They sought to link external factors to 
domestic actors, who would not disappear from the analysis but serve as important 
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intervening forces between external influences and internal reforms. The 
fundamental assumption of a systemic approach, therefore, is that democratization 
often cannot be understood apart from examining the influence of the international 
system upon the choices of domestic actors in an environment of strategic and 
continuously interacting states characterized by competition, learning, and 
emulation. 
 Yet even most systemic theories of regime change do not address the puzzle of 
institutional waves directly. There exists, for example, a healthy debate on the 
merits and drawbacks of foreign aid as an external tool of domestic regime 
promotion. But the influence of foreign aid alone cannot explain the clustering of 
regime transitions without recourse to some other variables. In other words, even if 
foreign aid is indeed an important factor in regime transitions, the presence of 
waves suggests that the influence of foreign aid varies widely over time – and this 
itself is a puzzle that must be explained. 
 At the same time, hegemonic shocks are clearly not the only existing 
explanation for democratic waves. Alternative explanations that most closely fit the 





 The historical explanation denies (or at least does not engage) the possibility of 
a generalizable theory of democratic waves. This is the view taken by many 
historians, who stress the contingency and uniqueness of historical events. “Men 
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wiser and more learned than I have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a 
predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me,” writes H.A.L. 
Fisher in the preface to his “History of Europe. “I can see only one emergency 
following upon another...and only one safe rule for the historian: that he should 
recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and 
the unforeseen...”67 
 The historical type of explanation was also put forth by Huntington in the The 
Third Wave. Huntington argued that the famous “third wave” of democratization  
resulted from a combination of factors, both internal and external. These included 
actions by the Catholic Church and other powerful external actors, the loss of 
legitimacy among autocratic elites due to poor economic performance, economic 
modernization, and “demonstration effects”. I will not repeat the criticisms put 
forth in the very beginning of the chapter except to reiterate that Huntington, 
though no stranger to theorizing, did not seek to propose a theory of democratic 
waves as such, only to examine the causes of the last wave.  
 There is no doubt that history stubbornly resists the straitjacket of theory. “Many 
a beautiful theory,” wrote Thomas Huxley, “was killed by an ugly fact.” And the 
search for law-like regularities is indeed a fruitless one, since human society is far 
too complex to submit itself to nomological principles. But this does not mean that 
all attempts to theorize about the social world must be abandoned.  Jon Elster 
invokes the French historian Paul Veyne’s objection against grand theory. Suppose, 
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says Veyne, we wanted to provide a nomological explanation for the unpopularity 
of Louis XIV by invoking a general social science theory. We might start by looking 
for factors that seem most salient, beginning perhaps with the generalization “kings 
who impose high taxes become unpopular”. But in order to take care of 
counterexamples from other reigns and eras, the general statement will have to 
saddled with numerous caveats, exceptions, and qualifications, the final result of 
which is “a chapter in the history of the reign of Louis XIV with the amusing feature 
of being written in the present and the plural” rather than in the past tense and the 
singular.68 
 Yet Veyne conflates theory with nomological, covering-law statements, which is 
simply not the case in social science. As Waltz writes: 
Theories are qualitatively different from laws. Laws identify invariant 
or probable associations. Theories show why those associations 
obtain. Each descriptive term in a law is directly tied to observational 
or laboratory procedures, and laws are established only if they pass 
observational or experimental tests.69 
 
Because laws establish relations between variables (and in the natural sciences, 
often to a very precise degree), they can be obtained through induction alone and 
buttressed by the empirical evidence of repeated observations. But “theories cannot 
be constructed through induction alone, for theoretical notions can only be 
invented, not discovered”70 “No laws are possible in sociology, for the number of 
cases is far smaller than the number of variables effecting the outcome," writes 
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Michael Mann.71 In short, Veyne makes the mistake of thinking that facts determine 
theories, whereas in fact a number of theories can fit a given set of facts. Henri 
Poincaré made this point about the primacy of theory when he wrote in Science 
and Hypothesis: “Science is built up with facts, as a house is with stones. But an 
accumulation of facts is no more a science than a heap of stones is a house.”72 
Laws and theories are tightly connected in the natural sciences precisely because 
laws allow the creation of theories – a repeated observation leads to an attempt to 
explain it. But because there are no laws in the social sciences, theories can only 
be generated through carefully crafted assumptions, and then seeing if they hold up 
through creating testable hypotheses. Because social science theories always 
encounter exceptions and anomalies, their real test, as Waltz argues, is whether 
they tells us something useful about the world. If not, they should be rejected as a 
weak explanation of outcomes (as in fact almost all social science theories are).73 
The question then becomes not whether a theory is realistic, but whether it’s useful. 
In that sense, “theory is fruitful because it goes beyond the necessarily barren 
                                                
71
 Michael Mann, The Sources of Social power, vol.1; quoted in “Delving into 
Democracy’s Shadows” by Scott McLemme, The Chronicle of Higher Education, 
Sep.17 2004. http://chronicle.com/free/v51/i04/04a01001.htm 
72
 Henri Poincare, Hypothesis and Science. Online at http://spartan.ac.brocku.ca/ 
~lward/Poincare/Poincare_1905_10.html.  Stanley Hoffman makes a similar point: 
“Collecting facts is not enough…it is not helpful to gather answers when no 
questions have been asked first.” Stanley Hoffman, “International Relations: The 
Long Road to Theory” cited in John Lewis Gaddis (1992) “International Relations 
Theory and the End of the Cold War” International Security 17.3, p.14 
73
 See also Imre Lakatos (1970) “Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific 
Research Programmes” in Lakatos and Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of 
Knowledge, Cambridge University Press 
  
49 
hypothetico-deductive approach.”74  
 The result is that social science theories can only make general predictions. A 
theory of hegemonic shocks cannot predict individual cases of transition. As 
mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, it cannot account for all instances of 
democratization. It does, however, point to factors that make domestic reforms 
more likely in the wake of shocks. It makes testable predictions about the 
consequences of these shocks, and describes the concrete mechanisms that 
connect shocks to waves. It can be tested (as I do in this dissertation) through both 
empirical analysis and careful examination of case studies. A state that fails to 
democratize in the wake of a shock presents an anomaly but does not invalidate 
the theory. If, however, a sudden hegemonic transition in which a democracy 
emerges as a winner fails to create a wave of democratization, that would present a 
major – possible fatal – problem for the theory. In that sense, social science 
theories are falsifiable, but in a different sense than natural sciences theories, which 
can be invalidated with the discovery of a single black swan. Social science 
theories simplify the world by isolating the most salient factors. As such, they 
require both boldness and humility – the boldness of a simplifying assumption, and 
the humility of recognizing it as such. 
 With this aside in mind, I now move on to the two alternative theoretical 
explanations for democratic waves – bellicist theory and diffusion models. 
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 Bellicist theories examine the influence of interstate conflict and military 
competition on domestic institutions. Through their primary emphasis is on state-
building, they have direct implications for the evolution of domestic regimes. 
Because I discuss bellicist theories in detail in Chapter 3, here I limit myself to a 
few summary remarks.  
 First, bellicist theories ignore the effect of non-military crises on the propensity 
for institutional reforms. Second, explanations that focus on the influence of major 
wars upon state development are ambiguous about their effects on regime 
outcome. Much of the bellicist literature is concerned with the effects of 
mobilization on state development. An early example is the writings of Otto 
Hintze, who stressed that a country’s geopolitical environment affects its 
mobilization strategy, which in turn shapes its regime type. Hintze, a scholar of the 
Prussian state, argued that constant preparation for war led to a standing army and 
a centralized state, while relative safety within the international system, 
geographically defined by mountains and oceans, created the internal opportunity 
for democracy.75 According to this argument, then, mobilization for war – conflict 
or constant threat thereof – leads to centralization of authority and despotism, with 
the corollary that relative isolation from interstate conflict produces democracy.76   
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 But an opposing school of thought argues that mobilization for war produces 
democratic institutions. “Throughout history, warfare has been a major 
democratizing force,” argues Dankwart Rustow, “because it has made necessary 
the marshalling of additional human resources.”77 North and Weingast, for 
instance, have argued that warfare led to the need for increased revenue, which 
forced the monarchy to cede important political rights to the Parliament.78 In 
general, then, mobilizing for war can force states to grant rights to previously-
excluded social groups in exchange for their cooperation and increased revenue. 
 Finally, the extensive literature on democratic peace reverses the causal arrow 
by arguing that democracy creates peace through various institutional and 
normative mechanisms. And other studies find no visible connection between war 
and regime change.79  
 It may be that all of these arguments are true to some extent, but there is not 
much room for a coherent theory of institutional waves among the confused and 
endogenous causal arrows. In short, while bellicist theories can help explain the 
timing of waves (they happen in the aftermath of major wars), they cannot account 
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for the waves’ direction toward or away from democracy or other regime types. To 
account for the content of the waves, we must turn to the incentives produced by 




By far the most common factor used to explain democratic waves involves 
some variant of institutional diffusion. The study of diffusion in political science 
began in American politics, with Walker’s (1969) foundational work on the spread 
of policy innovations across American states.80 Later work has examined the spread 
of state lotteries tax policy, pre-legalization abortion policies, and education 
reforms. In international relations, diffusion is posited to be some factor that 
enables institutions or regimes to carry over across borders.  Huntington’s 
“demonstration effects” fall into this category of explanation. Much of this literature 
is empirically driven, and focuses on factors like networks, neighborhood effects 
and positive feedback.81 
These theories are systemic at heart because they refuse to treat individual 
cases of reform as isolated instances. Instead democratization is seen to take place 
in an environment of strategic and continuously interacting units. In some instances 
                                                
80
 Jack L. Walker (1969) “The Diffusion of Innovations among the States” American 
Political Science Review 63.3:880-99. 
81
 See, e.g., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, “Diffusion and the 
International Context of Democratization”, International Organization Fall 2006, p. 
911-933; Peter T. Leeson and Andrea M. Dean (2009) “The Domino Theory: An 
Empirical Investigation” American Journal of Political Science 53.3:533-51. Harvey 
Starr (1991) “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of 
Democracy in the International System” Journal of Conflict Resolution 35.2:356-81. 
  
53 
democratization can become a self-reinforcing process, creating waves of reforms. 
Much of this literature  focuses on examining the patterns of democratic diffusion 
via regional and global effects, often through very sophisticated quantitative 
techniques and spatial models. In a typical finding, Loughlin et al (1998) report 
“strong and consistent evidence of temporal clustering of democratic and 
autocratic trends as well as strong spatial association (or autocorrelation) of 
democratization.”82 And while statistically plausible, this result does not tell us 
much about the specific mechanisms that lead to diffusion. As Narizny points out, 
“These works focus on the spatial-temporal dynamics of regime transition, not on 
the agents, methods, or motives of change. As a result, their causal mechanisms are 
severely undertheorized.”83  
The current literature on diffusion in some ways resembles the early literature 
on democratic peace – an empirical regularity seeking a theoretical explanation. 
The most recent trend in studies of diffusion has been to move away from 
aggregative empirics and toward the concrete mechanisms that produce these 
cross-border effects.84 In a direct sense, that is also the goal of this dissertation. I 
thus don’t view diffusion theories as a competing alternative, but as a broad 
category of explanations that subsumes a variety of explanations for the cross-
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border spread of domestic institutions, including my own. The theory described in 
this dissertation is also a theory based on diffusion – although a specific type of 
diffusion that stems from the effects of hegemonic shocks. To explain the dynamics 
of this diffusion I focus on the causal mechanisms that lead to the spread of regimes 
associated with the rising hegemon. While diffusion may explain the direction of 
institutional reforms (neighbors follow neighbors, etc), it cannot explain the timing 
of institutional waves. To do so requires recourse to a more specific mechanism of 
diffusion – in this case, the timing is shaped by outcomes of hegemonic shocks. 
Diffusion is too broad a concept to suffice as an explanation for democratic waves. 
Theories of waves should connect external influences to domestic reforms via 
concrete causal mechanisms, and show specific instances in which these 
mechanisms operate. That is my goal in the remainder of these pages. 
 
The Plan of the Dissertation 
 
 The rest of the dissertation proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 empirically tests the 
relationship between hegemonic shocks and domestic institutional change through 
large-n statistical analysis. This chapter will begin by defining and operationalizing 
my variables, stating hypotheses, and then testing them with OLS and fixed-effects 
regressions. The goal of this chapter is to examine the general patterns of the 
relationship between hegemonic volatility and institutional waves at the systemic 
level, and domestic reforms at the country level. I then compare how my systemic 
explanation fares next to purely domestic statistical models. 
 Next, chapters 3 through 5 offer case studies of the first three hegemonic shocks 
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of the twentieth century – World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II.  
Each of these shocks produced waves of reforms that differed in their duration, 
intensity, and content. The three chapters employ process-tracing and comparative 
historical analysis to trace the effects of each shock on specific institutional 
changes in countries around the world. While there is a large secondary literature 
on the causes and effects of these shocks, and likewise a large literature on the 
evolution of domestic regimes over the twentieth century, there is surprisingly little 
overlap between the two. One of the goals of this dissertation is to bring the two 
together in order to re-examine the domestic transformations of the past century 
through the prism of hegemonic shocks. Chapter 3 examines the short-lived 
democratic wave that followed World War. Chapter 4 examines the crisis of 
Western capitalism in the Great Depression, and the shift away from liberal 
democracy it produced in Europe and elsewhere. Chapter 5 examines the two 
institutional waves following World War II, when both the US and the USSR 
oversaw two distinct waves of transformations toward their respective regime types.   
 Finally, Chapter 6 concludes and summarizes, and discusses the theory’s 
implications for the current and future state of international relations. The financial 
crisis that began in 2008 re-awakened many of the same fears that observers 
expressed in the 1930s. Does state capitalism, as exemplified by the rise of China, 
present a new institutional bundle, and a new challenge to democracy similar to 
the earlier challenges of communism and fascism? And how would a future shock 
affect the pattern of regime transformations, particularly if the 2008-9 financial 
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crisis undermines the strength and legitimacy of democratic capitalism? This 
chapter will also discuss the implications for the U.S. policy of external regime 






















This chapter examines the relationship between hegemonic power and the spread 
of democracy using large-n statistical analysis. Serving as a complement to the case 
studies, the goal of this chapter is to examine the general patterns of the interaction 
between hegemony and regime change across the international system in the years 
between 1900 and 2000. A multivariate regression model that tracks changes in the 
hegemonic power of the United States reveals that it has a strong positive effect on 
democratization both at the systemic level and within individual countries, even 
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when controlling for other factors traditionally associated with democratization1. 
Additionally, sudden changes in the hegemonic power of fascist Germany and 
communist Soviet Union are strongly and negatively associated with decreases in 
the average level of democracy within countries and in the international system as 
a whole. These results are robust to a number of specifications, model variations, 
and measures of democracy.  
I begin by defining my main dependent and independent variables, democracy 
and national power. I also discuss the definition and measurement of the salient 
transformations of these variables, namely democratic waves and shares of 
hegemonic power (and shifts in the levels of hegemonic power). After a brief 
overview of systemic patterns (which show very strong support for an association 
between hegemonic power and levels of global democracy), I introduce other 
control variables commonly associated with democratization. This allows for the 
creation of a multivariate model that tests domestic arguments on their own terms 
while adding a new variable suggested by hegemonic shock theory. Changes in 
hegemonic power are shown to have a substantively and statistically significant 
effect on democratization both inside countries and around the world as a whole. 
In short, this chapter suggests that the comparative literature on democratization 
often suffers from an omitted variable bias, and that future studies of democracy 
and other regime reforms should take into account the effects of the rise and 
decline of hegemonic power.  
                                                
1 In the model, these include economic development, cross-border diffusion effects, 
regime history, geographic region, colonial history, and national culture. 
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Defining Democracy  
 Robert Dahl (1971) has influentially argued that the two core attributes of 
democracies are contestation (competitive elections for political leaders) and 
participation (broad and inclusive access to voting).2 This is the definition I adopt 
here.3 Given the above, the first question is whether democracy should be 
measured as a dichotomous or a continuous variable. Przeworski et al (2000) offer 
a high-spirited defense of a dichotomous measure.4 Their argument can perhaps 
best be summarized by the words of writer Amiri Baraka (1962): “A man is either 
free or not. There cannot be any apprenticeship for freedom.”5   
There is, however, a wide variation among democracies in the level of 
individual freedom and electoral participation. Donnelly (2000) suggests a three-
point checklist for when a dichotomous variable may be preferable to a continuous 
one: when the dividing line is sharp and clear, when the grey area between the two 
                                                
2
 Robert Dahl (1971) Polyarchy, Yale University Press. See also Michael Coppedge, 
Angel Alvarez, Claudia Maldonado (2008) “Two Persistent Dimensions of 
Democracy: Contestation and Inclusiveness” The Journal of Politics 70.3, p. 632-
647. 
3 For a partial list of conceptualizations and measurements of democracy, see Gary 
Goertz (2006) Social Science Concepts: A User’s Guide, Princeton University Press, 
p.8-9. 
4 Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando 
Limongi (2000) Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being 
in the World, 1950-1990, Cambridge University Press. For another argument in 
favor of a dichotomous measures of democracy, see Mike Alvarez, Jose Antonio 
Cheibub, Fernando Limongi and Adam Przeworski (1996) “Classifying Political 
Regimes” Studies in Comparative International Development 31:3-36 
5 “Tokenism” in Kulchur, Spring 1962 
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cases is small, and when few important cases fall into that grey area.6 On these 
criteria, democracy fails to qualify on all three grounds. Likewise, Elkins (2000) 
empirically investigates whether democracy should be measured as a dichotomous 
or continuous variable. He concludes that overall, graded measures have “superior 
validity and reliability”.7 Since I am interested in domestic reforms rather than 
clear-cut cases of democratic transitions, a continuous measure of democracy is 
appropriate for both theoretical and empirical reasons. 
  
Measuring Democratization 
 I use the Polity IV index to measure the level of democratization. It is a 
continuous, internally consistent, and frequently-used measure of autocratic and 
democratic regimes which (unlike Freedom House, for example) covers the time 
span examined in the argument. Polity codes annual information on regime and 
authority characteristics for all independent states (with a population over 500,000) 
from 1800 to 2004. Regimes are measured on a scale from -10 (strongly autocratic) 
to +10 (strongly democratic), as measured by four components: regulation, 
competitiveness, and openness of executive recruitment and constraints on the 
                                                
6 Jack Donnely (2006) Realism and International Relations, Cambridge University 
Press, p. 88. Epstein et al reject a dichotomous measure of democracy on similar 
grounds. See David L.  Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen and 
Sharyn O'Halloran (2006) “Democratic Transitions” American Journal of Political 
Science 50.3: 551-569. Kellstedt and Whitten (2009) likewise argue that 
continuous variables are more appropriate in the case of democracy. Paul M. 
Kellstedt and Guy D. Whitten (2009) The Fundamentals of Political Science 
Research, Cambridge University Press, p. 96.  
7
 Zachary Elkins (2000) “Gradations of Democracy? Empirical Tests of Alternative 
Conceptualizations” American Journal of Political Science 44.2:287 
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chief executive. (To make analysis easier, I have recoded it on a scale from 0 to 
20). At the systemic level, I measured democratization as the total global average of 
Polity IV scores in a given system-year. At the level of regions or countries, 
democratization is measured by the region’s or country’s Polity IV score in a given 
year.  
A common criticism of Polity is that it focuses on the competition dimension of 
democracy at the expense of participation.8 The United States, for example, has 
received a perfect score since 1871, despite the enfranchisement of women (1920), 
African-Americans (de jure in 1869, but de facto in 1965), and citizens aged 18-
21(1971) since that period. For this reason, and as a check on the robustness of the 
results, I also include a measure of democratization called SIP, or the Scalar Index 
of Politics. SIP combines the executive restraint components of the Polity IV score 
with Vanhannen’s measure of popular participation, and is scaled from 0 to 1.9 
Since non-democratic regimes lack well-developed quantitative indices, and 
regime dummies were used to classify individual states as communist or fascist, 
and global levels of fascism and communism in the system were measured using 
the total power (as measured by CINC; see below) of communist and fascist states. 
(See Appendix 1 for regime classifications.) 
 
                                                
8 Geraldo Munck and Jay Verkuilen (2002) “Conceptualizing and Measuring 
Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices” Comparative Political Studies 35.1:5-34 
9 SIP is described and employed in Scott Gates, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and 
Håvard Strand (2006) “Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability: Polity 
Duration, 1800-2000” American Journal of Political Science 50.4:893-908. 
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 Variable Description Obs Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
pol Polity score  9596 9.68 7.30 0 20 
polch 1-year change in Polity 
score  
9341 0.04 1.75 -19 16 








sipch 1-year change in SIP 
score  
9084 0.00055 0.087 -0.95 0.96 
sipglobal Average annual global 
SIP level 
101 0.4233 0.0748 0.3106 0.6055 
polglobal Average annual global 
Polity level 
101 0.9.60 1.38 7.30 12.90 
totfasccinc Fascist share of global 
power 







totcomcinc Communist share of 
global power 
87 0.233 0.121 0 0.378 
Table 2.1: Measures of domestic regimes (dependent variable), summary statistics 
 
Measuring Institutional Waves 
Following Huntington’s definition of a democratic wave, I define an institutional 
wave as a group of transitions between two regime types that occur within a 
specified period of time and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite 
direction during that period.10 Although frequently equated with democratization, 
                                                
10 Huntington defines a democratic wave as “a group of transitions from 
nondemocratic to democratic regimes that occur within a specified period of time 
and that significantly outnumber transitions in the opposite direction during that 
period.” (Huntington 1991:15) I define institutions as mechanisms employed by 
states to deal with problems of enforcement, security, coordination, and credible 
commitment. They are public rules that organize relationships among individuals, 
groups, and states. This definition follows the historical-institutionalist approach. 
See Kathleen Thelen (1999) “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics” 
Annual Review of Political Science 2:369-404. On credible commitment via 
legislatures, see Douglass North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and 
Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 
Seventeenth-Century England." Journal of Economic History 49:803-832.  States 
employ and reform institutions to increase their external security and internal 
stability, not always successfully. Central banks, courts, electoral rules and social 
welfare programs are all examples of various state institutions. Institutions are not 
“normally distributed” across states in the system. Instead, certain combinations of 
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institutional waves have been associated with a variety of regimes throughout 
history. Some examples include the revolutionary Latin American wars of 
independence between 1810 and 1825, the communist wave in Asia following 
World War II or, reaching deeper into time, the spread of parliamentarianism 
across Europe during the thirteenth century.11 
 Since Huntington first described them, the notion of democratic waves has 
become widely accepted in the literature.12 Przeworski et al (2006) constitute the 
                                                
institutions occur more frequently than others. A regime, then, is defined as a 
bundle of inter-related institutions bound by an overarching ideology of the state. 
11 The Latin American wave included the South American Wars of Independence 
(1810-25), the Mexican War of Independence (1810-21), and the Central American 
Declaration of Independence (1821). The post-WWII communist wave included 
the Chinese civil war, the Korean War, the First Indochina War, the Huks’ uprising 
in the Philippines, and the Malayan War. The parliamentary wave followed the 
rapid rise in European population and long-distance trade between the 11th and 
13th centuries. As Palmer et al note, “nothing shows better the similarity of 
institutions in Latin Christendom, or the inadequacy of tracing the history of any 
one country by itself.” R.P. Palmer, Joel Colton, and Lloyd Kramer, A History of the 
Modern World to 1815, 9th edition, Knopf, 2002, p.35. 
12 E.g. Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward. (2006) "Diffusion and the 
International Context of Democratization" International Organization 60(4): 911-
933. Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge (2006) “Diffusion Is No Illusion: 
Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy” Comparative Political 
Studies 39:463-89 and many others in the growing literature on democratic 
diffusion and clustering (see chapter 1 for a brief overview); David Collier and 
Steven Levitsky (2009) “Democracy: Conceptual Hierarchies in Comparative 
Research” in David Collier and John Gerring, eds. Concepts and Method in Social 
Science, Routledge. As with many ideas in social science, it would be more correct 
to say that Huntington re-introduced rather than introduced the concept: an article 
from 1887, for example, mentions “the second European democratic wave, which 
first became visible in 1830 and culminated in the general upheaval of 1848.” 
Anson D. Morse (1887) “The Cause of Secession” Political Science Quarterly 2.3: 
482. (The first wave refers to the cluster of liberalization following 1789 in the 
United States, France, Poland, Netherlands, and Haiti). 
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most prominent dissenters. 13 They criticize Huntington for using a measure based 
on the percentage of democratic states, and find no evidence for waves when using 
the criterion of transitions rather than institutional changes. However, their analysis 
is problematic for two important reasons: first, they employ a dichotomous measure 
of democracy that conceals more subtle changes in levels of democratization; 
transitions measured with dichotomous variables are sensitive to where one makes 
the cut.14 Two, most importantly, their time of analysis is limited to the years 1950-
1990. Since two of the three democratic waves occur before their period, the 
failure to find evidence of waves is understandable.  
 Figure 2.1 tracks the average annual Polity IV and SIP scores since 1900. In 
both instances the path of democratization is characterized by waves and counter-
waves, with democratic peaks following the two World Wars and the Soviet 
collapse. (The two measures are highly correlated, as expected, but Polity 
consistently over-estimates the level of democracy in the system.) The waves also 
appear when using other metrics, such as the proportion of countries that are 
democratic, or the absolute number of democracies in the international system (See 




                                                
13
 Democracy and Development, p.40-45 
















Figure 2.1 Average global democracy, Polity and SIP scores, 1900-2000 




















Figure 2.2 Democracies as a proportion of all states (with democracies defined as 






















Figure 2.3 Total number of democratic states (with democracies defined as states 
with a Polity score of 7 or more) 
 
 The two major regime alternatives to democracy in the twentieth century – 
fascism and communism – have also spread and retreated in wave-like patterns. 
(Figures 2.5, 2.5, 2.6) A fascist wave swept Europe and other parts of the world in 
the 1930s, and a wave of Communist transitions followed the Soviet victory in 
World War II.  
Although non-democratic regimes lack well-developed quantitative indices 
like Polity, the global spread of fascism and communism can be estimated by 
charting the percentage of world power held by fascist and communist states since 
























































Figure 2.6: Number of fascist and communist states, as a proportion of all states in 
the international system 
 
The existence of these waves presents the central puzzle to be explained. I now 
turn to a discussion of a variable that offers such an explanation – shares of relative 
power held by hegemons of competing regime types. 
 
Defining National Power 
Power has remained a contested term in political science, even when confined to 
the narrower domain of relative national power.15 “The concept of political 
                                                
15 There is an extensive literature in international relations on the meaning and 
measure of national power. See Gregory F. Treverton, Seth G. Jones (2005) 
“Measuring National Power” RAND Conference Proceedings; available online at 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/2005/RAND_CF215.pdf; Ashley J. 
Tellis, Janice Bially, Christopher Layne, Melissa McPherson (2000) “Measuring 
National Power in the Postindustrial Age”, RAND; Kelly M. Kadera and Gerald L. 
Sorokin (2004) “Measuring National Power” International Interactions 30, 211-230; 
David Baldwin (1989) The Paradoxes of Power, Basil Blackwell; Richard J. Stoll 
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power,” wrote Hans Morgenthau, “poses one of the most difficult and controversial 
problems of political science.”16 As with other essentially contested concepts, a 
measure of relative national power should capture the features salient to the 
particular theory under consideration.17 In this case, relative national power means 
the power to coerce (to successfully impose regimes upon others), to influence 
through trade and patronage, and to inspire institutional imitators, which assumes a 
degree of success and attractiveness in the international arena. A suitable measure 
of relative national power would then focus on material resources that proxy for 
military and economic prowess.  
Both military and economic measures of national power are flawed in their own 
way.18 Economic measures underestimate the brute strength of highly militarized 
                                                
and Michael D. Ward, eds. (1989) Power in World Politics, Lynne Rienner; Michael 
Handel (1981) Weak States in the International System, Frank Cass; Kjell Goldmann 
and Gunnar Sjöstedt, eds. (1979) Power, Capabilities, Interdependence: Problems 
in the Study of International Influence, Sage Publications. For non-materialist 
approaches to the study of national power, see Michael Barnett and Raymond 
Duvall (2005) “Power in International Politics” International Organization 59.1:39-
75; Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, eds. (2005) Power in Global 
Governance, Cambridge University Press; Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. Williams, 
eds. (2007) Power in World Politics, Routledge; Rodney Bruce Hall (2003) “Moral 
Authority as a Power Source” International Organization 51.4:591-622. 
16
 Hans Morgenthau (1948) Politics Among Nations, Ch.1, New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf 
17
 David Collier and Robert Adcock (1999) “Democracy and Dichotomies: A 
Pragmatic Approach to Choices about Concepts” Annual Review of Political 
Science 2: 537-565. On the primacy of concept analysis and case selection for 
choosing methods of statistical inference, see Gary Goertz (2006) Social Science 
Concepts: A User’s Guide, Princeton University Press. On “essentially contested” 
concepts, see Walter Gallie (1956) “Essentially Contested Concepts” Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society 56:167-98. 
18 On the importance of the link between economic growth and military power, see 
Paul Kennedy (1987) The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and 
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regimes such as nineteenth-century Prussia. Military measures in turn 
underestimate economic powers like Japan or conceal potential economic 
inefficiencies within militarily powerful states like the Soviet Union.19 Thus a 
measure of state capability appropriate for measuring hegemonic capacity should 
capture the multi-dimensional nature of power in hegemonic transitions. 
I use the Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) to measure relative 
national power. CINC defines power as “the ability of a nation to exercise and 
resist influence”. Stipulating that power and material capabilities are not identical, 
the codebook nonetheless argues that “given their association it is essential that we 
try to define the latter in operational terms so as to understand the former.”20 CINC 
includes all states from 1816 to 2001 and incorporates six variables: total 
population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption (after 
1859), number of military personnel, and military expenditure. The variables fall 
into three categories of two variables each - demographic, industrial, and military.21 
                                                
Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000, Random House. See also Emilio Casetti (2008) 
“The Long-Run Dynamic of the Nexus between Military Strength and National 
Power: An Econometric Analysis” Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society vol. 
2008 
19
 This is particularly the case when military technology relies on technological and 
economic investment. The historian Martin Walker has persuasively argued that the 
lack of mass consumption in the USSR blunted the incentive for technological 
advancement, which in turn prevented the country from successfully competing 
with the United States in military technology. See Martin Walker (1995) The Cold 
War: A History, Henry Holt and Company. 
20 CINC Codebook, p.1; David J. Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey (1972) 
"Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965." p. 19-48 
in Bruce Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers, Beverly Hills: Sage 
21 Total population reflects the idea that “a large population can have a larger army, 
maintain its home industries during times of war, and absorb losses in wartime 
  
71 
Where data was missing and the change rate could reasonably be assumed to be 
uniform, figures were interpolated using linear regression.22 Each of these 
categories are subject to criticism, particularly, as Wohlforth puts it, the “implicit 
assumption that the wellsprings of national power have not changed since the 
dawn of the industrial age”.23 But while Wohlforth correctly proposes to expand the 
concept to include such measures as the number of patents granted or the number 
of internet hosts per 1000 people, these additions are inappropriate for the time 
frame of my analysis. Besides being an internally consistent measure that spans the 
required range of time, CINC is a widely-used measure in international politics, 
which aids in replicability. It is a multi-dimensional measure, capturing both the 
military and economic aspects of power inherent in my approach. Its emphasis on 






                                                
easier than a state with a smaller population.” (Codebook p.21) Urban population 
is a proxy for modernization: it is associated “with higher education standards and 
life expectancies, with industrialization and industrial capacity, and with the 
concentrated availability of citizens who may me mobilized during times of 
conflict.” (p. 27) 
22
 CINC Codebook, p. 2. Geographic components of power (island, peninsular, and 
land-locked states) were deemed too dyad-specific to be useful for cross-national 
comparison, because they look at the relationships among states instead of national 
characteristics. (p.3) Natural resources like arable land, climate, and other variable 
availability are, according to the authors, already reflected in the indicators. (p.3) 
23
 William C. Wohlforth (1999) “The Stability of a Unipolar World” International 
Security 24.1: 5-41. See also William C. Wohlforth (1987) “The Perception of 




 As I mentioned in the first chapter, the word “hegemon” is used ambiguously in 
the international relations literature. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a 
hegemon as “a leading or paramount power,” where “leading” implies the 
possibility of multiple such states, while “paramount” implies a single all-powerful 
entity. I adopt the former definition – in this dissertation, a hegemon refers to a state 
that comprises a “pole” in the international system.24 In that sense a hegemon as 
used here is a more exclusive term than the Correlates of War definition of a 
“major power”, but more inclusive than the single-state definition adopted by, for 
example, Gilpin (1981) or Mearsheimer (2001).25  
                                                
24 The first recorded usage in the OED, in 1904, implies several such states: “The 
hegemon of the western hemisphere is the United States.” 
25 The COW coding of major powers also omits countries during “shock years”, the 
very period when their fortunes would shape institutional waves. The full COW 
coding is USA 1898-2000; UK 1816-2000; France 1816-1940, 1945-2008, 
Germany 1816-1918, 1925-1945, 1991-2008, Austria-Hungary 1816-1918, Italy 
1860-1943, Russia 1816-1917, 1922-2008, China 1950-2008, Japan 1895-1945, 
1991-2008. Mearsheimer (2001), on the other hand, defines a hegemon as “a state 
that is so powerful that it dominates all the other states in the system”. John 
Mearsheimer (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, W.W. Norton and 
Company, p.40. (At the same time, Mearsheimer’s list of “the five dominant great 
powers of the past 150 years” (p. 169) is very similar to mine, so this may be a 
matter of semantics: United States 1800-1990; USSR 1917-1991; United Kingdom 
1792-1945; Germany 1862-1945; and Japan 1868-1945.)  
For other single-state definitions, see Robert Gilpin (1981) War and Change in 
World Politics, Cambridge University Press, p.29 and William C. Wohlforth (1993) 
The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions During the Cold War, Cornell 
University Press, p.12-14. William Fox (1944) defined superpowers as countries 
that possessed great capabilities and could challenge and fight each other on a 
global scale. In his view, in 1943 the US, the UK, and the USSR were superpowers. 
See William Fox (1944) The Super-Powers: the United States, Britain, and the 
Soviet Union—their responsibility for peace. Harcourt, Brace Co. In the dissertation 
I use the term “hegemon” and “great power” interchangeably.  
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The salient characteristic of a “pole” is that it is not merely a major power, but a 
leading state with the capacity to impose regimes, influence other great powers, 
and inspire institutional imitators. Following the general view that the system was 
multipolar until World War Two and bipolar until the Soviet collapse26, hegemons 
between the years 1816 and 2000 were labeled as: US 1898-2000; Russia/USSR 
1816-1991; Great Britain 1816-1945; France 1816-1945; Germany 1871-1945; 
and Japan 1905-1945.27 When testing the effects of hegemonic shocks in the 
multivariate model below, fascist hegemons (Germany and Japan) are restricted to 
the period 1933-1945, while the communist hegemon (that is, the USSR) is 
restricted to the period 1923-1990 – after all a hegemon cannot inspire institutional 
wave unless it possesses that set of institutions itself.  
 
Defining Shocks and Shares of Hegemonic Power 
 Shocks clarify the balance of power, and in doing so reveal the leaders of the 
international system. Theorists have argued that the balance of power is most 
transparent after major wars, since, as Gilpin writes, “a hegemonic war is the 
ultimate test of change in the relative standing of the powers in the existing 
system.”28 I expand on Gilpin’s idea of a hegemonic war to include non-military 
                                                
26 See, e.g., Waltz (1979) or Kennedy (1987) “The multipolar world of 1885 was 
replaced by a bipolar world as early as 1943.” (Kennedy 1987:197, orig. emphasis) 
27 A dataset extending beyond 2000 will have to grapple with the rise of China and 
(to a lesser extent) India, but I consider the period between 1991 and 2000 to be 
one of unchallenged American unipolarity.  
28 Gilpin (1981) fn.80 
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shifts in the balance of power. I define a hegemonic shock as a sudden shift in the 
distribution of relative power among the leading states in the international system.  
Since the definition of a hegemon was discussed above, here I will focus on the 
concept of a “sudden shift” in relative power. In the international relations 
literature, “shocks” have traditionally been defined in the same way that Justice 
Potter Stewart defined obscenity – we know them when we see them. In practice, 
this has meant defining certain pre-designated years as “shock years” and using 
dummy variables to separate them from non-shock years for the purposes of 
regression analysis. For example, Gates et al (2007) define shock years in their 
dataset as lasting from 1914–23, 1939–49, and 1989–96.  
To get a better grasp on sudden shifts in hegemonic power, I measured 
hegemonic volatility by summing the absolute values of annual changes in CINC 
scores among the hegemons. More precisely, hegemonic volatility (HV) for a given 
year t is defined by the formula: 
! 
HVt =




where n is the number of hegemonic states in a given year. This variable captures 
hegemonic shocks by tracking how quickly the distribution of relative power 
among major states changes over time. It is also an improvement on existing 
measures that use dummy variables for pre-designated shock years. The figure 
below shows hegemonic volatility smoothed over time (an average of that year’s 




Figure 2.7: Average Hegemonic Volatility (smoothed), 1900-2000 
 
There are three immediately visible spikes, falling approximately between 
1917-1922, 1940-1947 (with some reverberations continuing into the 1950s), and 
1989-1995. These represent my case selections of World War I, World War II, and 
the Soviet Collapse (a case study to be completed at a later date). Although it does 
not appear on the graph above, I have added another case, the Great Depression, 
for the following reasons. First, due to the way the CINC index is constructed, it is 
likely to underestimate economic change in favor of military and geopolitical 
factors. Second, consistent with the demands of the theory, even when measured 
via CINC relative U.S. power begins to decline beginning in the mid-1920s and 
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especially after 1929, while German power increases dramatically after Hitler’s 
ascent to power in 1933. (See Figure 2.8) The period of the Great Depression thus 
provides an important and unique case of a democratic hegemon in decline, 
offering greater variation on my dependent variable.  
 
Figure 2.8: US and German Power (measured by CINC), 1920-1940 
 
Total hegemonic volatility, however, is not an appropriate measure to account 
for the spread of democratization. While clarifying the case selection, hegemonic 
volatility conceals the upward and downward movements of different hegemonic 
regime types. The testable hypotheses that flow from examining hegemonic shocks 
focus on the rise and fall of individual great powers. Namely, we would expect a 
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rise in power of a democratic hegemon (in this case, the United States 1900-2000) 
to lead to increased democratization at the systemic and within-country levels. A 
decline in the power of the democratic hegemon, on the other hand, should lead to 
a decrease in democratization. Similarly, the rise and fall of the communist and 
fascist hegemons should lead to a rise and fall in the spread of communism and 
fascism. 
 
H1: Decline in relative power of a hegemon leads to a retreat in the hegemon’s 
regime type around the world.  
H1.1: The intensity of the decline affects the magnitude of regime retreat. 
 
Conversely: 
H2: A rise in the relative power of a hegemon leads to the spread of the hegemon’s 
regime type around the world.  
H2.1: The intensity of the hegemonic rise affects the magnitude of regime spread. 
 
To test these hypotheses, I created a measure called the hegemonic share of 
power for the state representing each regime type – democratic (the United States), 
fascist (Nazi Germany) and communist (Soviet Russia). In the case of the U.S., the 
share of hegemonic power was measured as a proportion of American power and 
total hegemonic power in a given system-year. In the case of Germany and the 
USSR, their hegemonic share was calculated similarly, but only for those years in 
which the hegemons actually represented the alternative regime types (USSR 1922-
1991, Germany 1933-1945), since these are the time periods salient to the theory 
at hand. I used a single hegemon to represent each regime type, since they were 
the leading representatives of their regimes that inspired others to follow suit, and 
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since it was their sudden rise and decline, as documented in the case studies, that 
drive the waves. As a robustness check, the regression results were also tested with 
an expanded definition of hegemonic shares – all democratic great powers (Britain, 
France, and the U.S.) instead of only the United States, and all fascist great powers 
(Germany and Japan). This operationalization was highly correlated with the one 
used here, and produced very similar results. (See footnote 33, below.) 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Shares of hegemonic power bounded by salient regime spans, United 







Variable Description Summary Statistics  
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
US share of hegemonic 
power (usshare) 
U.S. CINC score as a proportion of 
the total CINC of hegemonic states in 
a given system-year 
0.4868 0.1997 0.254 1 
Average US share of 
hegemonic power 
(avusshare) 
A 5-year average of the U.S. share of 
hegemonic power (current year plus 
the four previous years). 
0.4726 0.1800 0.2725 1 
Change in US share of 
hegemonic power 
(cgusshare) 
1-year change in the U.S. share of 
hegemonic power  









Average change of US share 
of hegemonic power 
(avchusshare) 
A 5-year average of change in the 
U.S. share of hegemonic power 
(current year plus the four previous 
years). Captures the overall trends 
associated with hegemonic shocks. 
0.0070 0.0274 -0.024 0.112 
German share of hegemonic 
power, 1933-45 
(grshare) 
German CINC score as a proportion 
of the total CINC of hegemonic states 
in a given system-year 
0.193 0.051 0.111 0.269 
Average German share of 
hegemonic power 
(avgrshare) 
A 5-year average of German share of 
hegemonic power (current year plus 
the four previous years). 
0.185 0.047 0.117 0.245 
Change in the German 
share of hegemonic power 
(chgrshare) 
1-year change in the German share of 
hegemonic power 








Average change in the 
German share of hegemonic 
power 
(avchgrshare) 
A 5-year average of change in the 
German share of hegemonic power 
(current year plus the four previous 
years). 
0.006 0.014 -0.025 0.023 
Soviet share of hegemonic 
power, 1922-1991 
(rushare) 
USSR CINC score as a proportion of 
the total CINC of hegemonic states in 
a given system-year 
0.374 0.143 0.133 0.566 
Average Soviet share of 
hegemonic power 
(avrushare) 
A 5-year average of the USSR share of 
hegemonic power (current year plus 
the four previous years). 
0.365 0.145 0.143 0.559 
Change in the Soviet share 
of hegemonic power 
(chrushare) 
1-year change in the USSR share of 
hegemonic power  








Average change in the 
Soviet share of hegemonic 
power 
(avchrushare) 
A 5-year average of change in the 
USSR share of hegemonic power 
(current year plus the four previous 
years). 
0.005 0.014 -0.026 0.050 
Table 2.2: Measures of hegemonic power, 1900-2000 (n=101 for US variables, 13 







A system-level analysis of the effects of hegemonic shocks suggests a strong 
relationship between the amount of relative power wielded by the hegemons and 
the spread of democratic, fascist, and communist states around the world. The U.S. 
share of hegemonic power is a strong predictor of global democracy at the systemic 
level. It has a strong and statistically significant effect on spread of democratization; 
for example, a 10% increase in the share of U.S. hegemonic power is associated 
with an increase in the global democratization average by nearly 0.7 points. (See 








U.S. share of 
hegemonic power 
(1900-2000) 




U.S. share of 
hegemonic power 
(1900-2000) 
Total average Sip score, excluding the US 0.272 
(0.026)*** 
Russian share of 
hegemonic power 
(1918-1991) 
Global proportion of power, communist states 




German share of 
hegemonic power 
(1933-1945) 














 The bivariate results are suggestive, but they cannot account for the influence of 
other factors on democratization, nor can they provide much evidence of a causal 
relationship between the two variables. Including GDP data in the results above, 
for example, has some significant effects on the coefficients. To account for such 
effects I constructed a multivariate model that incorporates variables commonly 
employed in major democratization datasets. The most significant finding of this 
chapter is that changes in hegemonic power have a substantively and statistically 
strong effect on democratization within individual countries, even when common 
covariates of democracy are taken into account. 
The first of these is economic development. The relationship between economic 
growth and political development is among the most robust findings in political 
science, although scholars continue to debate the precise mechanisms that connect 
the two. Economic development was measured by two factors – the log of per 
capita GDP, and the level of urbanization. Per capita GDP data was taken from 
Angus Maddison’s dataset of historical statistics. Urbanization was measured by as 
urban population (living in cities above 500,000 people) as a proportion of total 
population. Both population measures were obtained from the CINC dataset. In the 
regression model the two economic development variables were lagged by a year.  
Diffusion – the tendency for states to adopt the institutions of their neighbors – 
has also frequently been identified as a spur to democratization. Since diffusion 
forms an alternative explanation to hegemonic shocks, it is particularly important to 
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account for its influence in a statistical model. Diffusion was measured in two ways 
– as the country’s proportion of democratic neighbors for any given country-year, 
and a dummy variable coded as 1 if a country’s neighbor had transitioned to a 
democracy over the previous year. This data was obtained from the replication 
dataset by Gleditsch and Ward (2006).29 The diffusion variables, like the economic 
development variables, were lagged by a year. 
A state’s institutional history is also an important factor in shaping democratic 
development. The state’s institutional history was measured by two complementary 
variables – the number of years a country had existed with a democratic regime, 
and the number of years it had existed with an autocratic regime. This data was 
also obtained from Gleditsch and Ward (2006). 
A number of other factors have traditionally been associated with shaping 
democracy. The spread of democracy has varied with geographic regions (see 
Appendix 2 for a more detailed discussion). Regional data is important to capture 
because they control for “false diffusion.” As Brinks and Coppedge put it: “Any 
variable that favors countries being, becoming, or remaining democratic would, if 
regionally concentrated, lead to a region that appears to be more likely to be, 
become, or remain democratic; and this regional tendency could appear to be the 
product of democratic diffusion within the region.”30 Geographic data was coded 
by hand. Finally, colonial history and national culture were also coded by hand as 
                                                
29 Kristian Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward. (2006) "Diffusion and the International 
Context of Democratization" International Organization 60(4): 911-933. 
Replication archive available at http://privatewww.essex.ac.uk/~ksg/publ.html. 
30 Brinks and Coppedge (2006) 
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dummy variables. Five dummy variables were created to distinguish among former 
British, French, Portuguese, Spanish or Dutch colonies. (Of these, former British 
colonies are thought to have a consistently higher propensity for democracy.) A 
country was coded 1 if it had been one of those colonies, and 0 otherwise. Five 
dummies were also created to distinguish among predominantly Protestant, 
Catholic, Muslim, Greek Orthodox, and Buddhist countries, the country’s religion 
serving as a proxy for national culture. (Of these, predominantly Muslim countries 
are thought to have a consistently lower propensity for democracy.) Since the 
British colony and Muslim variables are the most theory-relevant, most regressions 
included only those two variables to avoid a including variables less salient for 
testing the theory. Data for colonial history and national culture was coded using 
data from the CIA World Factbook. Table 6 provides the summary statistics for 
these control variables (excluding the geographic and national culture dummies.) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max 
Per capita GDP 
(pcgdp) 
8116 4211 4592 218 42916 
Urbanization 
(urban) 
9860 0.170 0.16 0 1 
% democratic 
neighbors (pnbdem) 
9338 0.31 0.31 0 1 
Number of neighbor 
transitions to 
democracy (nbtd) 
9226 0.078 0.34 0 6 
Length of autocratic 
rule (autdur) 
9573 26.1 30.8 0 123 
Length of democratic 
rule (demdur) 
9573 8.4 19.5 0 123 
Table 2.4: Summary statistics, control variables. Geographic and national culture 




Multivariate Regression Results 
 Because my dependent variable is continuous, and the relationship between 
democracy and hegemonic power is posited to be linear, I employ an OLS model 
to examine the effects of hegemonic shocks. My independent variable in these 
models is the U.S. share of hegemonic power. The first model uses just one 
additional control variable, the log of per capita GDP in thousand of dollars, lagged 
by one year. The main independent variable is statistically and substantively 
significant (as it is in the other model variations). A ten percent increase in the 
share of US power is associated with a 0.68 rise in the average country’s Polity 
score.  
 The second model adds variables that control for regional and neighborhood 
diffusion. These include two measures of neighborhood diffusion: a dummy 
variable that measures whether a neighbor transitioned to a democracy in the 
previous year, and the percent of a country’s democratic neighbors (also lagged by 
a year). It also includes regional dummies to account for regional diffusion (not 
shown; see Appendix 2 for an expanded discussion of regional variation). Model 3 
adds regime duration to the control variables in Model 2, in order to account for 
institutional inertia within countries. Previous research has shown that experience 
with democracy affects the success of democratization. Institutional history is 
measured by the number of years a country has experienced democracy and 
autocracy. Model 4 adds variables that account for colonial history (a series of 
dummies for British, French, Portuguese, Spanish, and Dutch colonies; not shown) 
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and a measure of political culture (proxied by dummies that indicate a Protestant, 
Catholic, Muslim, Greek, or Buddhist/Confucian religious dominance; not shown). 
Finally, Model 5 uses the control variables in Model 4 but uses change in US share 
of hegemonic power as the main independent variable (the derivative of the level 
of the US share of hegemonic power). As before, an increase in the change of share 
of US power is associated with an increase in the average global level of 
democracy. 
 
Table 2.5: Country-level effects of hegemonic power. All variables measured 1900-
2000. DV is Polity score, rescaled to 0-20. * significant at the 90% level; ** 
significant at the 95% level; ***significant at the 99% level 
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As the below results show, the share of U.S. hegemonic power, and changes 
within it, have a significant effect on democratic development under a number of 
different specifications, and using a variety of control variables. The U.S. share of 
hegemonic power appears to have an effect at the individual country level, and this 
effect remains significant even when all other variables are included. In line with 
expectations, economic development and diffusion effects are also consistently 
significant, as is regime history. Regime duration, under both autocracy and 
democracy, is statistically significant and with the expected coefficient signs. 
Geographic dummies, colonial history and national culture vary in significance 
(they have been omitted from the display to simplify the presentation.)31 The share 
of US power, and changes within that power (whether on a year-to-year of five-
year basis), remains significant under a number of robustness checks, including 
robust standard errors, and when a lag of the dependent variable is included in the 
analysis.32 It remained significant for both measures of democracy, the Polity and 
the SIP score. The models were also run using an alternative measure of  
hegemonic change – instead of focusing on a single hegemon to represent each 
                                                
31 In general, French, Spanish and Portuguese colonies have negative coefficients; 
British and Dutch colonies have positive but statistically insignificant coefficients.  
32 Including a lag of the dependent variable is not generally recommended because 
it is highly correlated with the DV and inflates the r-squared. It can be used as a 
robustness check, however, since it “soaks up” a lot of the variance and can reveal 
which variables remain significant when the lag is included. 
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regime type, measures of hegemonic shares were expanded to included other great 
powers with that regime type.33 
 To control for the persistent institutional inertia within individual countries, 
Model 5 was re-run with fixed effects, yielding the results below. 
 Democracy 
Model 
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power) 






















































Table 2.6: Model 5 from Table 2.2 with fixed effects.  
                                                
33 To do so I created a variable called demshare, which included the share of 
hegemonic power of the democratic great powers – the U.S., Britain, and France; 
and fascshare, which included the share of hegemonic power of Germany and 
Japan between the years 1933-1945. Since the USSR was the only communist great 
period during this period, this variation was not necessary for communist regimes. 
Demshare had a similar effect on the average level of democracy as the U.S. share, 
and was substantively and statistically significant in the model variations used 
above. (Not surprisingly, since the correlation coefficients between usshare and 
demshare was 0.67) Likewise, when fascshare is substituted for grshare in the fixed-
effects model, the coefficient is negative (as expected) and statistically significant at 
the 95% confidence interval. 
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 As in the previous results, the salient independent variable remains 
substantively and statistically significant. Similarly, when the shares of Soviet or 
German hegemonic power are substituted as the main independent variable, their 
coefficients are large and statistically significant but negative, as the theory 
predicts.34  
 
Testing the Effects of Hegemonic Coercion 
 The effects of hegemonic shocks on the likelihood of regime coercion can be 
tested directly by looking at the rate of coerced regime promotions after military 
shocks. In theory, military hegemonic shocks should create a marked increase in 
instances of hegemons imposing their own regimes on other states (“mimetic” 
imposition). In other words, we would expect to see spikes in mimetic regime 
promotion by great powers in the closing months and immediately following both 
world wars. 
To test this hypothesis empirically requires some measure of coercive regime 
promotion (CRP). Measurement is slightly complicated by the fact that there are 
two equally valid ways to count these cases – the number of promoters or the 
number of targets. First, we might add up the number of states imposing regimes 
upon others, then see how many of those states are hegemons, and then see how 
many of those hegemons were imposing their own regimes. Second, we might add 
                                                
34 As a robustness check, the fixed-effects models were run with two variations of 
the main independent variable: a one-year change in the level of hegemonic 
power, and the average five-year change in the share of hegemonic power. These 
models were also run with a lag of the dependent variable on the right-hand side. 
In all cases, the main independent variable remained statistically significant. 
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up the number of states experiencing or undergoing CRPs, then see how of those 
cases involve hegemons, and how many cases in that subset were countries 
undergoing mimetic CRP by a hegemon. Although the two numbers correspond, 
they are not always equivalent – a number of states may try to impose a regime on 
a single state (Albania in 1912 for example); conversely, a single state may try to 
impose a regime on more than one state during the same year (USSR in 1945).  
The list of promoters and targets was taken from Owen 2002 and 2010 and 
supplemented by a few cases left out of the dataset.35 To obtain a rough measure of 
overall regime promotion intensity, I multiplied the two measures together, so that, 
for example, if two countries were promoting a regime in three other states, the 
total intensity score was six. The total regime promotion intensity for all states is 
shown in Figure 2.10: 
 
 
                                                
35 See John Owen (2002) “The Foreign Imposition of Domestic Institutions” 
International Organization 56.2:375-409 and John Owen (2010) The Clash of Ideas 
in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change 1510-2010, 
Princeton University Press. I have added four omitted cases: USSR in Mongolia 
(1921); US in Nicaragua (1954), US and Britain in Iran (1953), and US in Chile 
(1973). These do not significantly affect the results since all but the first instance 




Figure 2.10: Total regime promotion intensity, 1900-2000. 
 
There are three visible spikes (after the two world wars and another in the late 
1960s.) The next step is to isolate those instances of regime coercion in which great 
powers are promoting their own regimes. The frequency of mimetic impositions by 



















Figure 2.11: Mimetic regime imposition by great powers, 1900-2000. 
 
Graphing the salient variable yields the posited results: mimetic regime impositions 
by great powers are much more likely to occur in the wake of military hegemonic 
shocks.36  The table below breaks down the number of promotions by the relevant 
categories (“shock” years are counted as the last year of the war and the following 
two years, or 1918-1920 and 1944-1946, for a total of six shock years): 
 
 
                                                
36 Great power impositions in general are much more likely after hegemonic 
shocks. The graph of total regime impositions (mimetic and non-mimetic) by great 
powers is virtually identical to Figure 2.11. It is displayed in Appendix 4.  
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29 27 56 
Non-hegemon, 
Mimetic 
2 29 31 
Hegemon, 
Non-mimetic 
2 14 16 
Non-hegemon, 
non-mimetic 
1 17 18 
TOTAL 34 87 121 
Table 2.7: External interventions, promoter types 1900-2000, classified by shock vs. 
non-shock years 
 
 As the table demonstrates, great powers dominate but do not monopolize 
regime coercion in the twentieth century: of the 121 instances of regime coercion 
during this period, great powers were promoters in 72 of the cases. However, great 
powers nearly monopolize regime promotion during hegemonic transitions. During 
transition years, countries attempted to impose their regimes on others 34 times, 
and in 31 of those cases the promoter was a great power.37 Moreover, great powers 
are much more likely to promote their own regimes in the wake of shocks – of the 
31 cases of hegemonic intervention during shock years, in 29 of those cases they 
promoted their own regimes (about 94 percent).38 Of the 41 cases of hegemonic 
intervention during non-shock years, they imposed their own regime in 27 cases 
(about 66%). Dividing by the number of years, in an average shock year there were 
                                                
37 The number of impositions is higher than the umber of countries promoting 
regimes because in many instances the same country (particularly the US and the 
USSR) attempted to impose its regime on multiple countries. 
38 The two exceptions being Japan in Russia (1918) and the USSR in Austria (1945). 
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4.8 mimetic impositions by a great power, and only 0.28 such impositions in an 
average non-shock year.39 
In short, great powers act differently after hegemonic shocks. They are more 
likely to impose regimes during hegemonic transitions, and when they do so they 
are more likely to impose their own regimes than in non-shock years. The reasons 
for this, as suggested in the previous chapter, stem from the temporary decrease in 
the costs and increased likelihood of success in the wake of hegemonic shocks.  
These findings both complement and build upon the recent literature on 
external regime impositions. Over the past decade or so, perhaps inspired by the 
American experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, the literature on regime promotions 
has been pessimistic about the effect of coerced regime imposition on domestic 
stability. For example, Pickering and Peceny (2006) examine regime promotions by 
the U.S., Britain, France, and the U.N. Between 1946 and 1996. 40 “Most scholars 
doubt that military intervention can lead to democracy,” they write. “Many are 
skeptical because they see the fundamental causes of democracy as internal.”41 
They find that UN interventions are more likely to result in democracy than 
intervention by the democratic great powers, and find a strong statistical 
association between hostile intervention by the United States and democratization. 
They argue, however, that this relationship is driven by three cases in the 
                                                
39 A difference-of-means test between mimetic hegemonic impositions in shock vs. 
non-shock years reveals (unsurprisingly) that the difference is statistically 
significant. 
40
 Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny (2006) “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint” 
International Studies Quarterly 50:539-559 
41
 Pickering and Peceny 2006:539 
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Caribbean, only one of which (Panama in 1989) created a stable democracy. They 
conclude that there is “little evidence that military intervention by liberal states 
helps to foster democracy in target countries” and argue that “the evidence 
presented here offers a cautionary tale for those determined to forge democracy at 
gunpoint.”42 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs (2006) reach a similar conclusion. 43 
Their analysis is based on an extension of selectorate theory, focusing on the 
implications for the survival of the intervening leader and the type of government 
institutions in the target states that interventions are most likely to produce. 
Examining state and UN interventions between 1946 and 2001, they find that 
external military intervention “does little to promote democracy and often leads to 
its erosion and the substitution of largely symbolic reforms”. 44 Likewise, in a study 
of superpower interventions during the Cold War, Easterly et al (2008) find that 
intervention by either the United States or the USSR both decreased the likelihood 
of democracy by about 33 percent. 45 Peic and Reiter (2010) examine forty-two 
cases of regime imposition since 1920 and find that interventions increase the risk 
of civil war because they damage the infrastructural power of the state.46 They 
                                                
42
 Pickering and Peceny 2006:539,556 
43
 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs (2006) “Intervention and 
Democracy” International Organization 60:627-49 
44
 Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2006:647 
45
 William Easterly, Shanker Satyanath, and Daniel Berger (2008) “Superpower 
Interventions and their Consequences for Democracy: An Empirical Inquiry” NBER 
Working Paper 13992, p.1 
46
 Goran Peic and Dan Reiter (2010) “Foreign-Imposed Regime Change, State 
Power and Civil War Onset, 1920-2004” British Journal of Political Science  
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conclude that interventions that follow interstate wars and change the target state’s 
political institutions increase the risk of civil war eightfold.47  
Examining the effects of foreign interventions on regime transformations is 
complicated by the problem of selection effects - since outsiders are more likely to 
intervene in states that are experiencing problems, these targets of intervention are 
also more likely to experience failed consolidations and civil wars afterwards, 
exaggerating the negative connection between intervention and regime failure. 48 In 
an unpublished working paper, Downes (2011) accounts for these selection effects  
through matching procedures, and finds that foreign interventions can promote 
regime stability when outside powers are seeking to restore previous rulers. 
However, when they are seeking to depose the current ruler and install a new 
government, civil war becomes more than three times as likely. This happens 
because disrupting a sitting government “disrupts state power and foments 
grievances and resentments.”49 
Finally, John Owen (2010) takes a longer view of foreign interventions, 
examining instances of external regime promotions since 1500.50 He argues that 
impositions of domestic regime occur in waves, and describes three such waves 
                                                
47
 Peic and Reiter 2010:22 
48
 For a similar approach to examining the effects of peace-keeping on civil wars, 
see Virginia Page Fortna (2008) Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ 
Choices after Civil War, Princeton University Press 
49
 Alexander B. Downes (2011) “Catastrophic Success:Foreign-Imposed Regime 
Change and Civil War” Working Paper, draft March 29, 2011, p.1 
50
 John M. Owen (2010) The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational 
Networks, States, and Regime Change 1510-2010, Princeton University Press 
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since 1500, each accompanied by an ideological struggle between competing 
regime types - the first between 1520 and 1650 (catholics vs. protestants); the 
second between 1770 and 1850 (republics vs. constitutional monarchies vs. 
absolute monarchies; and the third between 1917 and the present day (democracy 
vs. fascism vs. communism. Owen argues that the incidence of foreign regime 
promotion “rises steeply during periods of great-power struggle, either hot or cold 
wars”. 51 The waves of imposition occur because in the presence of competing 
ideologies, particularly during times of relative insecurity, states find strategic 
significance in regime imposition or view them as relatively costless.52  
Although my analysis is based on John Owen’s dataset, his data leads me to a 
different conclusion about the causes of the waves of regime impositions. These 
bursts of interventions are indeed the products of competition between competing 
regime types, but they occur in the immediate aftermath of the struggle rather than 
during its course. In particular, mimetic regime impositions by great powers occur 
once the struggle has been decisively concluded via interstate war. Great powers 
do undertake non-mimetic impositions during the course of the struggle itself - 
most notably, during the Cold War - but these interventions are far less 
concentrated in time. At least for the twentieth century, Owen’s argument requires 
an important refinement: non-mimetic impositions occur during ideological 
struggles, but mimetic impositions occur directly after these struggles, and tend to 
be more clustered in time. These latter sorts of imposition are what produce the 
                                                
51
 Owen 2010:24 
52
 Owen 2010:27 
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waves of foreign-imposed regime changes, and contribute (along with influence 
and emulation) to the larger waves of regime change that follow hegemonic 
shocks. 
These results also have some implications for the study of state death and the 
dynamics of international norms. Fazal(2007) has argued that state death is 
associated with buffer states caught between states with enduring rivalries.53 
Hegemonic shocks have also frequently been associated with the death and birth of 
states – World War I, for instance, destroyed the continental empires of central and 
eastern Europe and created a number of new nation-states from their remnants. The 
fascist wave culminated in the forced annexation and death of a number of states 
across Europe. Hegemonic shocks, in other words, may create unique conditions 
that intensify the normal mechanisms of state death.  
Fazal has also argued that violent state death has virtually ceased after 1945 
because of a norm against conquest. This suggests that while shocks create 
incentives for hegemonic coercion, the nature of that coercion (that is, whether it 
takes the form of dismemberment of rivals, forcible annexation or regime 
imposition through occupation) is mediated by the shifting structure of norms in the 
international system – and that these shifts are guided by the changing behaviors of 
the rising hegemons. The same mechanisms that lead to institutional waves may 
also create cascades of norm change. Because norms are inherently social 
constructs, and because they are associated with persuasion instead of power, 
                                                
53 Tanisha Fazal (2007) State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, 
Occupation, and Annexation, Princeton University Press 
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material factors are assumed to be less important or even irrelevant in shaping 
changes in global norms. However, there is a tendency in the constructivist 
literature to conflate power with coercion – and since social constructs cannot be 
coerced, material power does not play an important role in these discussions. Yet 
power can and does influence normative changes in complicated ways, some of 
which may have nothing to do with brute force. States may imitate the norms of 
rising hegemons for similar reasons that they imitate their institutions – to copy 
their success, to attract allies, or to gain legitimacy in the eyes of their peers. 
Hegemonic shocks can thus shift the normative preferences of domestic actors and 
groups in many states simultaneously, leading to a norm cascade. To take one 
prominent example, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union discredited the 
normative basis for communism among its fellow travelers in the developing world, 
contributing to a normative shift toward democracy. Today, illiberal states pay lip 
service to the importance of national elections even when the elections themselves 
are subject to a variety of political constraints. In this case, the sudden decline in 
the power of a communist hegemon directly contributed to a normative shift away 
from communism as an alternative institutional bundle. To equate norm change 
with persuasion while conflating power with coercion ignores the complexity of 
these influences.  
Overall, the above analysis suggests that the literature on regime impositions 
would benefit from a closer look at its interaction with interstate war and the 
international environment as a whole. Recent studies suggest important causal links 
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between external impositions, interstate wars, and systemic peace. Lo, Hashimoto 
and Reiter (2008), for example find that peace is more durable following interstate 
wars in which the loser experience a foreign-imposed regime change.54 Pessimistic 
conclusions about the democratizing effects of foreign interventions may be 
warranted, but they may benefit from distinguishing interventions that take place in 
the wake of hegemonic shocks from those that do not. Interventions after major 
wars occur at a time when the rising hegemons are at their most powerful and most 
committed to changing the global order. Post-shock interventions may also be 
legitimized by the outcome of a major war in a way that peacetime interventions 
are not. The U.S. occupation of Germany encountered no native opposition at least 
in part due to the nature of the war and the total defeat that accompanied its 
conclusion. In his book Embracing Defeat, the historian John Dower has argued 
that the success of the U.S. occupation of Japan after World War II was shaped at 
least in part by the nature of the war that proceeded it, and the decisive defeat that 
brought the war to an end.55As I will argue in Chapter 5, the Soviet occupation of 
Eastern Europe was legitimized in part by the nature of the Soviet victory in that 
conflict. These factors simply do not come into play with interventions that occur 
in the absence of major interstate wars. In short, the effect of hegemonic shocks on 
                                                
54
 Nigel Lo, Barry Hashimoto, and Dan Reiter (2008) “Ensuring Peace: Foreign-
Imposed Regime Change and Post-War Peace Duration, 1914-2001” International 
Organization 62.4:717-36 
55
 John Dower (1999) Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, W.W. 
Norton & Company 
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The empirical tests suggest that quantitative literature on democratization should 
pay close attention to a particular systemic influence that shapes and constrains 
domestic regime outcomes – the hegemonic share of power, and sudden changes 
within the level of that power. This variable remains significant under a number of 
model specifications and measures of the dependent variable. In the case studies 
that follow, I will examine the effects of hegemonic power in more detail, focusing 















APPENDIX 1: Regime Classifications 
 
States Classified as Fascist: 
 
Austria - 1933-1944  
Bulgaria - 1934-1944  
Germany - 1933-1944  
Hungary - 1938-1944  
Italy - 1922-43  
Japan - 1936-1945 
Portugal - 1934-73  
Romania - 1940-44  
Spain - 1936-75  
Albania - 1939-1944  
Belgium – occupied May 28 1940 to end of 1944 (1940-44)  
Czechoslovakia - 1939-1944  
Denmark - 1940-44  
France May 1940 to December 1944  
Greece April 1941 to October 1944 (1941-44)  
The Netherlands - May 10 1940 to beginning of 1945 (1940-44)  
Norway - 1940-44  
Poland October 1939 to early 1945 (1940-44) 
Yugoslavia  (incl independent state of Croatia 1941-43) – April 17, 1941 to May 
1945 (1941-44)  
Philippines - April 1942 to December 1944 (1942-44)  
Thailand - December 1941 to June 1944 (1942-44)  
 
States Classified as Communist: 
 
Afghanistan - 1978-1991  
Albania - 1946-1991 
Angola - 1976-1992 
Benin - 1976-1989 
Bulgaria - 1947-1990 
Cambodia - 1976-1991 
China since 1950  
Congo - 1970-1991 
Cuba since 1959 
Czechoslovakia - 1948-1989 
Ethiopia - 1975-1990 
Eastern Germany - 1950-1990 
Greece - 1948-49 
Grenada - 1979-1983 
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Hungary - 1950-1989 
Laos since 1976 
Mongolia - 1925-1991 
Mozambique - 1975-1990 
North Korea since 1948 
Poland - 1945-1989 
Romania - 1948-1989 
Somalia - 1976-1990 
USSR - 1921-1991 
Republic of Vietnam - 1954-1975 
Yemen’s People Republic - 1968-1989 
Vietnam since 1976  



















APPENDIX 2: Regional Effects of Hegemonic Power 
Scholars have noted significant variation in the spread of democracies across 
geographic regions.56 Figure 6, below, charts the spread of democracies across 















Figure A1: Regional variations in the spread and retreat of democracy, 1900-2000. 
 
                                                
56 See, e.g. John O'Loughlin, Michael D. Ward, Corey L. Lofdahl, Jordin S. Cohen, 
David S. Brown, David Reilly, Kristian S. Gleditsch, Michael Shin (1998) “The 




Despite the differences, at least some of the waves are present in all the regions. In 
the Western countries, which democratized earliest, there is a peak around World 
War I and a trough in the 1930s, culminating in an all-time low in the early years 
of World War II and a rapid democratic recovery at the end of the war. Central and 
Eastern Europe experiences a rapid increase, followed by rollback, after both wars; 
the period of Soviet rule is marked by democratic stagnation, followed by a rapid 
spread of democracy in the early 1990s. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, 
begins as fairy democratic (due to a small number of states of relatively democratic 
states at the beginning of the century) and declines throughout most of the 
twentieth century as new states enter the region, but experiences a rapid wave in 
the 1990s. Asia experiences bursts of democratization after World War II and 
during the 1990s. Central and South America stagnate during much of the 
twentieth century, and experience democratic waves in the 1990s; the Caribbean 
sees a short-lived burst of democracy after World War I, followed by a rapid 
decline and recovery in the 1960s. The Middle East shows distinct waves, with 
rollbacks, in the early years of the twentieth century and after World War II, 
followed by a smaller wave in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Table A1 presents the relationship between regional democracy and US 
hegemony (measured in two ways: the level of U.S. hegemonic share, and the  
change in the level of US hegemonic share averaged over the preceding five years). 
The first two columns show the results of a simple bivariate regression for each 
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region. The last two columns show regression results that include a measure of the 
































































































Table A1.  Regional Effects. Columns 1 and 2 are bivariate results. Results in 
columns 3 and 4 include regional per capita GDP data in the regression. 
 N = 101. DV is Polity. 
 
 The results show a strong relationship between the two variables, with some 
variation. The American share of hegemonic power (and changes therein) is 
strongly correlated with levels of democratization in all regions except Sub-Saharan 
Africa, although the effect is weaker in the Caribbean. When regional wealth is 
                                                
57 Includes Western Europe, Scandinavia, and the settler colonies: U.S., Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. 
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taken into account, the relationship remains strong everywhere except in Asia (and 




















APPENDIX 3: Replication of Gleditsch and Ward (2006) 
This appendix replicates the results found in Gleditsch and Ward (2006) and adds a 
variable associated with hegemonic shocks as a particularly tough check of the 
robustness of my results.  Gleditsch and Ward analyze the spatial diffusion of 
democracy and the effect of neighborhood contagion on autocratic breakdown.58 I 
first replicate Model 1 (found on page 925) of the article, then replicate the same 
model with the addition of a variable that captures changes in the level of 
American hegemonic power. They employ a Markov chain model that looks at 
factors such as democratic transitions in neighbors and the global proportion of 
democracy. A replication of their results thus offers a direct test of the idea that 
hegemonic power has an effect on the spread of democracy distinct from diffusion 
processes as a whole. It also biases the results against a positive finding for my 
variable, since the variables they use (see table below) are likely to correlate very 
closely with variables associated with the effects of hegemonic power. Second, the 
independent variable used in the model is dichotomous, which doesn’t capture the 
effects of hegemonic power on democratic reforms that do not lead to clear-cut 
transitions. For these two reasons, the replication is thus a “hard case” for my 
theory, since the model is biased against positive results for my variables. 
As a brief preview, the results are mixed. Of the three operationalizations of my 
variable used in the replication, two are not statistically significant. A third, 
however (measuring a five-year average of the change in U.S. hegemonic power) is 
                                                
58 Kristian Skrede Gleditch and Michael D. Ward (2006) “Diffusion and the 
International Context of Democratization” International Organization 60.4:911-933 
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statistically significant, and shows that increases in the rate of U.S. hegemonic 
power make democracies less likely to break down, consistent with the predictions 
generated by the theory. The result is substantively large – the coefficient of this 
variable is bigger than any of the other independent variables used in their model. 
These results suggest that at the very least levels of hegemonic power deserve a 
closer look in further empirical studies of democratization. 
Covariates Beta Coefficient Gamma Coefficient 
Constant 2.46 (0.81)*** 3.856 (0.317) 
Logged GDP per capita -0.500 (0.089)*** -0.065 (0.004) 
Proportion of Neighboring 
Democracies 
-0.550 (0.264)** -0.687 (0.467) 
Civil War 0.369 (0.223)* -0.016 (0.025) 
Years of Peace at Territory 0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.0001) 
Economic Growth -0.024 (0.012)* 0.003 (0.0001) 
Global Proportion of 
Democracies 
-0.621 (1.05) -2.570 (0.467)*** 
Neighboring Transition to 
Democracy 
 -0.436 (0.138) 
Table A2: Replication of Model 1 from Gledistch and Ward 2006, page 925 
 
Here, the beta coefficient represents the likelihood that a democracy will 
endure, while the gamma coefficient represents the likelihood that an autocracy 
will break down.59 Thus, for example, a higher proportion of neighboring 
democracies significantly increases the likelihood that democracies will break 
down (contrary to their prediction, with beta  = -0.550) but also significantly 
decreases the likelihood that autocracies will endure (with gamma  = -0.687) 
                                                
59 The gamma coefficient is calculated by adding the beta coefficient and the alpha 
coefficient (the coefficient of the interaction term for that variable). 
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Next, I replicated this model with the addition of a measure of U.S. hegemonic 
power. I used three variations: a lag of the U.S. share of hegemonic power 
(lusshare), change in the share of U.S. hegemonic power (chusshare), and a running 
five-year average in the change in the U.S. share of hegemonic power 
(avchusshare). Ex ante, the last measure appears to be the most likely candidate, 
since it measures changes in the rate of change over a five year-period and thus is 
closest to capturing the dynamics of a hegemonic shock. In fact, this variable is 
significant at the 10% level and more importantly, possessed the expected signs: 
Covariates Beta Coefficient Gamma Coefficient 
Constant 3.309 (0.966)*** 3.731 (0.365) 
Logged GDP per capita -0.509 (0.090)*** -0.066 (0.004) 
Proportion of Neighboring 
Democracies 
-0.537 (0.267)** -0.689 (0.046) 
Civil War 0.364 (0.225) -0.017 (0.025) 
Years of Peace at Territory 0.002 (0.002) -0.004 (0.000) 
Economic Growth -0.021 (0.012)* 0.003 (0.0001) 
Global Proportion of 
Democracies 
-3.283 (1.936)* -2.120 (1.09) 
Neighboring Transition to 
Democracy 
 -0.434 (0.138)*** 
Average change in US 
hegemonic power share 
5.867 (3.317)* -1.070 (3.40) 
Table A3: Model 1 with the addition of avchusshare, a measure of change of US 
hegemonic power 
 
Here, a sudden increase in the US share of power increases the likelihood that 
democracies will endure. (The other two measures were not statistically significant, 
although substantively they had the expected signs.) The coefficient (in bold) is very 
large (5.867) and statistically significant. Substantively, the magnitude of this 
coefficient is larger than all the other variables except the global proportion of 
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democracies. It also decreases the likelihood that autocracies will endure, but the 
effect is not statistically significant. Given the aforementioned factors that bias the 
model against finding a significant relationship, it seems plausible that future 
quantitative studies should further examine the effects of hegemonic power on the 




















APPENDIX 4: Total Regime Impositions by Great Powers 
 
This graph shows the intensity of regime impositions by great powers.  It is virtually 
identical to Figure 2.11, but includes both mimetic and non-mimetic impositions. 
The graph demonstrates that all hegemonic interventions cluster after hegemonic 
shocks, contra Owen (2010). 
 
 














“The year 1918 marked a bright and conspicuous date in the annals of 
our history. After a series of successes which seemed to forecast their 
eventual triumph, our aggressors suddenly foundered in a cataclysm 
which at a single blow destroyed the oldest monarchies of Europe.” 
 
-- Gustave Le Bon (1921)1 
 
 
“Purged and humbled, democracy presents itself for revision.”  
 





The first democratic wave of the twentieth century found an unexpected origin in 
the immense destruction of the Great War. The postwar flowering of democratic 
regimes on the European continent was a period of hope born from tragedy, a 
moment of crisis transformed into opportunity. The wave of reforms that 
accompanied the end of the war was intense, widespread, ambitious – and 
                                                
1 Gustave Le Bon (1921) The World in Revolt: A Psychological Study of Our Times, 
transl. by Bernard Miall, New York: The Macmillan Company, p.9 
2 T.V. Smith (1927) “Review of Democracy Under Revision by H.G. Wells” The 
Social Service Review 1.4:665 
  
113 
ultimately unsuccessful. Between 1917 and 1922, over a dozen newly-born 
European states emerged from the ruins of collapsed empires (See Figure 3.1) and 
adopted democratic institutions like parliaments, civil liberties, and universal 
suffrage. At the same time, semi-democracies like Britain and Belgium expanding 
voting rights to previously excluded groups like women and working-class men. 
The spirit of postwar democratic optimism was so strong that a year after the 
armistice, British politician and historian James Bryce wondered whether the “trend 
toward democracy now widely visible is a natural trend, due to a general law of 
social progress”.3  
 
Figure 3.1: Total number of states in the international system, 1900-1930 
  
  
                                                




 Surveying the wreckage of collapsed European empires, it was tempting to 
believe that an era of democracy had indeed dawned on the continent. The 
outcome of the war appeared to vindicate democracy while exposing the 
deficiencies of its competitors. Absolutist empires, defeated and disgraced, had 
been refashioned in a democratic mold, however precariously, all across Europe. A 
poet writing in 1919 could not “dare to speak of kings and queens / Democracy is 
now the card”.4 Returning to the United States after his triumphant European tour, 
Woodrow Wilson proclaimed that democratic principles had “penetrated to the 
heart and understanding” of both masses and rulers, and imagined the Founding 
Fathers “looking on with a sort of enraptured amazement that the American spirit 
should have made conquest of the world.”5 
 The wave of postwar democratization was driven by two factors related to the 
outcome of the war. First, the collapse of ill-glued6 monarchical empires created a 
number of new states in central and eastern Europe. Inspired by democracy’s 
ability to mobilize masses and triumph over powerful enemies, the leaders of these 
new states looked to democratic institutions as the way to harness the postwar spirit 
of national self-determination, modernize their societies, and acquire both 
                                                
4 Richard de Gallienne (1919) “Ballade of the Modern Bard” Harper’s Magazine, 
October, p. 761 
5 Woodrow Wilson, Speech of September 6 1919, quoted in G. John Ikenberry 
(2000) After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order 
After Major Wars, Princeton University Press, p.158 
6 To borrow Jacques Barzun’s description of Austria-Hungary. Jacques Barzun 
(2000) From Dawn to Decadence: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life from 1500 to 
the Present, Harper Perennial, p.690 
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international and domestic respectability. “Four great empires in Europe, all ruled 
by ancient dynasties, crash to the ground,” wrote Bryce, “and we see efforts made 
to build up out of the ruins new States, each of which is enacting for itself a 
democratic constitution.”7 American power proved decisive in the European 
theater and now loomed large across the continent. By joining the democratic 
camp, the new states also hoped to secure American financial assistance and 
security guarantees. At the same time, the “ostentatious purity”8 of Woodrow 
Wilson’s democratic vision provided the ideological basis for the reforms. 
Europeans “who had been long tried, confused, bereaved,” write Palmer et al, 
“were stirred by Wilson’s thrilling language in favor of a higher cause.”9 In the new 
states, material and ideological factors converged to bolster democracy’s appeal 
and legitimacy.10 
 Second, the war led to democratizing reforms via the mobilization of women 
and labor in partial democracies. As leaders of the Allied countries soon realized, 
uninterrupted industrial production was a necessary ingredient for waging a 
                                                
7 Bryce 1921:4-5. These were the Hohenzollern, Austro-Hungarian, Russian and 
Ottoman empires. 
8 J.M. Roberts (1999) Twentieth Century: The History of the World, 1901 to 2000, 
Viking, p.283 
9 R. R. Palmer, Joel Colton, and Lloyd S. Kramer (2002) A History of the Modern 
World, 9th edition, McGraw-Hill, p.687-8 
10 In an empirical analysis, Gates et al find that states created by the war were 
much more democratic that the average pre-war regime. Scott Gates, Håvard 
Hegre, Mark P. Jones, Håvard Strand, “Democratic Waves? Global Patterns of 
Democratization, 1800-2000,” paper prepared for delivery at the National Political 
Science Conference, January 2007, Trondheim, Norway, p.14. For similar 
arguments, see Palmer et al 2002:746 and Raymond Sontag (1970) A Broken 
World: 1919-39, HarperCollins, p.66. 
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prolonged, materiel-heavy war. For the first time since the wars of Napoleon, 
victory hinged on mobilizing the disenfranchised. The modern battlefield 
demanded mass armies, and industry absorbed massive amounts of labor. Triumph 
would require the cooperation of the labor class. For workers, this newfound 
importance offered an opportunity to generate political concessions and led to an 
expectation that a higher standard of living “must emerge with the coming of 
peace.”11 Warfare strengthened labor’s organizational power and forced the 
working and ruling classes to strike a reciprocal bargain – if workers’ acquiescence 
led to victory, they would be rewarded with political freedom and welfare 
measures. As the hostilities ended, labor was more unified, better organized, “and 
in a position to back its demands with threats.”12 The Allied victory cemented the 
wartime bargain and made the expansion of political rights inevitable in the short 
term.  
 In the space of a few years, the alchemy of war had transformed the laborer into 
a union worker, the housewife into a suffragette, the emperor into a relic. At the 
onset of the conflict, Europe had only three states that could be called 
democracies; by the end, the number had grown to sixteen. (See Figures 3.2 and 
3.3)13 
                                                
11 Dietrich Rueschmeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens (1992) 
Capitalist Development and Democracy, University of Chicago Press, p. 91-2; See 
also Sandra Halperin (2004) War and Social Change in Modern Europe: The Great 
Transformation Revisited, Cambridge University Press, p.154 
12 Halperin 2004:171 
13 Norman Davies (1996) Europe: A History, Oxford University Press, p. 943. The 






Figure 3.2: The postwar democratic wave, as measured by Polity, 1900-1930. 
 
                                                
remains the same. According to Nancy Berneo, by 1920 twenty-six out of twenty-
eight European states were parliamentary democracies. (She notes that by 1938, 
thirteen of these democracies had become dictatorships.) Nancy Bermeo (1997) 
“Getting Mad or Going Mad? Citizens, Scarcity and the Breakdown of Democracy 
in Interwar Europe” Center for the Study of Democracy, paper 97.06. Huntington 
(1991:17) writes that 17 countries had adopted democratic institutions between 
1915 and 1931, but only four of these had retained them through the 1930s. 
Peceny notes that the number of democracies “nearly doubled” in 1919, although 
almost all of these new democratic regimes collapsed by the end of the 1930s. 
Mark Peceny (2010) “Democratizing During Hard Times: Germany’s Transition to 
Democracy in the Wake of the First World War” Paper presented at the 106th 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5, 




Figures 3.3: The postwar democratic wave, as measured by SIP, 1900-1930. 
 
 
But the countries that formed the democratic wave of 1918-1923 pursued two 
distinct trajectories. New states formed from imperial ruins adopted radically 
democratic institutions but saw failures and reversals in the late 1920s and the 
1930s. The causes for this failure, as I argue later in this chapter, were embedded in 
the dynamics that created the wave in the first place. The outcome of the war had 
brought together a number of short-lived pro-democracy coalitions, creating a 
number of transitions in countries where the structural conditions for long-term 
democratic consolidation were simply not in place, whether due to a sustainable 
parliamentary majority to consolidate initial reforms, or the absence of economic 
and social conditions for democratic consolidation were absent. Optimistic leaders, 
swept up in the tide of national self-determination and democratic rhetoric after the 
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war adopted institutions that their countries had little chance of sustaining. These 
states attempted to democratize despite the absence of structural conditions that 
generally serve to sustain democracy – a well-established middle class, economic 
stability, ethnic cooperation, and past experience with democratic “rules of the 
game”. Europe’s democratic reversal is often linked to the crisis of confidence 
caused by the Great Depression. But even inside countries where economic 
collapse was the final nail in democracy’s coffin, problems began well before 
1929. “The new states hatched at Versailles,” writes Tony Judt, “were fragile and 
somehow impermanent from the very start.”14 Parliamentary coalitions everywhere 
were short-lived, unstable, and ineffective. Interwar Romania, for example, saw 
coalitions fall on average every sixteen months.15 “A kind of economic, political, 
and cultural illiteracy prevailed,” writes Fritz Stern. “[T]here was an insufficient 
understanding of the preconditions for democracy and of the connections between 
economic and social conditions and democratic politics.”16 The defeat of the 
Central Powers, writes Huntington, “produced democratic institutions in central 
and eastern European countries that socially and economically (except for 
Czechoslovakia) were not ready for them and hence they did not last long.”17 
Unlike the newly-formed states, countries that had been semi-democratic 
                                                
14 Tony Judt (2005) Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945, Penguin Press, p.195 
15 Andrew C. Janos (1970) “The One-Party State and Social Mobilization” in 
Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern 
Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems, Basic Books, p. 207 
16 Fritz Stern (1997) “The new democracies in crisis in interwar Europe” in Axel 
Hadenius, ed., Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, Cambridge University Press, p.17 
17 Huntington 1991:86. I discuss Czechoslovakia as an exception that proves the 
rule later in this chapter. 
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before the war – many in western and northern Europe – successfully expanded 
their suffrage and developed the first elements of the welfare state. In contrast to 
their east and central European peers, states like Canada, Belgium, and Great 
Britain managed to consolidate their postwar democratic gains with few internal 
reversals. These states, Frieden notes, “faced fewer postwar difficulties than eastern 
and central Europe.” Even territories most affected by fighting like Belgium and 
northern France saw the rapid resumption of economic activity. Despite a recession 
in 1920-21, by the following year “business conditions were returning to 
normality,” writes Frieden. “Despite difficulties and disappointments, by 1924 
Europe had essentially recovered.”18 Most of these states also had substantial 
experience with democracy and a large middle class that moderated political 
volatility. In these countries, the major shift toward autocracy came two decades 
later, during the Nazi occupation at the beginning of World War II. By contrast, 
“the little countries that emerged from the collapse of the old land empires in 1918 
were poor, unstable, insecure – and resentful of their neighbors.”19 The main long-
term effect of the war, therefore, was to make proto-democracies more democratic 
without creating any sustainable new democracies. It did, however, give many 
countries a preview of democratic institutions that would return later in the century 
with World War II and the Soviet Collapse. 
The remainder of the chapter is divided into four sections. I first examine the 
                                                
18 Jeffry A. Frieden (2006) Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth 
Century, W.W. Norton, p.138-9 
19
 Judt 2005:4 
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hegemonic transition that occurred as a result of the war, focusing on the decline of 
monarchical Germany and the victory by democratic great powers – Britain, 
France, and particularly the United States. I then turn to a study of the mobilization 
of labor and postwar expansion of suffrage in Europe’s partial democracies. The 
next section examines the creation of new democracies out of the ruins of 
European empires. Finally, I examine the failed consolidations and the democracy 
backlash of the mid-1920s. 
 
The Postwar Power Transition 
 
The war’s outcome raised the prestige of democratic institutions for old and 
new states alike. The postwar shift in the distribution of power (see Figure 3.4) 
made democratic regimes more powerful, more able to exercise global influence, 
and more appealing all at once. It was the Great War, argues Fritz Stern, “that saw 
the elevation of democracy into a universal ideal.”20 By defeating autocracies on 
the battlefield and on the factory floor, it suggested that democratic institutions 
were an effective way to organize modern society.  
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Figure 3.4: US and German shares of hegemonic power, 1900-1930. The period 
between 1918 and 1923 shows a rapid hegemonic transition with a German 
decline and an American surge. 
 
 
This outcome seemed far from inevitable in 1914. The conventional wisdom of 
the day argued that democracy was paralyzed by checks and balances and stymied 
by fickle public opinion. As a result, it would prove inferior to autocracy in 
mobilizing men and resources for a major conflict. This idea of “democratic 
defeatism” persisted since the earliest writings on politics.21 In his account of the 
Peloponnesian War, Thucydides attributed the victory of authoritarian Sparta over 
democratic Athens to the democratic impediments faced by Athenian leaders.22 
Alexis de Tocqueville, E.H. Carr, George Kennan, and Walter Lippmann all shared 
                                                
21 Michael Desch (2002) “Democracy and Victory: Why Regime Type Hardly 
Matters” International Security 27.2, p.5 
22 See especially the discussion of the Sicilian debate. Thucydides, The 
Peloponnesian War, book 7 
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the belief that democratic institutions failed to adequately prepare countries for 
wars. Even democracy’s supporters admitted that its benefits “are not secured 
without very considerable sacrifices,” as the U.S. Assistant Secretary of War for 
Industrial Relations wrote in 1916. “As a political system it is clumsy and inefficient 
in all material ways…”23 A 1917 article in Harper’s magazine voiced a widespread 
concern when it wondered whether democracy could compete with autocratic 
rule: 
In an age dominated by science and dependent upon the scientific 
method, are the democratic masses capable of intelligent self-direction, 
or must they in self-defense surrender the control of government to the 
superior ability of the trained and exceptionally gifted few? There is no 
time to enlighten or consult the electorate. …Does democracy then 
stand discredited? Has it been demonstrated that national efficiency and 
popular government are irreconcilable?24 
 
“Today the great war is being waged between German autocracy and English 
science under democratic control,” concluded the author. “We shall not know 
until after the terms of peace have been announced which of the two is the more 
efficient.”25 This view reflected the perception of many political leaders. As Senator 
Henry Cabot Lodge noted in 1915,“if democracy is not both able and ready to 
defend itself it will go down in subjection before military autocracy because the 
latter is then the more efficient.”26 The vital test of any regime, wrote the historian 
                                                
23 Ernest Martin Hopkins (1916) “Democracy and Industry” Annals of the American 
Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.65, p.60 
24 Robert W. Bruere (1917) “Can Democracy Be Efficient?” Harper’s Magazine 
195.2, p. 821. This idea has a long history, stretching back to Aristotle’s Politics, 
and made a forceful return in the Great Depression. 
25 Bruere 1917, p. 825 
26
 Henry Cabot Lodge (1915) “Force and Peace” Annals of the American Academy 
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and diplomat George Beer in 1916, is not the character of its internal politics but its 
ability “to survive in a struggle imposed by others. Were European democracy to 
fail in this crisis, its fate would be sealed and America would become the last 
bulwark of free government.”27 President Wilson too saw the war as a test for 
democracy and a struggle between two competing visions of the future. In a 1918 
speech, he described the United States as the “practitioner of the new creed of 
mankind” and Germany as the “most consistent practitioner of the old”. The war, 
he said, was a “battle to determine whether the new democracy or the old 
autocracy shall govern the world.”28 As the United States entered the fight, 
American sociologist Franklin Giddings summed up the stakes: 
So, at last, the giant democracies of western Europe and the giant 
absolutisms of central Europe confronted each other on the fields of 
France and Flanders in life and death grapple….Democracy or 
dynasty will be sovereign, from this time on.29 
 
The war provided the century’s first Manichean confrontation between two rival 
ideologies of the state. Now that monarchy has passed into the realm of 
anachronism, it is difficult to imagine that it once presented a viable and legitimate 
challenge to democracy. But at the start of the century, conservative autocracy still 
held sway in much of Europe and “dynasty” was the default form of government for 
                                                
of Political and Social Science, Vol.60, p.210 
27
 George Louis Beer (1916) “America's International Responsibilities and Foreign 
Policy” Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.66, 
p.80 
28 Woodrow Wilson (1918) Message to Teachers, June 28; quoted in Ikenberry 
2001:127 
29
 Franklin H. Giddings (1917) “The Bases of a Just and Enduring Peace” Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol.72, p.86 
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new states. Norway chose a king after gaining independence from Sweden in 1908, 
as did Albania when it seceded from Turkey in 1913. With the exception of France 
and Switzerland, until 1914 continental Europe remained monarchical; despite the 
spread of parliaments, “parliamentary control over political life was far from 
guaranteed; emperors and kings still ruled through their chancellors and prime 
ministers.”30 
In pre-war Europe, Imperial Germany represented the epitome of such 
enlightened monarchy. As the historian Paul Kennedy notes, on the eve of the war 
Germany was the only great power that combined “the modern, industrialized 
strength of the western democracies with the autocratic…decision-making features 
of the eastern monarchies.”31 It was widely admired even by democracy-minded 
contemporaries as the model of a scientific and highly organized state.32 Urging the 
U.S. to prepare for a tough fight, a journalist in 1916 described Germany as 
typifying “the greatest military efficiency the world has ever seen.”33 
                                                
30 Palmer et al 2002:587 
31
 Paul Kennedy (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change 
and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York: Random House, p.214 
32 The widespread American admiration of Imperial Germany, and particularly its 
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Beyond its military reputation, Germany’s prestige extended into the 
management of economic affairs. As the U.S. Secretary of Commerce William 
Redfield argued in 1915, Germany had become one of the three great global 
traders of the day, along with Great Britain and the United States.34 Moreover, the 
country’s trade was “distinguished by the application of science to business to an 
unparalleled degree,” argued Redfield. “She presented a spectacle of organized 
competence, utilizing her resources in men and material more effectively than 
anyone else.” British commerce, by contrast, “lacked the application of science to 
work. It was not highly organized in the German sense.” And while he was 
optimistic about American’s entrepreneurial and innovative spirit, Redfield 
conceded that the United States “did not use the scientific methods of Germany, 
and our commerce as a whole lacked organization.”35  
This Teutonic capacity for organization was often linked to the centralized 
nature of the German state. Thorstein Veblen, in his 1915 book Imperial Germany 
and the Industrial Revolution, sought to explain Germany’s “industrial advance and 
high efficiency”.36 How, Veblen asked, did the country achieve such a dominant 
economic position on the continent in so brief a time? The answer was to be found 
in Germany’s late adoption of industrialization and the “dynastic” nature of its 
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system. England’s industrialization was achieved slowly, haltingly, and with the 
accoutrement of wasteful cultural practices like conspicuous consumption by the 
elites. As a latecomer, Germany was able to borrow proven practices and 
technology, quickening the pace of economic development. Moreover, its 
centralized state was able to “concentrate and push forward the economic 
development” and prevent the wasteful consumption of output by the leading 
classes.37 
Germany’s pre-eminence before the war made its defeat all the more 
momentous, its disgrace all the more visible. It lost the war, the empire, and any 
prestige it had gained during its rise over the past five decades. Its economy was in 
ruins, its political leadership discredited. Just before the war “German commerce 
had reached a stage of wonderful development,” wrote the president of the 
Hamburg Chamber of Commerce in 1920. But the war “brought the powerful 
machinery of our commerce to a sudden stop…. On account of the war and the 
subsequent peace treaty of Versailles our commerce has lost its means of 
subsistence to a great extent.”38 In the same year, an advisor to the German 
government reported that the country’s agricultural production had dropped to 40 
percent of its pre-war levels. The loss of the Saar region and Alsace-Lorraine 
deprived it of 75 percent of its pre-war ore supplies, while the physical 
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deterioration of plants in wartime reduced industrial efficiency by half.39 In the 
course of a few years, Germany “plunged from a position on the world market that 
was second only to Britain, and threatening to replace it,” wrote the economic 
historian Paul Hehn, “to almost a second or third-class power.”40 Its political 
transformation epitomized the sudden extinction of monarchical legitimacy. For 
decades “the center of resistance to the Western democracies,” it was now 
transformed into the democratic Weimar Republic.41 
If the war offered a powerful test of rival regimes, its outcome supplied a clear 
and dramatic answer. Germany’s precipitous decline dealt “a last blow to the 
ancient institutions of monarchy and aristocratic feudalism.”42 Democracy, on, the 
other hand, emerged as the clear winner. Only democracies had endured the 
conflict with their political systems intact, and “now stood alone in appearing to 
maintain political continuity,” notes Markoff.43 France, Britain, and the United 
States “towered over the world,” writes Sontag. “Very quickly, it became usual to 
speak of the Big Three – Woodrow Wilson, David Lloyd George, and Georges 
Clemenceau – as the peacemakers who would shape a new and better world on 
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the ruins of the old.”44 At Versailles, they dominated the negotiations to a 
remarkable degree, producing the only postwar settlement in history made 
exclusively by democracies.45 In the wake of the war, “the power and prestige 
associated with democratic institutions were greatly enhanced.”46  
Among the victors, the United States was the greatest beneficiary of the war – in 
fact, the only great power besides Japan to benefit from the fighting.47 “The new 
postwar distribution of power,” wrote Ikenberry, “left the United States as the 
preeminent state.”48 This shift in the global hierarchy was widely noted by 
contemporaries. “The change since 1914 in the international position of the United 
States,” wrote the financial editor of the New York Times in 1926, “[is] perhaps the 
most dramatic transformation of economic history.”49  
The war forced Europe to rely on American capital, loans, technology, supplies, 
and political leadership. “The war devastated Europe but made the United States 
the world’s principal industrial, financial, and trading power.”50 The volume of 
American exports increased sharply.  As the volume of exports increased, the 
United States became a capital-exporting nation and the center of international 
finance shifted from London to New York.  As Keynes reported to the British 
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cabinet shortly after the war: “It is hardly an exaggeration to say that in a few 
months’ time the American executive and the American public will be in a position 
to dictate to this country on matters that affect us more dearly than them.”51 
Between 1914 and the end of the war the country’s stock of gold almost doubled, 
and now amounted to nearly half of the world supply.52 
The economic power of the United States, already apparent by the turn of the 
century, increased dramatically during the hostilities, becoming “a determining 
factor in world prosperity.”53 The country “seemed to have all the economic 
advantages which some of the other great powers possessed in part, but none of 
their disadvantages.”54 Manufacturing production nearly tripled during the war. In 
1913 Germany, Britain, France, and Belgium produced “substantially more” than 
the United States; by the late 1920s the U.S. “was outproducing these countries by 
nearly half.”55 It produced almost 40 percent of the world’s coal and more than half 
of the world’s industrial production.56 Untouched by the deprivations of the war, it 
had a relatively high standard of living. In addition, the U.S. enjoyed the 
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advantages of “a large domestic market which allowed for efficiencies of scale.”57 
In population, agricultural and industrial output, available investor capital, raw 
resources - “in all these areas, the United States was unrivaled in size and 
efficiency.”58 
America’s industrial base allowed it to quickly catch up to Europe in military 
strength, which had been relatively small compared to a Europe at the end of a 
decade of enormous military spending. The country’s “underlying economic 
dynamism allowed it quickly to match the Europeans once it was drawn into the 
war.”59 During the time of its direct involvement in the war, between April 1917 
and November 1918, the United States produced an immense supply of munitions 
and materials. Production of war materials peaked at 270,000 rifles, 35,000 
machine guns, 410 artillery units, 2700 tons of toxic gas, and 3850 airplane 
engines per month.60 In 1915, the American army comprised 100,000 soldiers and 
112,000 National Guardsmen, one-twentieth the size of the German Army. By the 
end of the war, it managed to mobilize over 4.2 million people through universal 
conscription. Of those, just over 2 million reached France and 1.4 million saw 
active combat.61  
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Through its armies, loans, and supplies of material, the United States had 
determined the outcome of the war and now appeared poised to shape its 
aftermath. “Victors, vanquished, and neutrals admitted that American intervention 
had decided the conflict.”62 Its power loomed large on the continent; the American 
model appeared to offer a potent combination of stability, legitimacy and strength. 
“The American republic had risen to a position of power as Europe consumed 
itself” and its role shifted “from a passive observer of the slow collapse of the 
classical order to an active leader of attempts to reconstitute it.”63 
The rise in U.S. material capabilities complemented and reinforced Woodrow 
Wilson’s democratic rhetoric. He was “confident of the adequacy of America’s 
material power to command the acquiescence of the exhausted combatants in 
Europe” and saw America’s dramatic rise as an opportunity to spread its institutions 
to the Old World.64 “When the war is over we can force them to our way of 
thinking,” he told Colonel House in 1917, “because by that time they will, among 
other things, be financially in our hands.”65 American power inspired democracy 
by its success, and the prospect of American financial support encouraged other 
converts. Where these were insufficient, pro-democracy rhetoric provided an 
additional impetus for reforms. “The world looked with awe and expectation to one 
man – the president of the United States,” writes Palmer. “Wilson occupied a lone 
                                                
62
 Palmer et al 2002:687 
63
 Walworth 1977:4 
64
 Walworth 1977: 17 
65
 Quoted in Arthur S. Link (1979) Woodrow Wilson: Revolution, War, and Peace, 
Harlan Davidson, p.80; quoted in Ikenberry 2000:122 
  
133 
eminence, enjoyed a universal prestige.” On his European tour in January 1918, he 
was received “as the man who would lead civilization out of its wasteland.”66  
 
Interstate War and Democratic Reforms 
 
 The Great War created a number of new states that adopted democratic 
institutions, but it also furthered democratization in a number of states that existed 
before the war, among both former autocracies like Germany and partial 
democracies like Britain. Explanations that focus on the influence of major wars 
upon state development are ambiguous about their effects on regime outcome. This 
ambiguity can be clarified somewhat if the effects of war are separated into two 
categories – military mobilization and military outcomes. These influences can 
diverge even within the same war – preparing for major conflict can lead to 
increased autocracy, while the conflict’s outcome may unleash democratizing 
forces. Much of the bellicist literature is concerned with the effects of mobilization 
on state development. An early example is the writings of Otto Hintze and John 
Seeley, members of the so-called German historical school. They stressed that a 
country’s geopolitical environment affects its mobilization strategy, which in turn 
shapes its regime type. Hintze, a scholar of the Prussian state, argued that constant 
preparation for war led to a standing army and a centralized state, while relative 
safety within the international system, geographically defined by mountains and 
oceans, created the internal opportunity for democracy.67 Seeley likewise argued 
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that the hostility of the external environment shaped the state through the need for 
universal military conscription. A threatening environment, as in the case of Prussia 
or Russia, led to universal military service and an absolutist state; a relatively 
secure, thallasocratic state like Britain or the United States avoided universal 
service in the formative years of their history, and therefore adopted relatively 
democratic institutions.68 Mobilization for war, Raymond Aron writes, is inevitably 
autocratic: 
[T]he citizen-soldier is part of a vast machine over which he has no 
control. Group autonomy and liberty of opinion and expression 
become a luxury that a country in danger cannot easily afford. It 
fritters away material wealth amassed during the years of peace while 
stinting on the individual rights once generously granted. The liberal 
bourgeoisie fades away; the masses are ruled by soldiers and 
organizers. Total mobilization is close to totalitarianism.69 
 
According to this argument, then, mobilization for war – conflict or constant threat 
thereof – leads to centralization of authority and despotism, with the corollary that 
relative isolation from interstate conflict produces democracy.70 Yet an opposing 
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school of thought has long argued that mobilization for war produces democratic 
institutions. “Throughout history, warfare has been a major democratizing force,” 
wrote Walt Rustow, “because it has made necessary the marshalling of additional 
human resources.”71 North and Weingast, for instance, have argued that warfare 
led to the need for increased revenue, which forced the monarchy to cede 
important political rights to the Parliament.72 Despite this limitation on his 
sovereignty, the king was soon able to raise much more war revenue than in the 
pre-Parliament days. With their property rights credibly secured, wealth holders felt 
comfortable to lend and invest their capital.73 As North and Weingast suggest, this 
credible commitment to property rights greatly increased England’s mobilization 
capacity and set it on the long path toward global hegemony.74 The overall effect of 
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England’s wars in the seventeenth century, therefore, was to shift the locus of 
power from king to parliament. Similarly, French wars in the next century 
eventually forced the bankrupt king to gather the Estates-General, sparking the 
events that led to the French Revolution. In general, then, mobilizing for war can 
force states to grant rights to previously-excluded social groups in exchange for 
their cooperation and increased revenue. 
 Cooperation of the masses became particularly important in modern warfare, 
where industrial production and mass conscription requires the willing 
participation of the nation as a whole. Gianfranco Poggi, in his study on the 
development of the state, argued that the wars of 1792-1815 helped create a 
century of great power peace in Europe because they had demonstrated to 
European rulers the “threatening connection” between sustained, large-scale 
modern warfare and social revolution.75 This was undoubtedly true in World War I. 
Across Europe, the necessities of wartime mobilization gave women and working-
class men an unprecedented opportunity to gain political power and press for 
social reforms. In return for their participation in the trenches and on the factory 
floors, these groups were able to extract political concessions like voting rights and 
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welfare provisions. The postwar expansion of suffrage, the growth of unions, and 
the rise of labor parties in these countries was made possible by mass conscription 
and the wartime economy, which shifted the balance of power within European 
societies toward the working classes. Mass mobilization produced what 
Hobsbawm called the “strange democratization of war”.76  
 The war indeed ushered in a period of social change. As Barzun notes, “Class 
barriers lost rigidity; conventions were relaxed. The soldier was cut loose from his 
nine-to-five at the office or six-to-four at the factory, as well as from home and its 
constraints.”77 For the well-off, Palmer writes, “it became embarrassing to show 
their comforts too openly. It was patriotic to eat meagerly and to wear old clothes. 
War gave a new impetus even to the idea of economic equality, if only to enlist 
rich and poor alike in a common cause.”78 Writing in 1921, a journalist described 
the wartime period in Britain as a “social revolution”: “Caste was for a time 
abolished. University professors were acting as field laborers. Patrician women 
were making munitions with factory girls. A great, strong, spiritual wind seemed to 
have swept through all classes of English life.”79  
 These egalitarian impulses produced an atmosphere that encouraged social 
reforms. Working-class soldiers in Sweden demanded suffrage with the slogan: 
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“one man, one gun, one vote”.80 In Canada, the mass mobilization for war was a 
critical catalyst in the post-war introduction of universal suffrage.81 As in the 
Napoleonic conflicts a century before, the mass mobilization of society required to 
wage it created a leveling impulse in all aspects of social and political life. 
Meanwhile, the necessities of industrial production meant that the support of 
ordinary men and women was needed if the war was to go on.  
 Mass conscription for the trenches drained workers from the factories and 
created constant labor shortages. At the same time, the voracious consumption of 
new and deadly firepower led to chronic shortages of supplies, producing a 
tremendous increase in demand for factory labor.82 Like never before, war had 
“extended its tentacles deep to the rear, spreading from the trenches into the fields, 
the mines, and the factories."83 The American industrialist Howard E. Coffin wrote 
in 1916: "Twentieth century warfare demands that the blood of the soldier must be 
mingled with three to five parts of the sweat of the man in the factories, mills, 
mines, and fields of the nation in arms."84 In short supply and high demand, 
workers gained more bargaining leverage, and the need for a steady supply of ships 
and cannons meant that labor unrest and industrial strikes could become 
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“potentially as damaging to the war effort as military mutinies.”85 Mass conscription 
and the wartime economy strengthened the unity and organization of labor, men 
and women alike, shifting the balance of power within European societies in its 
favor.86 “In fighting for democracy abroad we are gaining two of the biggest 
democratic principles at home,” wrote J. Borden Harriman, a member of the 
Council of National Defense in 1918. “The first is the recognition of the rights and 
dignity of labor, and the other is women's freedom, because never before have we 
so clearly realized that the output of the machine is just as essential to victory as 
the gun at the front.”87 This process was even more pronounced in England, 
Harriman argued. “At this moment 1,413,000 women are replacing men in 
industry in England,” she wrote. “Women, with the help of improved automatic 
machinery, are able to do the work previously done by fully skilled workers.”88 The 
need for mass armies also contributed to the push for democratization. 
“Conscription has made a vital difference,” wrote an American observer in 1919. 
“The State demanded the men it chose and sent them to Europe; it cannot deny 
them a fair measure of freedom and happiness.”89 As a result of these forces, writes 
Halperin, “powerholders became increasingly sensitive to the continued allegiance 
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of the men in the trenches and the women and men in the factories. Talk about 
extending the right to vote flourished.”90 In Britain, a Lord Landsdowne became so 
concerned that continuing the war with Germany might release democratic forces 
(or in his words, “spell ruin for the civilized order”) that in 1917 he urged a peace 
settlement to stop this process.91 
 The reciprocal bargain forged by the war undermines the often-repeated claim 
that working-class participation in the war effort demonstrated the triumph of 
nationalism over class solidarity.92 During the war, labor conflicts “continued 
unabated and, in many places, increased in both number and intensity.” 93 The war 
in fact proved to be a turning point in the evolution of organized labor in Europe. 
Far from demonstrating labor’s submission to nationalism, working-class 
participation in the war offered an opportunity to generate political concessions 
and reflected a growing desire “that a better standard of living for the masses must 
emerge with the coming of peace.”94 In Britain and other countries, it was widely 
recognized that the war could not be won without the support of the workers. Their 
participation had been “for the first time the critical condition for victory,” and it 
had been “felt to be so by politicians, civil servants, trade unionists, and the 
press.”95 At the end of the war, labor was more unified, better organized, “and in a 
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position to back its demands with threats.”96 Given their new status, Halperin 
notes, workers had reason to believe – and in some cases were promised – that 
“through their patriotism and sacrifices, they might win the rights for which they 
had struggled for over a century.”97 The postwar democratic reforms, argues 
Charles Tilly, came about when “citizens (including female citizens) who bore the 
terrible costs of war bargained with war-battered states for rights they had 
previously lacked, which their military and civilian service visibly justified.”98  
 
From Mobilization Strategies to War Outcomes 
 
The two opposing views on the effects of mobilization can be partially 
reconciled by recourse to different time horizons. The “mobilization leads to 
autocracy” argument appears to fit wars before the nineteenth century, and 
describes long-term institutional development of states before the advent of modern 
mass warfare. The “mobilization leads to democracy” argument, then, applies to 
wars since Napoleonic times, and deals with war’s effects on institutional 
development immediately before and during wars.  
But mobilization still tells only a part of the story about the effects of warfare on 
domestic development. While the scholars noted above stress the role of worker 
mobilization, they tend to ignore the all-important factor of the outcome of the war. 
Though mobilization opened up opportunities for reform, whether those reforms 
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were adopted was contingent on which regime actually won. A German victory, in 
other words, would have made postwar democratization – whether inside 
Germany or in Europe as a whole – much less likely.99 In the case of World War I, 
it was the interaction of the states’ mobilization strategies and the eventual victory 
of one particular mobilization strategy over another. As Elizabeth Kier has argued, 
states pursue different strategies to mobilize the people during war. They can 
coerce workers into participation through martial law and harsh enforcement of 
labor regulations, closing off opportunities for democratic reform. Another strategy, 
however, is to bargain with labor by offering them political rights and including 
them in wartime decision-making.100 
Where outcomes matter – and where the bellicist theories of the state connect 
to the theory of hegemonic shocks – is the ex post vindication or discrediting of the 
mobilization strategies chosen in wartime. “The workers in the mass,” wrote the 
editor of the Observer in 1919, “had to be assured a thousand times than in the 
event of victory of their freely-accepted discipline over the more forced and serf-like 
drill of the German system, unprecedented efforts would be made to raise the 
common people to an altogether higher level of intelligent, responsible, and well-
conditioned citizenship.”101 In other words, the granting of political rights was 
contingent on a favorable outcome for those states that adopted the bargaining 
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strategy of mobilization. Had the Central Powers won the war, this strategy would 
have been discredited, confirming the often-repeated suspicion that democracies 
are less effective at mobilizing their populations for major war. The outcome of the 
war provided a demonstration effect about the efficacy of competing strategies and 
the institutional choices that accompanied those strategies. The bargaining strategy 
was vindicated by the victory of the democratic great powers, while the coercive 
strategy was discredited through the defeat of the autocrats.  
A second, closely related path through which the outcome of the war affected 
domestic reforms was by putting pressure on losing regimes. As other scholars have 
pointed out, defeat can discredit losing elites, forcing them to bargain with the 
masses or risk being thrown out of office entirely. 102 Shocks such as revolutions and 
military defeats, argues Tilly, “undermine self-reproducing systems of control over 
states and thereby weaken the elites that have the most to lose from 
democratization. They open up room in which ordinary citizens can negotiate 
consent to newly emerging systems of rule.”103 In Germany, wartime political 
leaders found themselves replaced in 1918 via a popular rebellion backed by the 
army. Austria, Hungary, and Bulgaria also adopted democratic institutions at the 
end of the war. The democratic great powers, on the other hand, found their 
regimes strengthened by the victory. As mentioned above, only democracies 
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maintained political continuity during and after the war – and their ability to do so 
further enhanced the prestige of democratic institutions in the period following the 
war. The crisis of defeat dislodged existing regimes, while the triumph of victory 
solidified them.  
In short, mobilization for war produced great hopes for social and political 
change, and its outcome led to increasingly vehement demands for it.104 By the 
early 1920s, their participation vindicated through democratic triumph, labor 
movements and socialist parties found themselves in a position of unprecedented 
power. In Weimar Germany, Austria, Sweden, and other states, socialist parties and 
coalitions led their people’s transitions to new governments; Labour took power in 
Britain in 1923, and the left won in France in 1924. In many cases, socialist parties 
                                                
104 There is a large literature on why war outcomes favor democracy. My main 
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Ricardo Sanhueza (1999) “The Hazard Rate of Political Regimes” Public Choice 
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Press. As Gates et al 2007:11 put it, “Given democracies’ general propensity to win 
wars and autocracies’ greater propensity to expire in defeat, war is associated with 
greater democratization.” See Desch (2002) for a dissent. 
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maintained their presence as coalition partners through the 1920s.105 By bringing 
labor parties to the forefront of political action, the war helped usher in a number 
of social reforms. Government insurance schemes, eight-hour workdays, and other 
elements of the welfare state were becoming more common. Belgium introduced 
its first welfare legislation after the war, and Britain expanded its unemployment 
insurance provisions in 1922.106 In Sweden, the German defeat in the war led to the 
capitulation of the Swedish Conservatives, who had been stalling political reforms. 
Unlike their counterparts in Germany, Swedish conservative did not have the 
option of allying with a powerful landed upper class, and were politically isolated. 
After the war they agreed to the introduction of universal suffrage and a 
parliamentary government, in return for the preservation of the monarchy.107 In 
Belgium, workers had organized several major strikes in support of universal 
suffrage in the three decades before the war. All of these had been put down, often 
with force. During the war, however, the government needed labor’s support and 
gave the Socialist party a ministry. By the end of the war Belgium had adopted 
universal male suffrage.108   
 
The War and Female Suffrage 
 
Only two European countries had allowed female suffrage before World War I, 
                                                
105 Sheri Berman (2006) The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making 
of Europe’s Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, p. 97; Frieden 
2006:170 
106 Halperin 2004:156-7 
107 Rueschemeyer et al 1992:93 
108  Markoff 2006:73-4 
  
146 
Finland in 1906 and Norway in 1913. But between 1917 and 1924, over two 
dozen countries adopted female suffrage at least temporarily. The enfranchisement 
of women, writes Palmer, was the “most conspicuous innovation” of the postwar 
period.109 Charles Beard, writing in 1927, noted that World War I, “supposed to 
demonstrate manly valor at its highest pitch, accelerated the movement for woman 
suffrage. Nearly all the new states created after that conflict conferred on women 
the right to vote.” He concluded: “The feminist genie is out of the bottle.”110 
 Women received the right to vote in all the new states created by the war 
except Yugoslavia, as well as in Great Britain, Canada, United States, Sweden, 
Belgium, and other countries. (see Table 3.1, below) As with other forms of postwar 
reforms, the role of the war was crucial in furthering their cause; its influence is 
particularly visible, for example, in Canada’s expansion of the franchise, where the 
vote was first extended to women in uniform, then to women with close male 







                                                
109 Palmer et al 2002:744 
110 Charles Beard (1927) “Democracy Holds its Ground”, Harper’s Magazine, 
November, p. 681 




1917 Canada, Russia 
1918 Austria, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Germany, 
Hungary, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, Great Britain112 
1919 Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, Ukraine, Albania, Isle 
of Man, Belarus 
1920 Czechoslovakia, United States 
1921 Burma, Sweden, Armenia 
1922 Ecuador, Ireland 
1924 Kazakhstan, Mongolia, Saint Lucia, Tajikistan 
Table 3.1 Female Suffrage Expansion, 1917-1924113 
 
The war had drawn women into the labor force and demonstrated their 
capacity to do “jobs which it had been thought only men could do.”114 The 
insatiable need for troop replacements meant that women now streamed into 
offices and factories.  In the United States, the Council of National Defense 
appointed a Women’s Committee to advise the government on how to use women 
in the workplace, prompting journalist Ida Tarbell to write that “this was the first 
time in history that a government had called a country’s woman-power into co-
operation. The summons made its impression. It was ‘recognizing’ women. The 
women rose to the recognition.”115  
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The number of women in the labor force was bound to fall after the war, as 
veterans made their way back to the job market.116 But this experience in both 
world wars was part of a social process in which women’s work was redefined and 
women’s daily lives were reoriented around the national economy.117 Just as the 
demand for labor empowered common laborers, it gave women a first chance at an 
independent living. A journalist noted in 1921: “Any girl with her hair hanging 
down her back or tied into a pigtail could get a wage that her father would have 
envied before the war.”118 Jacques Barzun writes: 
Women were indispensable to ‘war work’ and not solely as nurses and 
entertainers of the troops, but as chauffeurs, bureaucrats, factory hands, 
and ‘farmerettes’. They showed that they could perform as well as men 
– often more conscientiously – in the reserved precincts of the male. It 
was impossible after the war to deny them the vote by arguing their 
incapacity.119  
 
The increasing influence of labor also made female voters an appealing source 
of conservative moderation. The immediate postwar period saw widespread labor 
unrest, rapid social changes, and explosive union growth. “For those conservative 
politicians who believed that women were intrinsically more conservative than 
men,” writes Markoff, “enfranchising women suddenly seemed more appealing. If 
                                                
116 Vinen is skeptical about the effects of war on female political empowerment at 
the workplace and the voting booth. Although female employment increased as a 
result of the war, this was always meant as a temporary measure: “Women’s jobs 
were often in industries such as munitions, where workers were bound to be laid 
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most countries between unions, employers and government that the employment of 
women should not be continued in peacetime.” (Vinen 2000:110) 
117 Palmer et al 2002:682 
118 Gibbs 1921:561 
119 Barzun 2000:699-700 
  
149 
the working classes had to be given the vote, it seemed to some to be safer to give 
it to women, too.”120 Vinen in fact argues that female enfranchisement was not a 
direct outcome of the war itself but a moderating counterweight to the postwar 
labor movement, and that “the women who were most readily enfranchised – the 
relatively old, property owners and war widows – were all welcomed into the 
political fold precisely because they seemed to offer a counterbalance to the 
revolutionary male proletariat” who was gaining his suffrage around the same 
time.121 The histoical evidence suggests that women did support center-right 
parties; in the Weimar Republic, for instance, women strongly supported the Centre 
Party but rejected the “boisterous and aggressively masculine” Nazi Party.122 The 
war thus spurred female suffrage both by mobilizing women in the workplace and 
creating an incentive for a counterweight to the post-war labor vote.123   
 
From the Ashes of Empires: World War I and the New Democracies 
 
As the Great War neared its conclusion in the fall of 1918, a group of 
dignitaries from central and eastern European nations, calling themselves the Mid-
European Union, gathered in Philadelphia’s Independence Hall. To the peal of a 
replica Liberty Bell, the group’s chairman proclaimed a new Declaration of 
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Independence for Middle Europe, which promised “that the sufferings of the world 
war shall not have been in vain” and that the principles of liberty, democracy, and 
popular sovereignty will be “incorporated in the organic laws of whatever 
Governments our respective peoples may hereafter establish.”124 
The declaration’s optimistic message, coming in the closing months of a conflict 
that had killed millions and devastated a continent, reflected the high hopes for 
new democracies in the immediate aftermath of the war. The great European 
empires of Germany, Austro-Hungary, Russia, and the Ottomans had collapsed. In 
their place rose a number of new states that saw democracy as a way to modernize 
their societies and harness the spirit of national self-determination. “The war broke 
the old land empires of Europe, while inspiring dreams of new ones,” wrote the 
historian Timothy Snyder. “It replaced the dynastic principle of rule by emperors 
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Hungary Austro-Hungarian Empire Partial Yes 1919 
Austria Austro-Hungarian Empire Yes Yes 1933 
Czechoslovakia Austro-Hungarian Empire Yes  -- 
Yugoslavia Austro-Hungarian Empire Yes  1929 
Turkey Ottoman Empire Partial Yes  
Bulgaria Ottoman Empire Yes  1923 
Germany German Empire Yes Yes 1933 
Russia/USSR Russian Empire Yes Yes 1917  
Finland Russian Empire Yes  -- 
Latvia Russian Empire Yes  1934 
Estonia Russian Empire Yes  1934 
Lithuania Russian Empire Yes  1926 
Poland Russian, German Empire Yes  1926 
Armenia Russian, Ottoman Empire Yes  1920 
Azerbaijan Russian Empire Yes  1920 
Georgia Russian Empire Yes  1921 
Table 3.2: New Democracies created by WWI  
 
 The resurrected Poland, its boundaries expanded into historically German, 
Ukrainian, and Lithuanian regions by the post-war settlement, emerged from the 
outset as a multi-ethnic state in which a third of the population was not ethnically 
Polish. Like its neighbors, Poland began with a constitution “which contained 
almost every conceivable guarantee of democratic government and almost every 
promise of social reform.”126  
 For the long-suffering Ottoman Empire, the war had been disastrous. Romania, 
Bulgaria, and especially Greece received most of its European territory, which was 
now reduced to a toehold on the Bosporus. Its Arab lands were taken away to 
become League of Nations mandates (only the Hejaz, now known as Saudi Arabia, 
became independent.) Kurdistan was to become autonomous, and Armenia 
independent, while Italy received islands in the Aegean. Only Istanbul and the 
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Anatolian interior remained.  Beyond territorial concessions, Europe re-established 
strict financial controls that had so angered the Ottomans in the previous century. 
The defeat, culminating in the embarrassing Treaty of Sévres, discredited the 
country’s pre-war elites and led to the swift rise of Mustafa Kemal, who launched a 
successful campaign for Turkish independence. Within two years, and with Soviet 
help, the Ataturk drove off the Greeks and their western allies. Armenia was 
reconquered and split with the Soviet Union. A secular Turkish republic was 
declared in 1923.  
 Kemal was first and foremost a modernizer rather than a democratizer, but in 
democracy’s brief glory days of the early 1920s, the two concepts could not help 
but overlap, and his reforms reflected this temporary fusion. The 1924 constitution 
provided for a Grand National Assembly, elected directly by universal male 
suffrage via proportional representation (women received the vote in 1934). 
Religion was purged from public and political life, though personal freedom of 
religion was protected by the state. The law was secularized in a code based on the 
Swiss model, the caliphate being officially abolished in 1924. To Kemal and his 
followers, “the war demonstrated just how calamitous delay had been”.127 Here as 
in central Europe it took the shock of a war for old elites to become discredited, 
and for reforms to take place.  
 The defeated Russian Empire, like an old map peeling at the edges, shed a 
number of territories along its periphery. The February revolution revealed the full 
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weakness of the imperial government and inspired a number of independence 
movements. In the north, Finland finally gained full autonomy and all three Baltic 
states declared independence. Poland was reconstituted as a democratic republic 
after more than a century of absence. In the Caucasus, the Russian collapse created 
the democratic republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The latter became 
the first Muslim nation to grant political rights to women, and adopted a Parliament 
that was elected through proportional representation and included representatives 
of Jewish and Armenian minorities.128  
 Within Russia itself, the war led to a moderate regime “made up of liberal 
noblemen and middle-class leaders, generally democrats and constitutionalists”.129 
It lasted only eight months, from February to October 1917, when a Bolshevik 
coup pre-empted what would have been the Russian Republic’s founding elections. 
The Russian case represents a compressed version of the sequence, where the 
period of democratic transition was exceptionally short, and the failed 
consolidation occurred very quickly. As in Germany, the transition itself was only 
made possible by the extraordinary shock of the war, which brought together a 
coalition of domestic actors that would not have ordinarily shared the overthrow of 
monarchy as a common goal.130 The role of the army in this improvised coalition 
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was particularly decisive. In the failed 1905 revolution it was used to suppress 
revolts, but after the battlefield defeats of 1917, “the dissolution of the army and the 
deepening of agrarian revolt became intertwined. Former soldiers returned to the 
villages to join in, and often lead, the land seizures.”131 A magazine article from the 
time noted the broad assent for reforms at all levels of the army, where the 
revolutionary movement made unexpected headway among officers as well as the 
rank and file: “[T]he ease with which aristocratic regiments were won over to the 
cause of democracy, and more especially the responsive attitude of officers of the 
court battalions and of the General Staff, was as much of a surprise to the 
revolutionists as it was to the Czar.”132   
 In February 1917 the troops in St. Petersburg mutinied, accompanied by strikes 
and riots throughout the city, and the Provisional Government was established.  It 
made attempts “to stabilize the Russian Revolution in liberal-democratic form,” 
introducing “the full panoply of civil liberties and setting in train the 
democratization of local government .”133 A 1917 observer described the Duma 
committee that had assumed power as “composed chiefly of Liberals and 
Moderates and includes only two Socialists,” while the ultra-conservatives, the so-
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called Blacks, were not represented at all.134 Western observers welcomed the 
revolution as a triumph of democracy. “Does not every American feel that 
assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the 
wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few 
weeks in Russia?” asked Woodrow Wilson in an April 1917 speech to Congress.135 
 But the war would undermine the provisional government just as it did the 
monarchy that preceded it. Urban workers demanded industrial reform, national 
minorities demanded greater self-determination, famers demanded the seizure of 
estates and land redistribution, and the military pushed for a peace treaty. “On all 
these issues the Provisional Government had to repudiate the wishes of the people, 
and by so doing, it forfeited all popular support for its authority.”136 Because the 
government failed to exit the war, the army left the pro-government coalition. 
Because it failed to undertake industrial and land reforms, it lost the laborers and 
the farmers. “Because it was unwilling and unable to abandon the war and to 
sanction or stop the agrarian revolts, the Provisional Government could not escape 
having its flimsy political bases swept away, as social conflicts deepened and 
disorder spread in the cities, at the fronts, and in the countryside.”137 By November 
the situation became so untenable that Lenin and the Bolsheviks were able to seize 
the shards of power on the street.  
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 In Finland, after a four-month civil war and a brief experiment with monarchy, 
a democratic republic was established in early 1919. A century of semi-autonomy 
within the tsarist empire had provided the country with an aristocratic leadership, 
mostly Swedish in origin, that “had learned to lead rather than dominate the mass 
of Finnish people” and now did so as “representatives of a political and social 
democracy in which the condition of the lower classes was steadily improved” 
through land redistribution, cooperative movements, and agricultural 
development.138 The republic’s founding elections were held in December of 1918 
at the local level, followed by a parliamentary election several months later.  
 The three Baltic states all declared independence in 1918 and quickly moved to 
put in place constitutions, parliaments, and universal suffrage (all three granted 
women the right to vote the same year). Their constitutions provided for 
proportional representation, legal equality, minority rights, and weak executives.139 
The state supported the cooperative movement, and the private estates of Baltic 
Germans were transferred to landless peasants.140 By 1925, for example, more than 
70 percent of rural Latvians were landowners. The economic trajectory in these 
states appeared to be toward capitalism “based on private ownership and 
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 The Austro-Hungarian empire was shorn of territories and separated into two 
principal successor states, Austria and Hungary, as well as two new multi-ethnic 
states: Czechoslovakia for Northern Slavs (Czechs and Slovaks), and Yugoslavia for 
Southern Slavs (Slovenians, Croats, and Serbs). Austria became a democratic 
socialist republic after the Entente powers blocked German-Austrian unification. 
Free elections in February 1919 brought together a coalition of urban Socialists and 
rural Christian socialists, though support for Communist representatives was 
negligible.142 Hungary lost portions of its lands to Czechoslovakia, Romania, and 
Serbia as punishment for allying with the Axis powers. In November 1918, the 
Chrysanthemum Revolution brought to power Mihály Károlyi, a liberal count who 
established the Hungarian Democratic Republic. As in Russia, the moderate 
democratic government was unable to deal with demands from competing groups 
and was replaced five months later by a Bolshevik “Republic of Councils”. Five 
months after that, Admiral Miklos Horthy led a counter-revolutionary offensive by 
the Hungarian military, installing himself as regent of a permanently vacant 
monarchy. The system that emerged under Horthy was semi-authoritarian, 
outlawing the Communist Party and limiting Jews’ access to universities (anti-
Semitism was permitted partly because so many Communists had been Jews). 
Sontag suggests that the 1920s was a period “of rule for and by the old agrarian 
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aristocracy, behind the forms of popular rule,” in which dissent from aristocratic 
government was suppressed.143 Palmer argues, however, that Hungary possessed at 
least the “machinery of democracy” until the 1930s, meaning it had a constitution, 
a parliament, elections, and political parties.144 
 Germany’s transformation from a monarchy to a republic symbolized the 
changes sweeping across central and eastern Europe. Wilhelmine Germany was a 
monarchy in which a small number of citizens elected two-thirds of the legislature. 
The new Weimar Republic, by contrast, adopted universal suffrage for all male and 
female citizens over twenty.  In July 1919, after several months of deliberation, a 
constitution was adopted that established a democratic republic. It included not 
only “universal, equal, direct, and secret” 145 suffrage, but also proportional 
representation, and procedures for recalls, referenda, and ballot initiatives. The 
Kaiser was replaced by a popularly elected president, and a national legislature, the 
Reichstag.146  
 In sum, nearly all of the new states that were created (or resurrected, in Poland’s 
case) by the war adopted democratic institutions like parliaments, universal 
suffrage, and proportional representation. The war not only drastically undermined 
the power and legitimacy of monarchy, but also demonstrated that democratic 
institutions could be efficient and resilient in a crisis, and that they could challenge 
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and even defeat modern centralized autocracies both on the battlefield and the 
factory floor. At the end of the war, power and ideology combined to create a 
moment when democracy appeared to be the way forward. The dramatic shift in 
the distribution of power among the major states was accompanied by a shift in 
public rhetoric.147 The sudden collapse of monarchical regimes “made many 
people optimistic about the prospects for democratic government.”148 The 
alternatives appeared either moribund (in the case of monarchical absolutism) or 
volatile (in the case of Communism). A fledgling communist regime had appeared 
in Russia after the country’s brief flirtation with liberal democracy, but it was the 
product of a war-born minority-forged coup facing a bitter civil war and foreign 
invasion, a “tyranny nourished by misery” rather than a viable path for economic 
and political development.149 The outcome, as is generally the case with 
hegemonic shocks, seemed unambiguous. The “obvious victors has been the major 
western democracies of the day, and the great losers were what politicians called 
“autocracies”….Beyond its inherent normative appeal, democracy now appeared 
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“desirable in itself, or the mark of respectability in the international arena”.150 Such 
widespread consensus on the attraction of democracy would not resurface until the 
Soviet collapse seven decades later. It seemed to offer a path to both domestic and 
international legitimacy, and for those rulers who saw little value in such trifles, it 
was seen as a way to modernize, strengthen, and stabilize their own fragile new 
states and societies, and ingratiate themselves with the new democratic hegemon. 
Part of the motivation for new states to undertake liberalizing reforms was the 
prospect of economic incentives and security guarantees from the United States, 
the ostensible champion of the new democratic order. But in the aftermath of the 
war, the United States offered little more than inspiring rhetoric, choosing to turn 
inward during the isolationism of the 1920s. As Peceny puts it: 
…the post-World War I democratic transitions should not be 
considered examples of efforts to impose democracy through force. 
The victorious Allies made almost no explicit efforts to insist upon the 
development of democratic institutions and practices in target states. 
None of the architecture of democracy promotion so common today 
was present in 1919 Europe.151 
 
Wilson’s rhetoric, Ikenberry writes, “was not backed up by offers of economic and 
military assistance that might have made his settlement ideas more attractive and 
credible”152 – and, perhaps, more durable. This was a mistake that American 
policy-makers explicitly sought to correct after World War II. The consolidation of 
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fragile regimes was made all the more difficult by the absence of material support 
from the rising hegemon. 
 
The Democracy Backlash, 1922-1928 
 
 The post-WWI democratic wave was unprecedented both in the audacity of 
its political aspirations and the near-complete failure of these aspirations in the face 
of later crises and reversals. Even before the Great Depression produced an 
authoritarian wave in the 1930s, despots and dictators began ascending to power 
across Europe and around the world. Fledgling democracies fell in Russia (1917), 
Hungary (1919), Italy (1922), Bulgaria (1923), Poland (1926), Portugal (1926), 
Lithuania (1926) and Yugoslavia (1929). In addition, the new states of Armenia, 
Georgia, and Azerbaijan, which had also adopted democratic institutions, were 
reabsorbed back into the Russian empire by 1922, this time under a Communist 
aegis. The optimistic period after the war, Ikenberry writes, “was a democratic high 
tide rather than a gathering flood.”153 
 The causes of these failed democratic consolidations stemmed from factors 
inherent in the dynamics of the initial wave. First, the shock of the war had brought 
together extraordinary domestic coalitions that supported democratic reforms. 
These ad hoc domestic alliances could not be sustained once the immediate crisis 
had passed. Like a victorious international alliance that dissolves once its purpose 
is served, these domestic coalitions struggled to hold together after the initial 
transition period. As the pro-reform class coalitions and party alliances forged by 
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the shock of the war faded, Europe entered what Karl Polanyi called “the counter-
revolutionary phase of the postwar period”:   
When, in Central Europe, the social structure broke down under the 
strain of war and defeat, the working class alone was available for the 
task of keeping things going. Everywhere power was thrust upon the 
trade unions and Social Democratic parties: Austria, Hungary, even 
Germany, were declared republics although no active republican party 
had ever been known to exist in any of these countries before. But 
hardly had the acute danger of dissolution passed and the services of 
the trade unions became superfluous than the middle classes tried to 
exclude the working class from all influence on public life.154 
 
A second, related reason for the failure was the overexpansion of democratic 
institutions into countries that lacked the domestic preconditions normally 
associated with democratic consolidation – factors like a large and powerful 
middle class, economic stability, or previous history with democratic governance. 
aught up in the wave of democratic optimism and Wilson’s democratic rhetoric, 
leaders of new states adopted institutions that had little chance of being 
consolidated in an atmosphere of economic uncertainty, political fragmentation, 
and ethnic strife.155 As Roberts writes, “Initial optimism only intensified 
dissatisfactions and disappointment felt with constitutional and liberal government 
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in Europe when it seemed to fail…”156 The spirit of postwar democratic enthusiasm 
inflated unrealistic expectations in countries whose prospects for its maintenance 
faced a number of tough challenges. As Raymond Aron writes: 
In countries restored or created by diplomatic decision, the model 
was the Western-type democracy that had needed a century to take 
root even in France. But these new countries were riven by 
nationalist conflicts. Their middle classes, with the sole exception of 
Czechoslovakia, were small and had no experience of power. So it 
was not surprising that the large number of parties, adding 
parliamentary quarrels to the underlying causes of division, soon 
proved inimical to the survival of the state.157 
 
The spirit of compromise and consensus required for parliamentary governance 
could not be sustained in an environment of quarreling ethnic and social groups 
brought together in artificially bounded territories. The newly-created states were 
“to a large extent accidents of the war.” None of them, with the exception of 
Poland, represented “a deeply felt, long-maturing, or widespread revolutionary 
settlement.”158 Croatians complained of Serbian mistreatment in Yugoslavia; 
Magyars of Romanian mistreatment in Transylvania, and so on. States born from 
the war “were as divided within their new frontiers as they had been within the old, 
and were separated from one another by even greater hostility than they had 
experienced under German or Hungarian domination,” writes Francois Furet. “The 
                                                
156
 Roberts 2008:312 
157  Aron 1951/ 2002:146 
158 Palmer et al 2002:745 
  
164 
Allies had miniaturized national hatred in the name of the principle of 
nationhood.”159  
Walter Bagehot, writing about France’s Third Republic, once noted that 
parliamentary government often fails because it requires “that a nation should have 
nerve to endure incessant discussion and frequent change of rulers.”160 For the 
states of interwar Europe, such nerve required, in the words of Fritz Stern, “a 
psychological stamina for ambiguity and uncertainty,” an attitude that that could 
not sustain enough adherents in the interwar period.161 With the disappearance of 
strong pro-democracy class coalitions and the absence domestic pre-requisites 
conducive for its consolidation, the momentum for democratization could not be 
sustained.  
Russia, for example, began its revolutionary path in 1917 with a turn to 
moderation and democratic rule, personified by the liberal, centrist figure of 
Alexander Kerensky, leader of the Provisional Government. “Six weeks ago Russia 
was an autocracy,” announced David Lloyd George in a speech in spring 1917. 
“She now is one of the most advanced democracies in the world.”162 But liberal 
democrats (represented by the Kadet party) could find no natural constituency 
                                                
159 Francois Furet (1999) The Passing of an Illusion: The Idea of Communism in the 
Twentieth Century, University of Chicago Press, p.58 
160 Walter Bagehot (1874/1965) Bagehot’s Historical Essays, edited by Norman St. 
John-Stevas, New York: Anchor Books, p. 449-50. Quoted in Fritz Stern (1992) The 
Failure of Liberalism: Essays on the Political Culture of Modern Germany, Columbia 
University Press, p.xxiv. 
161 Stern 1997:20 
162
 Quoted in James L. Slayden (1917) “Disarmament and International Courts 
Prerequisites to a Durable Peace” Annals of the American Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Vol.72, p.100 
  
165 
among the largely agrarian population. Russia’s lack of a stable middle class meant 
that anti-system parties like the Bolshevik could take advantage of peasant anxieties 
to undermine support for the Provisional Government. Promising peace for soldiers 
(Kerensky’s government unwisely decided to continue Russia’s involvement in the 
unpopular war) and bread for peasants, the Bolsheviks were able to manipulate 
public opinion to a sufficient extent to undertake a successful – and largely 
bloodless – coup d’etat in November of 1917. The democratic coalition that 
formed Russia’s government in February dissolved in the face of uncertainty, poor 
decisions, and lack of middle-class support, replaced only nine months later by a 
radical faction that praised democracy in theory and immediately began to 
dismantle it in practice. 
The collapse of the Russian empire created a temporary vacuum of power along 
is peripheries. As a result, a number of new states sprung from its periphery that 
proclaimed the universalist ideals of democracy and national self-determination. In 
February 1918, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and the eastern (Russian) portion of Armenia 
formed the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic. Though each 
nationality had wanted its own state, Wilson told the Azeri delegation at the Paris 
Peace Conference that he wanted to avoid territorial fragmentation, and advised 
them to form a union in order to achieve international recognition. When the union 
split apart after only three months later, its constituent members created three 
Democratic Republics. These states aspired to adopt the best practices of 
democratic rule such as suffrage and a parliament based on proportional 
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representation. Azerbaijan, for instance, set up a parliament elected on the basis of 
universal suffrage (including female suffrage – the first Muslim country to do so). In 
January 1920 the Allied Supreme Council formally recognized the new states, but 
by that point the Bolshevik state was re-asserting its former territorial claims. The 
Red Army occupied Azerbaijan in April 1920, Armenia (with Ottoman forces) in 
December 1920, and Georgia in March 1921, ending their brief attempts at 
democratization. These failed consolidations revealed another way in which the 
crisis of the war created self-destructing democracies. The war had temporarily 
weakened a losing hegemon to such an extent that sovereign states began peeling 
from its peripheries. But as the country stabilized itself after a civil war, these new 
territories were rapidly re-absorbed into the old empire, which had by now 
transformed itself into a communist state. 
Across eastern and central Europe, new countries were plagued by weak and 
fragmented parliamentary system. Party “factionalism” – the bugbear of the 1930s 
and a catalyst for the autocratic turn of that decade – was a problem for many of 
these states from the start. In the Baltics, fragmented legislatures composed of a 
number of small parties led to ephemeral governing majorities and short-lived 
coalitions. In Estonia between 1919 and 1933 an average government lasted eight 
months.163 The lack of political leadership was made worse by the absence of 
unifying native figures during the period of Russian domination.164 Lithuania was 
the first to falter, when in 1926 Antanas Smetona established an authoritarian 
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presidential regime. Latvia and Estonia managed to sustain democratic governance 
through the 1930s, however, and cannot be considered part of the post-war 
democratic rollback. The demise of democracy in these states (both succumbed in 
1934) can be more properly attributed to the Great Depression and the 
accompanying authoritarian wave of the 1930s.165 
Poland also experienced paralyzing party factionalism in the postwar years, and 
the country increasingly came to be ruled by Marshal Józef Pilsudski, widely 
admired for his role in restoring Polish independence and in the war with the new 
Soviet Union. Pilsudski acted as the country’s Chief of State until 1922, withdrew 
from politics in the following year and seized dictatorial power in 1926, ruling until 
his death in 1935.166 Hungary was another country in which a weak parliament 
created the space for an authoritarian turn, although in this case the collapse was 
much quicker. In October 1918 the liberal leftist count Mihaly Karolyi led the 
largely bloodless Chrysanthemum Revolution in October 1918. The Hungarian 
Democratic Republic, with Karolyi as president, was established on November 16. 
Once again, the domestic conditions inside the country were not conducive for 
democratic consolidation. The parliamentary government generated widespread 
discontent among the elites by preserving a prewar-size civil service that operated 
on a greatly reduced budget.167 Karolyi’s governing coalition ruled in parallel with 
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local revolutionary councils, composed of Social Democrats, which resembled the 
Russian Soviets, creating a condition of dual power similar to Russia’s fatal 
dvoevlastiye in 1917 that inhibited the parliament from exercising its authority and 
undermined its rule in both cases. Hungary’s Social Democrats, for instance, 
prevented Karolyi’s initiative of transferring land to peasants on the grounds that it 
would promote capitalism. Mass unemployment, inflation, refugee flows and a 
punitive armistice quickly drained public support for the new regime, until a 
revolutionary Communist dictatorship was established in March of 1919, only five 
months after Karolyi’s revolution. This in turn led to foreign intervention and a 
counter-revolution by the conservative forces led by Admiral Horthy, who 
established a conservative monarchy that governed the country until 1944. 
In Bulgaria, postwar politics were dominated by the Agrarian Union until its 
overthrow by a military revolt in 1923. The Union was a movement led by 
Alexander Stamboliyski that pursued economic and political policies on behalf of 
the peasants, who comprised nearly eighty percent of the population. 168 Despite 
his popularity with the peasants, Stamboliyski found no support among either the 
small middle class or the military. His party formed its own militia, called the 
Orange Shirts, who intimidated the political opposition. As one of the Central 
Powers in the war, Bulgaria was subject to a harsh peace treaty that reduced its 
territory, limited its army to twenty thousand men, and forced it to pay a hundred 
million pounds in reparations. As executor of the treaty, Stamboliyski became 
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increasingly unpopular with right-wing factions and the army, who finally carried 
out a coup in June 1923. While Stamboliyski pursued a peaceful foreign policy and 
genuinely sought to secure the political rights of the Bulgarian peasantry, his rule 
exhibited a heavy hand in dealing with those who disagreed with his policies. As 
with other countries in the region, Bulgaria’s political atmosphere was too volatile 
to maintain even a semblance of democracy, though in this case the downfall came 
from a rather low starting point. 
Democracy failed not only in new states but also in places like Portugal, which 
had some history with liberal constitutional rule, although of the oligarchic rather 
than democratic sort. For a few years after the war, the Republican parliamentary 
regime plodded along, “registering the greatest cabinet instability of any state in 
Europe, accompanied by high inflation, a massive public debt, and only minimal 
economic growth.”169 As in Bulgaria, Poland and Lithuania, a weak and fragmented 
parliamentary system in combination with a lack of social and economic pre-
conditions for democratic development led to an intervention by the military, who 
seized power in a nearly bloodless coup in May of 1926. 
Nationalist tensions in new multi-ethnic states also undermined the 
consolidation of democratic rule. The system of parliamentary democracy, reliant 
on consensus and compromise, was not suited for the fractious, multi-ethnic 
politics of Yugoslavia after 1919. It had existed since that time under the name of 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes as a multi-ethnic parliamentary 
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state (though not a true democracy) dominated by Serbs. Despite Croatian 
resistance, it “managed a chaotic semblance of parliamentary rule until 1929,” 
when King Alexander – himself a Serb who found governing increasingly difficult 
as the decade wore on – renamed the country Yugoslavia and established a 
dictatorship.170 In retrospect it was surprising that the system managed to last as 
long as it did, with political compromise so difficult to achieve in “so complex and 
divided a polity.” 171  
If Yugoslavia exemplified the absence of domestic conditions needed to sustain 
democracy, the failure of democracy in Germany showed the immense but 
temporary power of the war to create pro-democracy coalitions that dissolved as 
the crisis passed. In his push for making the world safe for democracy, Woodrow 
Wilson made the end of hostilities contingent upon German democratization 
(unlike the French, who demanded unconditional surrender). As German defeat 
began to seem more inevitable, the country’s leaders began backing democratic 
reforms in the hopes of securing a more favorable agreement with the Allies, 
particularly from the United States. In September 1918, General Erich Ludendorff 
proclaimed his support for a German parliamentary government. Ludendorff was 
far from a typical liberal. As Quartermaster General of the country’s army he 
oversaw the daily operations of General Hindenburg’s government, a military 
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dictatorship that ran the country during the last two years of the war.172 He 
anticipated that the hegemonic influence exerted by the United States would allow 
Germany to conclude a more favorable postwar settlement if it made a transition to 
democracy. Along the same lines, in October 1918 the Kaiser asked the liberal 
Prince Max of Baden to take up the chancellorship and begin settlement 
negotiations with the Entente powers. (As a signal of his democratic intentions, the 
Prince appointed a government that included representatives from the Social 
Democrats for the first time in German history.) During this period, Wilson 
continued to push for democracy as a pre-condition for an armistice. As Peceny 
notes, “this external pressure helped generate the incremental steps” taken by the 
Max von Baden government to liberalize Germany in October of 1918, so that 
power shifted to the elected Reichstag while the Chancellor, the Cabinet and the 
executive branch no longer reported to the Kaiser.173 These steps were taken with 
the hope that American influence would lead to more tolerable surrender terms for 
a democratic Germany. The fragile alliance of army officers, aristocracy, and 
liberal parties hinged on a successful postwar agreement dominated by the United 
States. After the war ended, however, Wilson lost his bargaining leverage both with 
the Allies (and with France in particular) and among the United States congress, 
who accused Wilson of leniency and pushed for a harsher peace. France insisted 
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upon punitive indemnities and the dismemberment of the Reich as a way to 
prevent another attempt at German hegemony. (Moreover, the insistence on 
democratization in central and eastern Europe fell by the wayside as France began 
to advocate strong alliances in the region to prevent the expansion of German 
influence, regardless of their internal regime.) Britain’s Liberal Party was more 
sympathetic to Wilson’s cause, but the December 1918 elections brought in a 
conservative coalition that demanded a much more punitive peace. Wilson lost 
even the support of his own Congress, as the Republicans won both houses in 
midterm elections held days before the signing of the Armistice in November 1918. 
During the election, the Republicans had accused Wilson of being soft on 
Germany, and campaigned for unconditional surrender.174 
The Allied victory thus not only destroyed the legitimacy of Germany’s 
authoritarian regime and created a window of opportunity for political reform in 
November of 1918, but also created incentives for erstwhile German conservatives 
to adopt pro-democratic views. German transition to democracy immediately 
before the end of the war resulted from “the contingent commitment to democracy 
by elements of the authoritarian regime in the somewhat mistaken hope that a 
republican Germany would earn a more lenient peace agreement than one 
governed by Kaiser Wilhelm.”175 This embrace of democracy, however, hinged on 
a favorable outcome in postwar negotiations with the Allies. When that outcome 
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failed to materialize, the incentive for democratization among the army and the 
conservative elites faded as well, providing another blow to the uneasy pro-
democracy coalition created by the crisis of the war.176 Germany’s governing 
“Weimar coalition” – the Majority Social Democrats, the catholic Center party, and 
the liberal German Democratic party – was saddled with blame for the punitive 
judgment brought upon the country at Versailles. These three parties had been the 
foremost proponents of democratization before the war, and their failure to secure 
a tolerable peace crippled their ability to govern through the 1920s. Between 1919 
(the last time the Weimar coalition gained an electoral majority) and 1933, the 
Reichstag did not sustain a majority government and was constantly challenged by 
anti-system parties from both the extreme left and the extreme right. The initial 
popularity of the Social Democrats stemmed in large part from middle-class voters 
who saw a strong Social Democratic party as a defense against labor unrest and a 
potential Bolshevik revolution. Germany’s military officers supported the 
democratic reforms offered by the Weimar Coalition for that reason, as the 
historian Richard Evans argues: 
[T]he General Staff agreed with the Majority Social Democrats under 
Friedrich Ebert that the threat of the revolutionary workers’ and 
soldiers’ council would best be warded off if they worked in tandem 
to secure a stable parliamentary democracy…this was an act of 
expediency, not of faith….Within a short space of time, however, the 
workers’ and soldiers’ councils had faded from the political scene, 
and the need for compromise with the forces of democracy seemed 
to many leading officers to have lost its urgency.177  
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Business interests likewise stood behind democratic reforms for reasons that 
were bound to disappear as the Communist threat receded. “Like other elements of 
the Wilhelmine establishment,” writes Evans, “big business accepted the Republic 
because it seemed the most likely way of warding off something worse.”178 But as 
the threat of a Communist revolution faded, the temporarily parallel interests of 
industrialists, the aristocracy and the forces of democracy began to diverge. The 
Social Democrats’ representation in the Reichstag fell from an all-time high of 38% 
in the 1919 elections to around 25% over the next decade.179 “The widespread 
feeling after 1923 that the threat of a Bolshevik revolution had receded,” writes 
Evans, “meant that the bourgeois parties were no longer so willing to compromise 
with the Social Democrats in the interests of preserving the Republic as a bulwark 
against Communism.”180  
Between 1919 and 1933 the country saw twenty different cabinets, each lasting 
on average less than eight months. Unstable coalitions created constant squabbles 
and weakened the parliament’s ability to govern, “since all they could settle on was 
the lowest common denominator and the line of least resistance.”181 While the 
anticipation of beneficial American influence provided an additional incentive for 
reforms, this influence did not materialize in the aftermath of the war and fatally 
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crippled the governing Weimar Coalition. In short, the crisis of the war generated 
two incentives for liberalization – fear of Communism and hope for an American-
led settlement – that disappeared in the postwar years, undermining the effort to 
sustain German democracy. 
In the interwar period, Czechoslovakia was the exception that proved the rule. 
Created in 1918 and expanded to include Ruthenia in 1919, the Czechoslovak 
Republic “brought together regions at very different levels of development 
populated by people with very different experiences.”182 It adopted a constitution 
based on the French and American models, with proportional representation, a 
dual executive designed to keep the president weak, guarantees of individual rights 
and freedoms, and an elected National Assembly that enjoyed a monopoly on 
legislative initiative. The First Czechoslovak Republic was “a comparatively 
modern, well-functioning democracy.”183 Despite tensions between Czechs and 
Slovaks, it stood apart as the only east European state that retained democratic 
institutions through the 1930s.184 In the second half of the 1930s it was an island of 
democracy in a sea of despotism, finally succumbing to a German takeover in 
1939.  
The survival of Czechoslovakian democracy can be directly traced to the nature 
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of the party coalitions. The so-called petka, a five-party coalition that ruled the 
country for most of the interwar period, created a government “dominated by 
disciplined political parties” and provided a measure of continuity and stability.185 
While its neighbors experienced short-lived governments or takeovers by anti-
system parties, Czechoslovakia managed to maintain a degree of political 
coherence and internal stability through the petka. Its members met regularly to 
advise the prime minister and shape cabinet policies. These sessions ensured that 
internal disagreements did not spiral out of control, prevented cabinet crises at 
times of unrest (such as during the period of hyper-inflation in 1922-23), enabled 
the government to maintain unity in the eyes of public opinion, and created rigid 
discipline and a locus for political action when necessary.186 As a result, the 
governing coalition never faced a significant challenge from anti-system parties. 
The domestic conditions in Czechoslovakia, in short, were uniquely adopted to 
maintaining democratic institutions in spite of general instability across the 
continent. 
For Czechoslovakia’s neighbors, however, the outcome was very different. As 
E.H. Carr later wrote in The Twenty Years Crisis: “The liberal democracies scattered 
throughout the world by the peace settlement of 1919 were the product of abstract 
theory, stuck no roots in the soil, and quickly shriveled away.”187 Across much of 
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Europe, democracies “had to operate in a world in which it had many enemies, old 
and new,” writes Roberts. “It had not been a widespread form of government 
before 1914 and many Europeans were soon regretting the passing of the regimes 
under which they had previously lived.”188 The political and economic instability in 
the newly-created states further undermined democracy’s chances. As Frieden 
writes: 
The successor states started from scratch, the spawn of defeated 
autocracies. They scrambled to turn former provinces into modern 
nation-states in the midst of famine and economic collapse. The new 
governments typically had few ways to pay their bills other than to 
print money. The result was a wave of inflation that destroyed the 
value of currencies, disrupted economies, and in extreme cases 
threatened the social fabric of nations.189  
 
While the outcome of the war propped up democracy on the podium of 
universal acclaim, reality soon showed that these hopes had created the 
democratic version of a stock market bubble on the European continent, one that 
was bound to burst as the decade set in. Extraordinary ad hoc domestic coalitions 
that came together to create the initial wave dissolved as the immediate crisis of the 
war passed. In the absence of strong pro-democracy coalitions, domestic 
circumstances in economically and socially undeveloped states could not sustain 
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The First World War produced the century’s first democratic wave by 
demonstrating democracy’s effectiveness to rulers, creating new states on the ruins 
of autocratic empires, and increasing the organizational power of women and 
working-class men. With its reliance on industrial production at home and mass 
armies at the front, the war made the support of workers and conscripted soldiers 
crucial for waging the war. The connection between mass mobilization and 
democracy was not predetermined, but mobilization did open up opportunities for 
reforms whose outcome hinged on the outcome of the war.  
The defeat of autocracies and the emergence of the United States as a new 
global hegemon produced a brief moment when democracy appeared to be the 
only way forward. It was, in retrospect, an ill-fated victory. The fundamental 
premise of the Versailles treaty – the idea of democracy as the answer to the 
problems of modernity – was not established by the outcome of the war. The 
democracies that emerged from the war were “never secure in their claims of 
legitimacy in those states where this legitimacy was most closely tested.”190 The 
Soviet Union after 1923 and Germany after 1933 – two states excluded from the 
negotiations at Versailles – would in time offer their own visions of the modern 
state. By the end of the 1930s, democracy appeared discredited and moribund. 
Given the general tenor of that period, can we separate the democratic backlash of 
the 1920s from the authoritarian, fascist-inspired wave of the 1930s? These 
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distinctions are not always easy to draw, but one essential difference was the 
revolutionary mentality of the anti-democratic movements. In the 1920s, classic 
conservatives moved away from democracy to preserve the old order and exclude 
the masses from political life. By the next decade, revolutionary conservatives 
sought to demolish the old order, to bring the masses into politics, and to 
fundamentally transform relations among social and economic classes – as detailed 
in the next chapter. 
The postwar democratic wave sowed seeds of its own demise as rulers and 
coalitions, swept up in the post-war momentum, adopted liberal institutions in 
countries that lacked the social cohesion, political pre-conditions or economic 
stability necessary for democratic consolidation. Pro-reform coalitions that initiated 
the changes dissolved as the crisis passed. In addition, those rulers who saw 
democratization as a way to ingratiate themselves with the United States were met 
instead with empty rhetoric instead of economic assistance and security 
guarantees. In the beginning, those who “lacked a principled commitment to 
liberal democracy embraced the liberal creed because they thought Wilson and the 
victorious Allies would provide material benefits to those who jumped on the 
democratic bandwagon,” writes Peceny. “Over time, the failure of the liberal great 
powers to reward other states for embracing liberal institutions…led those who 
only had a contingent commitment to democracy to abandon that commitment.”191 
Wilson had hoped that Europe would accept his vision for the world “more by 
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moral and ideological appeal,” as Ikenberry puts it, “than by the exercise of 
American power or diplomatic tact.”192 In the end, that hope proved elusive. The 
failure of the post-war wave can therefore be explained in part by the rising 
hegemon’s reticence to use coercion or influence to promote democratic regimes, 
relying instead on the expectation that emulation alone would create a world safe 
for democracy.  
In failing to resolve the major dilemma of the twentieth century – the design 
and legitimacy of the modern nation-state – World War I was the first a series of 
confrontations between democracy and alternative institutional arrangements. The 
outcome of these confrontations were shaped in large part by sudden shocks to the 
global distribution of power and the incentives for reform they created in states 
around the world. In the end, the war was “indeed a victory for democracy, though 
a bitter one,” writes Palmer. “For the basic problems of modern civilization, 
industrialism and nationalism, economic security and international stability, it gave 
no answer.”193 Its outcome inaugurated a struggle for influence and legitimacy that 
ended only when the last remaining alternative imploded in 1991. But in the late 
1920s, Europe’s first democratic experiment teetered on the edge of failure. It was 
the Great Depression that sent it into the abyss of the interwar years. 
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“We are at the present time passing through a certain  
disillusionment about democracy.” 
 
--A.D. Lindsay (1929)1 
 
 
“As the clever hopes expire 
of a low dishonest decade:  
Waves of anger and fear  
Circulate over the bright 
And darkened lands of the earth” 
  





In 1942, Joseph Schumpeter published his Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. 
Now remembered chiefly as a paean to the “creative destruction” of capitalism, the 
book was actually a eulogy for what Schumpeter saw as a dying system. Although 
it was the ever-evolving nature of capitalism that made it the best system for 
increasing productivity and standards of living, Schumpeter did not believe that 
                                                
1
 A.D. Lindsay (1951) The Essentials of Democracy, Oxford University Press, p.7, 
quoted in Fritz Stern (1997) “The new democracies in crisis in interwar Europe” in 
Axel Hadenius, ed., Democracy’s Victory and Crisis, Cambridge University Press. 
2 W.H. Auden (1939) “September 1, 1939” in Another Time 
  
182 
either capitalism or liberal democracy would be able to survive in the face of 
fascism and socialism. Capitalism, he argued, “produced [an] atmosphere of almost 
universal hostility to its own social order.” The replacement of the petit bourgeois 
by giant corporations took “the life out of the idea of property....Dematerialized, 
defunctionalized and absentee ownership does not call forth moral allegiance as 
the vital form of property did.” And even as the progress of capitalism corroded its 
own moral legitimacy, it spurred an alienated and hostile class of intellectuals who 
further undermined the system’s appeal and incited movements that would call for 
its replacement.3  
 Moreover, since democracy for Schumpeter was a “product of the capitalist 
process” and therefore associated with its failure, their decline would be 
simultaneous and mutually reinforcing. Like many of his contemporaries, 
Schumpeter did not believe that the fractious nature of democracy was equipped to 
handle the conflicts of complex modern societies, since “the democratic method 
never works at its best when nations are much divided on fundamental questions of 
social structure.” The real struggle, Schumpeter argued, would be between 
socialism and fascism, in which socialism would eventually emerge as the winner. 
He concluded with a “pessimistic prognosis” about capitalist democracy – not only 
because of the system’s inherent inability to resolve serious class conflict, but also 
because as more countries became socialist, democracy’s power and legitimacy 
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would fade by comparison.4  
 Written in the late 1930s, the nadir of liberal democracy, Schumpeter’s 
predictions echoed the views of many of his contemporaries. The growing 
legitimacy and acceptance of fascist institutions reflected the hegemonic transition 
that followed the onset of the Great Depression in 1929 and accelerated with the 
Nazi ascent to power in 1933. Moreover, this reversal of fortune was directly tied 
to the differences between fascist and democratic institutions. All across Europe, 
writes Sheri Berman, “the political and economic policies and appeals offered by 
fascists and national socialists proved to be widely popular. Tapping into the 
widespread longing for some alternative to the reigning capitalist system and for an 
end to class conflict and social divisions, fascists and national socialists managed to 
achieve a surprising degree of support.”5 As Jeffry Frieden writes:  
Governments in central, eastern, and southern Europe invoked a new 
fascist ideal as they stamped out labor, the Left, and eventually all 
opposition in the march toward militaristic self-reliance. The upper 
tier of developing countries in Latin America, the Middle East and 
Asia rejected Europe and North America to build national economies 
on nationalist principles; the colonies prepared themselves to do the 
same.6 
 
The wave of fascism that swept the world after 1933 was the result of a growing 
disparity between the declining democratic powers – Britain, France, and 
especially the United States – and their vibrant non-democratic rivals, Nazi 
                                                
4
 Schumpeter 1942:297-8 
5
 Sheri Berman (2006) The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracy and the Making 
of Europe’s Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, p.151 
6
 Jeffry A. Frieden (2006) Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth 
Century, W.W. Norton and Company, p. 228 
  
184 
Germany and the Soviet Union. Amid the decay and fear of the 1930s (Auden’s 
“low, dishonest decade”) the latter two stood as beacons of hope and models of 
growth for leaders and masses alike. They had loudly rejected the conventional 
politics and economics associated with the Great Depression, and presented 
themselves as viable institutional alternatives to the failure of liberal democracy. 
Electoral triumphs in 1933 and a fascist victory in the Spanish civil war three years 
later “showed that fascists could win both in the polling booth and on the 
battlefield. For many people, democracy did not seem up to the dynamic new 
challenge.”7 The years of the Great Depression were a time “when the idea of 
Parliament as a fraud and a folly, a slow-footed relic of a dying age, was a standard 
faith of intellectuals on left and right alike.”8 
This chapter traces the growth in influence of authoritarian movements and the 
proliferation of institutions borrowed from Germany in Europe and around the 
world in the decade between 1933 and 1943. Since Soviet relative power grew less 
slowly in this period, and the adoption of Communist institutions did not reach 
critical mass until after the war, in this chapter I focus primarily on the influence of 
fascism.  
In its timing and content, the wave of reforms conformed to the expected 
patterns of the hegemonic transition. As the relative power of democratic regimes 
declined, democracy increasingly became seen as stagnant, outdated, and 
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inefficient. At the same time, as Germany began to increase its share of relative 
power and eliminated the pernicious scourge of unemployment, other states began 
to look toward fascism as a model for emulation. German economic expansion, 
particularly into South America and Eastern Europe, also drew states into its orbit. 
Germany and Italy also attempted to extend their influence through the financial 
support of a number of fascist movements in Europe, the Middle East, and Latin 
America. The onset of World War II began the final, coercive phase of the fascist 
wave, as Germany and Japan set up a number of puppets and tutelary regimes 
across Europe and Southeast Asia.  
Thus all three mechanisms of emulation, influence, and coercion (in that 
general order) contributed to the fascist wave between 1933 and 1943. In this 
period, a number of states adopted fascist institutions and expressed admiration for 
fascist innovations in the field of political economy. Fascist influence is easiest to 
trace in states whose leaders proclaimed themselves as such – Italy, Germany, 
Austria, Spain, Hungary, Romania, and Japan, and to a lesser extent Portugal and 
Greece. The list expanded greatly during Nazi takeovers between 1938 and 1943. 
At its height in the summer of 1942, the fascist order – fascist states, its occupied 
territories, colonies, satellites, puppets and tutelary regimes – included half the 
world’s population, or “virtually all of Europe and the Middle East and much of 
Asia and Africa.”9 Hitler’s empire alone “stretched from the Mediterranean to the 
                                                
9
 Frieden 2007:215 
  
186 
Arctic, from the English Channel to the Black Sea and almost the Caspian.”10  
The timing of the fascist wave also demonstrates the importance of hegemonic 
shocks in influencing institutional reforms. Mussolini seized power in 1922 
(although his regime was not consolidated until several years later and opposition 
newspapers continued until 1925). But as with the Russian revolution of 1917, a 
new ideology alone could not inspire a fascist wave without an accompanying 
hegemonic transition. Although a number of minor imitators sprung up in 
Mussolini’s wake, very few of these movements achieved any measure of 
popularity until after 1933. Stanley Payne, a prominent historian of fascism, noted 
the paucity of philofascist groups in the 1920s, concluding that “the major diffusion 
of fascist movements throughout Europe occurred during the following decade, in 
the aftermath of Hitler's triumph.”11 Codreanu’s Legion of the Archangel Michael in 
Romania, for example, was formed in 1927 but did develop any significant 
following until the mid-1930s. Likewise in Hungary, fascist mass mobilization 
efforts failed during the 1920s but succeeded in the following decade, encouraged 
both by foreign example and the deepening frustrations of Hungarian society.12  
The growing power of Germany meant that it could also exercise influence in 
more direct but not coercive ways.  This took the form of increasing trade ties with 
regions that did not have established relations with Western colonial powers, 
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particularly in Latin America and central Europe. In Latin America, for example, 
Germany’s share of imports grew from 7.3% to 16.2% between 1932 and 1938.13 
This enabled Germany to intervene in the economic affairs of its trading partners; 
in Eastern Europe, for example, it forced Romania to reserve its mineral oils for 
German export and sought to prevent the region’s economic integration.14 As 
German power revived, neutrality became much more difficult for its neighbors, 
who were forced to move closer toward a regime they may not have wished to 
imitate otherwise.  
But focusing on the overt expansion in influence and territory omits the more 
subtle channels through which fascist influence manifested itself in nominally non-
fascist states. Beginning in the early 1930s, political leaders all over the world 
began looking to Nazi institutional innovations without necessarily wishing to 
borrow the accompanying ideological baggage. National labor services designed to 
relieve unemployment, state-directed economies, systems of social welfare, mass 
political mobilization and strong executive rule were all hallmarks of statist 
innovations that took hold in the 1930s and later became essential components of 
modern mixed economies. Berman, in her study of the evolution of social 
democracy, concludes: “Several critical “innovations” championed by fascists and 
national socialists – such as the notion of a “people’s party” and an economic order 
that aimed to control but not destroy capitalism – became central features of 
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Europe’s postwar order.”15  
Because fascist expansion in the 1930s often proceeded by piecemeal 
borrowing of fascist institutions, it is important to define what constituted a fascist 
regime. More than any other regime type of the twentieth century, fascism eludes a 
concise definition. The historian Stanley Payne calls it “the vaguest of the major 
political terms” while Furet describes it as “a fuzzy, autodidactic amalgam”. 16 
Defining fascism is a difficult task; although during the height of its appeal it drew 
many intellectuals into its orbit, it lacked the theoretical and intellectual tradition of 
either communism and democracy. Hitler “never quoted anyone, so convinced 
was he of the absolute originality of his pronouncements.” 17 During the 1930s, 
certain leaders called themselves fascists without embracing any of its institutional 
features.  Others rejected the label even as they assiduously imitated elements of 
fascist regimes. At the same time, and particularly after World War II, “people of 
every political persuasion, and especially socialists and communists, have tended 
to attach the label of fascism so freely to whoever happens to oppose them as to 
obscure all distinctions.”18  
A single definition is complicated by the absence of a well-defined fascist 
“program”. There were important differences even within the two archetypal states, 
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Italy and Germany. The German authoritarians were, strictly speaking, Nazis rather 
than fascists. Whereas for fascism economy and society existed to exalt the state, 
for Nazis the state was the paramount instrument through which culture, politics 
and economics served to exalt the Aryan race. Its apotheosis was the Volk and the 
Volksgemeinschaft rather than the government - and although this distinction was 
more than cosmetic, its practical consequence in both cases led to the total 
subjugation of the individual to the state apparatus. In this chapter I use the term 
“fascism” to refer to both variants, following Payne’s advice to treat the word as “as 
a general type or generic phenomenon for heuristic and analytic purposes.” The 
fascist regime, he writes, “is an abstraction which never existed in pure empirical 
form but constitutes a conceptual device which serves to clarify the analysis of 
individual political phenomena.”19  
In the 1930s, fascism was a broad but nevertheless distinct family of 
authoritarian institutions bound by a shared philosophy of the state’s relation to the 
economy and the individual. It  arose as a response and a challenge not only to 
communism and liberal democracy but also to classical conservative 
authoritarianism. It rejected the autonomy of the economic sphere and the 
individual inherent in liberal democracy, and subordinated both to the general 
political will. In this it overlapped with communism, its sworn enemy. But while it 
rejected the primacy of capitalism over politics, it never went so far as to abandon 
the idea of private property or national tradition. (Indeed, it fetishized the 
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protection of private property as a defense against both communism and large-
scale finance capitalism, and found many supporters among small landowners. As 
fascism portrayed it, communal ownership and collectivization of the land 
presented threat from the left, while monopolies and large landowners threatened 
the small property-owners from the right.)20Also unlike communism, fascism saw 
the basic divisions of human communities shaped by national boundaries rather 
than socioeconomic classes. And while Communism sought to break free from the 
chains of the past, fascists sought a return to a mythical, prelapsarian age, free of 
the diseases of modernity. In this they resembled the classic conservatives of 
yesteryear, but this resemblance was only partial. As documented in the previous 
chapter, democratic breakdowns began to occur soon after World War I. Given the 
general authoritarian bent of the period, how does one separate democratic 
breakdowns from the influence of fascist institutions? The distinction is indeed 
difficult to trace in some cases. But with the exception of Italy, until 1933 what 
replaced democracy in these states was traditional conservative rule. It is here that 
the difference between fascist authoritarianism of the 1930s and traditional 
authoritarianism of the 1920s becomes instructive. The crisis of the Great 
Depression meant that authoritarian leaders could no longer remain content with 
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the classical authoritarian model. Instead of merely defending the status quo, the 
government now had to step in to stimulate the economy with welfare programs 
and deficit spending. The mobilization of popular support replaced the innate 
classical-authoritarian distrust of mobs and rallies; staid hierarchy gave way to 
charismatic, energetic leadership that promised action.  
In short, the populist authoritarian regimes of the 1930s moved away from their 
conventional law-and-order counterparts of previous years by borrowing elements 
of fascist institutions. “The 1930s and 1940s were the period of fascist success,” 
writes the historian Hugh Seton-Watson. “Inevitably fascist policies and institutions 
were aped by others.”21 Germany’s growing power “stimulated rightist movements 
and right-wing authoritarian regimes to adopt varying degrees of "fascistization" – 
certain outward trappings of fascist style-to present a more modern and dynamic 
image, with the hope of attaining broader mobilization and infrastructure.”22 This 
process was not synonymous with fascism – but, Payne notes, “it would be grossly 
inaccurate to argue that this process proceeded independent of fascism.”23 It had 
borrowed the public aesthetics, the choreography, and the semiotics of fascism, 
along with a new approach to political economy that emphasized the primacy of 
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political will over the national economy.24 Fascists and authoritarians had common 
enemies – big business, liberalism, Jews, and communists – categories that often 
overlapped in the muddled rhetoric of the times. Common goals led to “numerous 
instances of tactical alliances…between fascists and right authoritarians, and 
sometimes even cases of outright fusion, especially between fascists and the radical 
right…”25 When traditional authoritarian leaders sought inspiration for domestic 
reforms, the fascist model presented a natural path for development. The kings of 
Romania, Bulgaria, Greece, and Yugoslavia “ruled with the support of local 
fascists,” and this relationship was symbiotic, writes Frieden: “Traditional 
conservatives needed the fascists' mass base; the fascists needed the conservatives' 
credibility with big business.”26 And although the new authoritarians of the 1930s 
rarely approached the Third Reich’s “total coordination of all political, economic, 
intellectual and biological activities in a revolutionary mass-based dictatorship,” 
they nevertheless “borrowed features of fascism, establishing a corporative state, 
outlawing independent labor organizations, and forbidding strikes.”27 
Unlike the classic conservatives who fetishized tradition, fascists sought a break 
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from the old authoritarian ways of rule. Masses would be mobilized rather than 
shut out of politics. The sentiments that led to mass uprisings in nineteenth-century 
Europe would now be vented into new channels of discontent through spectacular 
rallies. Even though they were not always successful in this pursuit, fascist 
movements “always sought to transcend the elitist parliamentary cliquishness of 
poorly mobilized liberal groups or the sectarian exclusiveness and reliance on elite 
manipulation often found in the authoritarian right.”28 In doing so they combined 
modern mass politics with a reactionary mindset. Fascist leaders promoted 
traditional values through the untraditional mobilization of popular discontent.  “In 
their original ideas they often closely resemble old-fashioned conservatives, but 
their methods of struggle, indeed their whole notion of political organization, 
belong not to the idealized past but to the modern age,” writes Hugh Seton-
Watson. “Their outlook may be nostalgic, and it is certainly elitist, but as a political 
force they are more democratic than oligarchic.”29 As Rothermund points out, the 
fascist cult of the leader “was more primitive and barbarian than the Italian and 
German monarchies of prewar times. On the other hand it was very modern in its 
use of the mass media and in its support of science and technology.” 30 Frieden 
concisely sums up its contradictory impulses: 
Fascists celebrated agrarian traditionalism but accelerated 
industrialization. Their rhetoric trumpeted individualism and 
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independence, but their policies championed monopolies and 
cartels. Fascist rallies gloried in the splendor of supposed imperial 
pasts while demonizing the imperialist powers. Fascism concurrently 
embraced both reaction and radical change, preached a return to the 
moral certainties of a preindustrial idyll, but promised a rapid 
advance to modern industrialism.31 
 
Fascism was thus both a refutation of the past and the embrace of a pastoral, 
idealized simulacrum of that past. It rejected a vulgar and decadent modernity even 
as it sought to forge its own version of a hyper-modern state. Revolutionary 
conservatives, nihilistic utopians, pastoral industrializers, elitist populists - in such 
contradictions resides fascism’s paradoxical, ill-defined nature. It was above all a 
negation of the world in which it resided (Hitler was, in the words of lapsed Nazi 
writer Hermann Rauschning , “a prophet of nihilism”)32 that existed to create the 
world anew. It was a particularistic, national creed that sought - and found - 
imitators in countries and colonies spread widely around the world. (In 1928 
Mussolini famously declared that fascism was “not for export” before embarking, a 
few years later, on an ambitious program to do exactly that.)33 It managed to 
combine a broad populism with a belief in the power of a select oligarchy: “The 
appeal to the entire people and nation, together with the attempt to incorporate the 
masses in both structure and myth,” writes Payne, “was accompanied by a strong 
formal emphasis on the role and function of an elite, which was held to be both 
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uniquely fascist and indispensable to any achievement.”34 Sorting through these 
contradictions, Rothermund stresses “the rather eclectic and diffuse character of 
fascist ‘ideology’ which attracted all kinds of people – often for very different 
reasons. In this respect,” he argues, “fascism shared many traits with other populist 
movements which also drew strength from diffuse sets of ideas rather than from 
intellectual clarity.”35 
But even if the ideas were diffuse, even if fascism is best conceptualized as a 
loose family of institutions united by an overarching philosophy, what were some 
of its family traits, and what was that philosophy? One distinguishing feature the 
glorification of war and the militarization of party politics. For fascists “war was an 
act of creation that determined everything that followed”36– appropriately enough, 
since it was born out of the failure of peacemaking of World War I.  Martial virtues 
suffused daily politics, finding expression in militia and paramilitary groups (the so-
called “shirt movements”) that formed an integral element of party organization); in 
the military insignia, terminology, and rituals that reinforced the idea of national 
struggle; and even in the “male chauvinism and the tendency to exaggerate the 
masculine principle in almost every aspect of activity.”37 Another feature was the 
exaltation of youth as the cynosure of racial perfection and the encouragement of 
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youth movements. Charismatic leaders - exemplified by Hitler, Mussolini, 
Belgium’s Leon Degrelle, or Spain’s Antonio Prima de Reivera - and the 
accompanying cults of personality were another recurring theme. While a strong 
authoritarian leader and a cult of personality are obviously not limited to fascist 
regimes, “there was nonetheless a general tendency to exalt leadership, hierarchy, 
and subordination,” writes Payne, “so that all fascist movements came to espouse 
variants of a Führerprinzip, deferring to the creative function of leadership more 
than to prior ideology or a bureaucratized party line.”38 
Fascism displayed its greatest influence in the way it reorganized relations 
between the society and the economy, and this was its other distinctive trait that 
would later be adopted and absorbed by liberal democracy - transforming it, in the 
process, into the social democracy of today. Fascists sought to subordinate 
industrial capital to the needs of the state and the nation, in the process “creating a 
new communal or reciprocal productive relationship through new priorities, ideals, 
and extensive governmental control and regulation.”39 The managed political 
economy of fascism combined Keynesian finances, state guidance of industry, 
welfare schemes and labor programs that aimed to create full employment. Trade 
unions and powerful industrialists were crushed, which provided an excellent 
short-term solution to the problems of economic depression: “social frictions were 
eliminated, wages were kept down, production stepped up and full employment 
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was quickly achieved.”40 Fascists’ relationship with business was not entirely 
antagonistic; while they placed controls on the economy and encouraged autarky, 
they also suppressed wages and supported heavy industry.41 
Given the above elements, which countries in the 1930s would qualify as 
fascist? The answer is not found in a simple enumeration of who converted and 
who resisted. The division was never that clear-cut. As Payne puts it: 
[A] rigorous "either-or" approach toward the problem of generic 
fascism is fundamentally misleading. That is, the common reduction 
of all putative fascisms to one single generic phenomenon of 
absolutely common identity is inaccurate, while a radically 
nominalist approach which insists that all radical nationalist 
movements of interwar Europe were inherently different, though 
correct in the narrow technical sense that not one was a carbon copy 
of any other, has the opposite defect of ignoring distinctive 
similarities.42 
 
A strict definition would limit the list of fascist states to one - Italy. At the same 
time, “there was a certain family relationship between a number of political 
movements which played a leading part in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, and 
which historians ought to see in their relations to each other.” 43 More expansive 
definitions would also include Germany, Austria, Japan, Hungary, Romania, Spain, 
and Portugal. In addition, Falangist movements saw a growth in power across in 
Latin America, and philofascist movements expanded their influence in the Middle 
East. 
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In interwar democracies, by contrast, the diffusion of fascist institutions 
manifested itself not in the often small vote shares of fascist movements, but in the 
absorption of their ideas by mainstream political parties. In these countries, 
German ability to solve the problems of unemployment and social unrest through 
state planning attracted a great deal of interest and admiration, and spurred 
imitation driven by the need to compete in the international arena. Wrote Karl 
Manheim in 1940: “Competition with [the totalitarian] states compels the 
democracies to make use of some, at least, of their methods.”44 In many cases, 
political leaders adopted features of fascist regimes while simultaneously rejecting 
the ideological underpinnings that shaped their creation. The most widely adopted 
feature was some degree of corporatism, or a state-directed economy. Whereas 
liberal capitalism viewed politics and economics as separate spheres, Germany 
injected political control into the national economy. This subordination of the 
economic by the political took the form of extensive regulation, state planning 
committees, industrial subsidies, price and wage controls, job creation programs, 
and deficit spending.  
A major difference between the fascist regimes and countries like France, 
Sweden and the United States was that they chose to co-opt the labor movement 
rather than destroy it. But the fundamental goal and the method by which the goal 
was reached was still borrowed from fascist innovations – the establishment of a 
mixed economy in which the state would regulate economic activity in order to 
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avoid the vices of capitalism. As Schivelbusch notes, the policy discussions in the 
world’s remaining democracies “show how willing many people within the liberal 
camp were to try to save the situation by jettisoning liberal ballast. Some suggested 
reintroducing state-directed economies, like those during World War I; others 
proposed imitating various Fascist models.”45 Even Britain, a bastion of free 
enterprise, succumbed to the allure of authoritarian institutions. Late interwar 
Britain “was a uniquely gloomy and fearful era, a morbid age that saw the future of 
civilization in terms of disease, decay, and death” and experienced a loss of faith in 
the free-market system.46 Central planning seemed to be the answer, and held 
much appeal in the 1930s: “The successes of the planned economies in the 1930s 
confirmed what many believed instinctively: market forces could not go 
unregulated after the chaos of the slump.”47 These fears extended to issues of 
everyday governance, such as public infrastructure; “There was much angst in the 
1930s…about the speed with which fascist Italy and Germany were building 
[roads], leaving muddled, democratic Britain in the dust.”48 “The mere efficiency of 
such a system, the elimination of waste and obstruction, is obvious,” wrote George 
Orwell about fascism in 1939. “However horrible this system may seem to us, it 
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The United States represents a paradigmatic case of fascist influence that 
manifested itself in institutional imitation. The only categorically fascist party in the 
country was the German-American Bund, a tiny and uninfluential organization 
whose ranks peaked at fifteen thousand and whose members, many of whom 
German immigrants, never stood the chance of winning actual political office. 
Instead, fascist influence manifested itself through open interest in successful 
German institutions by the New Dealers. In a case study of the United States 
presented later in the chapter, I document the many ways in which American 
intellectuals, civil servants and politicians expressed admiration for Nazi reforms 
while rejecting the racial, authoritarian, and aggressive aspects of that regime. For 
now a few examples will suffice. Rexford Tugwell, a member of Roosevelt’s brain 
trust, openly expressed his admiration for Soviet planning and fascist corporatism. 
Decrying the ideological foundation of fascism, Tugwell nevertheless described it 
as “the cleanest, neatnest [sic], most efficiently operating piece of social machinery 
I’ve ever seen. It makes me envious.”50 As late as 1938, Roosevelt ordered a report 
on the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the German labor service, “not to procure propaganda 
material against the Third Reich, but as a source of information and inspiration”.51 
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Thanking the American ambassador in Berlin for the report, he wrote: “All of this 
helps us in planning, even though our methods are of the democratic variety!’”52  
Unsurprisingly, such syncretic imitation proved politically toxic after the 
beginning of the war, and particularly after the Axis defeat in 1945. Any hint of 
German influence was expunged from official statements. For example, when the 
administration publicly discussed the adoption of Nazi labor institutions in 1938, 
and actually integrated some of its elements into the Civilian Conservation Corps, 
“there was no public outcry…By 1941 that would have been unthinkable.” Instead, 
“The openness that had marked the late 1930s had vanished. In the face of the 
second world war…anything that was or seemed to be German was unacceptable 
to the American public.”53 The surprising extent of fascist institutional influence has 
remained mostly ignored in American consciousness and historiography, for 
predictable if self-serving reasons. After the war, “memories of the New Deal’s 
common roots with its enemies were repressed, and postwar America was free to 
enjoy a myth of immaculate conception of the liberal-democratic welfare state.”54 
“Despite the horror of the Nazi period, or rather because of it, the parallels 
between the German experience and those of other countries are important,” writes 
Peter Gourevitch in a comparative study of political responses to the economic 
crisis of the 1930s. “The economic policy experimentation of the early years of the 
Nazi period is an enhanced form of what Sweden, the United States, and France 
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were groping toward in the 1930s and what most of Western Europe and North 
American pursued after World War II: a mixed economy, with fiscal stimulus, 
regulated markets, and some public ownership of production.”55 Countries 
seemingly as diverse as Sweden, Germany, and the US “all experimented with 
demand stimulus and corporatist market regulation in the 1930s.”56 The fact that 
Germany’s influence did not extend beyond corporatist institutions in Sweden or 
the United States does not diminish the fact that it served as an institutional model 
for those states that loudly rejected Nazi ideology.  
Decades later, with the benefit of hindsight and an instinctual moral revulsion 
to fascism, it is difficult to appreciate how much sway this ideology had held in the 
1930s. Here the prism of history can distort just as it clarifies. The historian 
Raymond Sontag writes: 
When we read of Lloyd George returning from a talk with Hitler filled 
with praise for his host; when we recall the kind words Churchill had 
for what Nazism was doing within Germany even while he was 
warning of the menace of Nazi foreign policy; when we reconstruct 
the many laudatory things Lord Halifax, so kindly and decent a man, 
said in his conversations with Hitler in 1937; and when we note that 
the same enthusiasm can be found in supposedly discerning 
observers from other countries, then we marvel, because we see, 
marching endlessly to their death, the millions of victims of Nazi 
racism.57 
 
Yet until the invasion of Czechoslovakia, Sontag notes, the Nazi revolution was 
a largely bloodless affair. Until the late 1930s it had only a “few easily ignored 
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victims”; few inside Germany had actually been killed or imprisoned and even for 
Jews physical persecution was “sporadic” until the Kristallnacht of November 
1938.58 This relatively peaceful rise stood in stark contrast to Stalin’s Great Purges, 
which took the lives of millions. Culturally, “the surface of German national life 
had a color and enthusiasm absent from Russian life”. Geopolitically, “the shift in 
the international position of Germany was more obvious than the rise of Russian 
national power.”59  
As a result of these factors, the Soviet Union was slower to attract imitators. 
Most political leaders sought to contain capitalism in the fascist style, not to destroy 
it in the Soviet one. Although Communism exerted increasing influence in this 
period, its real moment of triumph did not arrive until the defeat of fascism in 
World War II. And while the defeat of Axis powers led to an abrupt rejection of 
fascist ideology in all but a few “risible backwaters”, in the late 1930s  fascism 
“was a serious contender for international economic supremacy…Neither 
communism nor liberal democracy had had anything like the reproductive and 
expansionary success of fascism.”60 Across Europe, there was implicit agreement 
among all but the hardcore communists that “if a choice must be made, Nazi rule 
would be less horrible than Soviet rule” – a view shared not only by the middle and 
upper classes, but even the workers and peasants, who “found little to envy in the 
convulsive changes going on in Russia. So, increasingly, it was the deepening 
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shadow of German power which lay on central and southeastern Europe.”61 For all 
these reasons, the majority of this chapter focuses on the diffusion of fascist 
institutions, while the expansion of communist influence is detailed in the chapter 
that follows.  
 
The Hegemonic Transition After 1929 
 
The sudden onset of an economic crisis in 1929 discredited the capitalist-
democratic model championed by Britain and the United States. Originating in the 
U.S., the Great Depression was seen as “the inevitable result of international, free-
market capitalism – a labile, accident-prone, uncontrollable, and irresponsible 
system.62 Not only did the U.S. play the leading role in the financial crisis, it also 
suffered more from it than other leading powers. According to Paul Kennedy, 
punitive tariffs and the relatively unconstrained nature of American capitalism 
meant that the downturn “hurt it much more than any other advanced economy.”63 
Between 1929 and 1933 money income fell by 53 percent. The country’s GNP was 
below 1929 levels throughout the decade, and remained there until 1941. 
Unemployment, measuring 1.5 million people in 1929, reached a peak of 12.8 
million just four years later, bringing with it a serious threat of social 
destabilization.64 Industrial production also suffered - by the time of Munich, U.S. 
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share of global manufacturing had dropped to its lowest level since 1910.65 For the 
first time in the country’s history, more people were leaving the United States than 
entering it.66 
At the same time, the 1930s witnessed a rapid revival of German power. 
Examining the shifts in national power during the interwar period, Kennedy 
concluded that the relative power of the United States in the 1930s was “in inverse 
ratio to that of both the USSR and Germany. That is to say, it was inordinately 
strong in the 1920s, but then declined more than any other of the Great Powers 
during the depressed 1930s.”67 Between 1933 and 1939 “Europe lived under the 
shadow of Russia and Germany.”68 The relative decline of democracies was 
exacerbated by their domestic politics, which favored disarmament. Both Britain 
and France were hurt badly by World War I, and public opinion pressed for peace. 
In the mid-1930s Britain and France were decreasing military expenditures, even as 
Germany and other authoritarian states were rapidly expanding theirs. 
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Figure 4.1: Germany vs. the United States. German relative power increases 
steadily between 1933 and 1943, while American power decreases until the later 
1930s, before recovering and increasing quickly in the early 1940s 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Number of fascist states, 1930-1945. The number rises steadily between 
1933-1930, then quickly increases with the onset of the war, and begins to collapse 





Figure 4.3: Annual global democracy score (measured by SIP) vs. percent of global 
power (measured by CINC) under fascist regimes, 1930-1945. As the share of 






Figure 4.4: US Power (measured by CINC) and the annual global democracy score 
(measured by SIP), 1930-1945. Both fall until the late 1930s; US power begins to 
recover in the early 1940s, and global democracy begins to increase toward the 
end of the war. 
 
 
There were no immediate winners in the aftermath of 1929. Like most of 
Europe, Weimar Germany was mired in unemployment and discontent; the Soviet 
Union had just barely survived a civil war, foreign invasions and economic 
collapse, and spent most of the 1920s retreating from socialism through its New 
Economic Plan, which sought to establish market relations between the cities and 
the countryside. The crisis of 1929 “hit Germany particularly hard.”69 Between 
1929 and 1933, industrial production declined by nearly a half and national 
income by a third; the collapse of the stock market depressed both savings and 
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investment.70 In 1933, with Germany on the verge of economic collapse, more 
than six million Germans – over a third of the labor force – were unemployed.71  
Germany’s decline in the late 1920s made its rise after 1933 seem all the more 
spectacular. If 1989 was the great turning point for modern democracy, 1933 
would prove to be the fascist annus mirabilis. The ascent of the National Socialists 
to power in 1933 inaugurated a long period of national recovery, economic 
expansion, and the quick end of unemployment. Between January 1933 and July 
1935, employment rose from 11.7 million to 16.9 million.72 By 1939, policies of 
full employment resulted in a labor shortage of approximately two million people. 
Meanwhile, industrial production had more than doubled. “In 1933 Germany was 
a disarmed and isolated power; by 1939 all Europe trembled in fear of German 
power.”73 
Germany’s rise was closely associated by contemporary observers with Nazi 
policies and institutional reforms, and particularly with their eagerness to abandon 
the economic and political orthodoxies associated with liberal democracy. “The 
pursuit of new paths was a point of pride rather than a difficult break from tradition. 
This allowed them to try out program after program until they figured out what 
worked.”74 While Britain and France concentrated on cutting public spending, 
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Goering declared: “We do not recognize the sanctity of some of these so-called 
economic laws.”75 Instead, the Nazis pursued an active policy of massive state 
intervention in the economy, including deficit spending and mass employment.  
The novelty of these programs consisted in redefining the government’s 
relationship with the economy. Under the new policies, and in stark contrast with 
the laissez-faire approach of liberal capitalism, “the economy would be made 
subject to the primacy of political and social goals as defined by the national 
leadership.” The Nazis shared “an ideological conviction that economic policies 
should be integrated with an overall concept of the role of the state. For Hitler 
economic problems were not insuperable constraints; they were issues to be 
overcome by political will.”76 In early 1935, the Volkischer Beobachter, the official 
propaganda outlet of the National Socialists, proclaimed: “all these capitalist 
institutions have received a new foundation. The system is an instrument in the 
hands of the politicians. Where capitalism still believes itself untouched, it has 
already been harnessed to politics.”77 
Unemployment was ended with a vigorous program of jobs creation - in the 
first year, half a million farm and community jobs were created for young adults, 
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another half a million to build public works like roads and bridges. Employees 
were ordered to cut wages and received subsidies for new hires.78 The destruction 
of labor unions was an important step in this process. While gaining security, the 
German workers lost their freedoms. Collective bargaining ended in 1933, and 
even switching jobs became difficult by the end of the decade.79 After the Nazis 
“destroyed the labor movement and instituted a reign of terror in the workplace,” 
businesses did not have to worry about inflationary wage increases.80 The 
destruction of labor helped stimulate recovery by sending a strong signal to 
businessmen that its problems were over: “no more strike waves; no more 
Bolshevik threat; no more political instability. All this gave capitalists strong 
reasons to catch up on a backlog of profitable investments. They brought money 
out of mattresses and foreign bank accounts and sank it into a now-hospitable 
business climate.”81 
An often forgotten aspect of the National Socialist reforms was that they were 
truly socialist. Hitler’s policies “benefited around 95 percent of all Germans. They 
did not experience National Socialism as a system of tyranny and terror but rather 
as a regime of social warmth, a sort of ‘warm and fuzzy’ dictatorship.” Social 
reforms and the “real possibility for social advancement” account for the regime’s 
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high level of mass support.82 These social reforms included free higher education, 
help for families and children, pensions, health insurance, and a general expansion 
of the welfare state.83 
The overall result was the emergence of a command economy - government 
controls over prices, wages, jobs, foreign trade, and the money market. As a result 
of these measures, government spending rose from 18 to 27.5 percent of national 
income between 1928 and 1938.84 Such aggressive stimulus policies would not 
have been possible in a liberal democracy without threatening serious inflation, but 
as Germany’s finance minister wrote with understatement, "National Socialism 
introduced in Germany a state-regulated economy which made it possible to 
prevent price and wage increases."85 The Nazis consciously avoided a Communist-
like attack on private property. Capitalism would be tamed, not destroyed; 
capitalists would be allowed social status and a measure of profits, as long as they 
continued to abide by the rules set by the political leadership and submitted 
themselves to the greater national good.86 
The rapid recovery thus took on a peculiarly Nazi-inspired path in the view of 
                                                
82
 Gotz Aly (2005) “Die Wohlfuhl-Diktator”Der Spiegel , Oct 2005, p.56; quoted in 
Berman 2006:147 
83
 Berman 2006:147 
84
 Garside in Garside 1993:21 
85
 Quoted in Frieden 2006:203 
86
 Peter Hayes likens capitalism in Nazi Germany to a game of poker in which “the 
house shuffles, deals, determines the ante and the wild cards, and can change them 
at will,” a game in which “there is a ceiling on winnings, which may be spent only 
as the casino permits and for the most part only on the premises.” Peter Hayes 
(1987) Industry and Ideology, quoted in James (1993:91) in Garside, ed. 
  
213 
contemporaries, who dubbed it the Wirtschaftswunder. The Nazis themselves 
encouraged this perception, which served to legitimize their regime and increase 
its attractiveness to foreign leaders searching for a way out of the Depression. 
Foreign observers, in turn, concluded that these policies worked best in a system 
that abandoned the chaos of democracy for the order and stability of fascism. In the 
preface to the 1936 German edition of his General Theory, Keynes himself 
suggested that his policies were "much more easily adapted to the conditions of a 
totalitarian state" than to a democracy.87  
The Great Depression was the only hegemonic shock of the twentieth century 
in which democracy did not emerge as one of the winners – instead, it was widely 
perceived to be its culprit. Democracy “seemed to have spent its vitality and 
devolved into an economic order that increasingly polarized society into rich and 
poor,” a system that appeared as unsuited for modern mass society as feudalism 
had become for industrializing states a century earlier.88 The Depression “not only 
challenged America’s economy and its political system, but also undermined the 
central myths and beliefs on which the system was founded.”89 This sentiment 
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extended far beyond America itself. “The panic which seized Europe west of Russia 
in 1931 was not simply a financial panic,” wrote Sontag. “It was a crisis of 
confidence. The accepted precepts for directing the life of man in society seemed 
suddenly not to work.”90 The shock of the Great Depression "disproved cultural 
paradigms of institutional rationality" and led to a more statist conception of a 
modern democracy.91 “It was obvious that laissez-faire capitalism was finished,” 
wrote George Orwell in 1940, “and that there had got to be some kind of 
reconstruction.”92 A Los Angeles Times article from 1935 declared: “All Europe is 
swinging either to the Communist or Fascist side, with the old parliamentary 
government in eclipse…”93 In the same year, New Yorker editor E.B. White wrote: 
“The experts say that capitalism is out,” and sardonically offered three alternatives: 
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“communism, fascism, and a lively state called chaos.”94  
The remainder of this chapter focuses on tracing fascist influence and emulation 
in Europe and around the world. The case studies focus in turn on Europe, Asia, the 
Middle East, Latin America, and the United States. I conclude with a brief 
discussion of the coercive phase of the fascist wave, beginning roughly in 1938.  
 
Fascist Influence in Europe 
 
Europe served as the locus of fascist imitation, and has thus received the most 
attention from scholars of comparative fascism. By the middle of the decade, “most 
continental European states were in the process of converting themselves into 
syncretic national authoritarian systems, some of them following the Italian 
example of creating a state party and introducing corporative economic 
regulations.”95 Even before the beginning of Nazi conquests and annexations, 
“countries across southern, central, and eastern Europe – from Portugal to Latvia 
and from Germany to Greece – adopted some variant of autarkic fascism.”96 In 
eastern and central Europe, the Depression led to a collapse in of international 
lending and a fall in commodity prices. This resulting budget crises and restive 
populations opened the door to right-wing authoritarians who often adopted 
elements of fascist institutions, particularly a state-managed economy characterized 
by price controls, the suppression of labor, autarky. In Western Europe (particularly 
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in Scandinavia) European democracies “began to find an alternative in the middle 
1930s” by imitating the interventionist economic policies, state planning measures 




Fascism arrived later in eastern Europe, allowing governing elites in the region 
to learn from the Italian and German experiences. This allowed them to keep 
revolutionary fascists “at bay by alternately repressing them and stealing their 
ideas.”98 A 1939 report to the British Foreign Office noted that the popularity of 
fascist ideas in Hungary has led the government to borrow elements of their 
political program.99 While both Hungary’s and Romania’s radical fascists 
established total control only after German occupation (the Arrow Cross in 
Hungary, the Iron Guard in Romania), “they also penetrated and influenced” 
previous interwar governments in both countries, so that starting in the mid-1930s 
these regimes “were pervaded by fascist ideas and practices, blended into more 
conservative authoritarianism.”100 
Among all the states in interwar Europe, “Hungary probably took the prize for 
the largest assortment per capita of fascist-type, semifascist, or right radical 
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movements.”101 It suffered territorial and demographic losses following the war, 
was governed briefly by a revolutionary Communist dictatorship in 1919, and 
generated great discontent among the elites by preserving a prewar-size civil 
service that operated on a greatly reduced budget. Anti-Semitism also became a 
significant political force for the first time. As a result, by the 1930s Hungary 
possessed a variety of groups supporting rightist anti-liberal nationalism, which 
included (starting with the most moderate) the old conservative upper class, the 
right radicals who championed a single-party authoritarianism, the radical national 
socialist movements who advocated imitation of fascist elements, and the fascist 
Arrow Cross movement of Ferenc Szalasi, which became the country’s largest 
political movement in 1939.102 
At the grass-roots level, a number of fascist organization with the label “national 
socialist” proliferated in Hungary. The National Socialist party of Work was 
founded in 1931, seeking to introduce Nazi social reforms into Hungary. In 1933, 
three other national socialist parties appeared: the Hungarian National Socialist 
Agricultural Laborers and Workers Party, the Hungarian National Socialist People's 
Party, and Count Fidel Palffy’s National Socialist Party, whose attempts to form a 
Hungarian SA and SS were banned by the government. The leaders of the three 
movements formed a national socialist “directorium” in 1934, which quickly fell 
apart over disagreements about the treatment of Jews. The infighting continued 
through the mid-1930s, and none of the movements failed to make an impression 
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on a national scale.103 
As in other European countries, fascist movements that looked to Mussolini’s 
Italy for inspiration appeared in the early 1920s but failed to capture the public’s 
imagination during the relative stability of the decade. Gombos, the leader of the 
so-called Szeged fascists (named after the city of the communist counter-
revolution), was forced to moderate his views to such an extent that Miklos Horthy, 
the country’s regent for most of the interwar period, felt comfortable in co-opting 
him as the Defense Minister in 1929, whereupon Gombos dissolved the main 
political arm of the Szeged fascists, the Party of Racial Defense.104 
The most significant (and also the most radical) Hungarian fascist movement 
was the Arrow Cross or Hungarist organization founded by Ferenc Szalasi. Szalasi’s 
concept of “Hungarism”, developed in the early 1930s, aimed at the creation of a 
quasi-federal, multi-ethnic state ruled by Hungarians, a Carpathian-Danubian Great 
Fatherland with Magyar as its official language. This design, however, required a 
great leader to carry it out, and somewhat like his Romanian counterpart Codreanu, 
Szalasi possessed a “mystical conviction” that he was supremely qualified to fill 
that role. This grand vision also required a war to bring it to life, necessitating the 
emphasis on martial virtues in daily life that came to define other fascist regimes of 
the period. Like other revolutionary autocrats, Szalasi viewed war as “a utopian 
cataclysm” that would “introduce the new millenarian world order to be led by 
Hungarism”. The Arrow Cross stood for corporatism in economic life and a 
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national socialist economy in which large-scale banking and industry would be 
nationalized, but private property and small businesses retained.105 
The impact of the Great Depression led to the proliferation of the above-
mentioned groups and forced Horthy to abandon the moderate conservatism of the 
past decade. He appointed Gombos as prime minister in 1932 (though requiring 
him to first publicly denounce anti-Semitism). Gombos immediately made an 
official visit to Italy, “establishing a pro-Italian tilt for the remainder of his 
administration.”106 He commandeered the main government party, changing its 
name and extending its reach throughout the country. He also established a youth 
organization and a political militia, the Advance Guard, with a membership of sixty 
thousand. This trend was accelerated by Hitler’s ascent to power in 1933, after 
which, as in other states in Europe and around the world, “Nazi influence quickly 
increased.”107 Gombos moved both the party and the state closer toward fascism, 
and the country as a whole “into the orbit of Hitler’s Germany.”108 He visited Hitler 
within a month of his election. Economic agreements that followed tied Hungary 
closer to Germany, also increasing Nazi influence. In 1934 Gombos began 
introducing a corporative system in Hungary; in 1935 he told Goring that “within 
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three years Hungary would be reorganized into a national socialist state.”109 His 
plans were disrupted, however, by a sudden illness and death at the end of 1936. 
His successor, Kalman Daranyi, was a right-wing radical who stopped short of 
revolutionary fascism.  
The focus on Nazi activity in Hungary thus shifted away from the state, and 
toward Szalasi after Gombos’ death. He visited Germany in 1936, and a few 
months later “national socialist activity became even more visible in Hungary.”110 
Szalasi's followers began organizing militias and calling for a coup, which led to 
Szalasi’s brief arrest in 1937 and a forcible dissolution of his party, but this only 
raised his status among the national socialists. In the same year his reconstituted 
movement was joined by nine other like-minded off-shoots, merging into a greater 
Hungarian National Socialist party. By 1938 his movement, generally known as the 
Arrow Cross, had become an obvious threat to the state, and Hrothy moved to 
protect himself by strengthening the powers of the executive. He gave himself the 
power to unconditionally veto new legislation and dissolve parliament; he was 
now regent for life, and the country’s regime as a whole moved to the right. To 
appease the radical right, the government increased military spending and 
restricted Jewish rights. The government also formed a political party designed to 
outflank the Arrow Cross from the right, the called the Movement of Hungarian Life 
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In the elections of 1939, “the nearest thing to a democratic contest in 
Hungarian history,” the Arrow Cross formed a coalition ticket with other national 
socialist parties, although it had officially been dissolved by the government earlier 
in the year.112 Despite the disenfranchisement of younger voters (men under 
twenty-five and women under thirty) who formed the bulk of Nazi support, despite 
fielding candidates in only half of the electoral districts, and despite “more than a 
little government interference”, the national socialists officially received nearly a 
quarter of the popular vote. The national socialists were now the largest political 
force in Hungary, with the Arrow Cross as the country’s largest independent party. 
By that point it claimed over a quarter million members in a country of seven 
million people, numbers comparable to the popularity of Germany’s Nazi Party in 
1932. Germany had in fact sent funds to assist the Arrow Cross electoral 
campaigns, having seen its ideological influence increase in 1938-9.113 
Despite the electoral success, the Arrow Cross was now deadlocked with the 
government, which remained fully in control and would not countenance radical 
experimentation. Szalasi, now in jail, tried to set his party on a legal path to power, 
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but this path “was now effectively blocked by a semi-authoritarian government.”114 
As in Austria, Romania, Baltics, and other states, the state’s move toward the right 
prevented the takeover by a revolutionary fascist movement, but did so by adopting 
the authoritarian trappings and ideology of its most dangerous opponents. The 
rapid rise of German power on the continent meant that “Hungarian revisionists 
came to favor a German alliance,”115 and the country entered the war on the side of 




As in other European states, the Depression led to an increase in support for 
Austrian fascism. In the 1930 elections the Nazis received 3 percent of the vote, 
while the radical right Heimwehr movement received more than 6 percent. In that 
year Heimwehr leaders adopted the Korneuburg Oath, which called for a 
corporative authoritarian regime influenced by the ideas of Othmar Spann, the 
country’s chief ideologist of corporatism.116 In a 1930 speech, the leader of the 
Styrian Heimwehr Walter Pfrimer, speaking about the reasons behind the 
manifesto’s adoption, said: “On all sides the conviction was evident that here in 
Austria only fascism could now save us.”117 
In the 1932 elections the Nazis amassed 16.4 percent of the vote, drawing 
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support away from more moderate right-wing movements. With none of the parties 
receiving a plurality of votes, the new Christian Social leader Engelbert Dollfuss 
was forced to bring the Heimwehr (increasingly influenced by the Nazis) into his 
coalition government to form a parliamentary majority. But after growing political 
fissures and the resignation of parliamentary officers in March 1933, Dollfuss 
established a dictatorship based on the Christian Socials in partnership with the 
Heimwehr. Both the extreme right (the Nazis) and the extreme left (the Socialists) 
were outlawed. After the defeat of a Socialist coup in February 1934, the Austrian 
Nazis, who now were the chief opponents of the regime, launched a campaign of 
terrorism that culminated in an attempted coup and the murder of Dollfuss in July 
1934. The end result was a total suppression of the Nazis, but the government had 
already shifted toward a corporatist, proto-fascist regime “copied from the Italian 
model.”118 As in other cases in central and eastern Europe, the ruling government 
pre-emptively suppressed revolutionary Nazis while simultaneously adopting 
elements of their institutions. The German historian Ulrich Eichsstädt wrote that 
Austria had already begun the path toward fascism after March 1933.119 In that 
year, both Dollfuss and the Heimwehr leader Stahremberg promised Mussolini that 
they would move toward fascism. Hoping to become the regime’s protector, 
Mussolini encouraged Austria’s “conversion into a kind of satellite fascist state.”120 
Austria’s new constitution, adopted in May 1934, was a thoroughly corporatist 
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one, the second such document to be adopted in Europe (after Portugal’s charter of 
1933). Parliament was replaced with a system of advisory councils composed of 
seven corporate bodies. Independent political groups were outlawed; the only legal 
political party was the Fatherland Front, a totalitarian government-created body 
formed by Dollfuss in 1933 along “the lines of the fascist and national-socialist 
parties.”121 In the following few years, Austria’s regime acquired “some of the outer 
trappings of fascism common to most other dictatorships in the 1930s.”122 The 
Fatherland Front organized a paramilitary group called the Frontmiliz in 1936, and 
the following year created an elite militia called the Sturmkorps, modeled after 
Germany’s SS. While the regime “copied from the methods used in Germany and 
Italy” it was closer in form to the Catholic corporatist-authoritarian fascism of Spain 
and Portugal (following the maxims of  the papal encyclical Quadragesimo Anno) 
rather than the militant, pagan, racist-biological variant of Nazi Germany.123 With 
the Anschluss of March 1938, Austria was incorporated into the greater Third 





Like Hungary, Romania by the late 1930s was home to one of the largest native 
fascist movements on the continent, the Legion of the Archangel Michael, also 
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known as the Iron Guard. Romania was a territorial beneficiary of the Great War, 
whose settlement doubled the country’s size. This expansion, however, created a 
newly multiethnic state that faced enormous social and economic problems. 
Divisions within the ruling Peasant Party after 1926 produced an ineffective 
government that was unable to carry out reforms, and when the Depression struck, 
a group of army officers engineered the return of King Carol, who had abdicated in 
1925 after a series of romantic scandals. Though he promised to uphold the 
constitution, Carol was an admirer of Mussolini and quickly moved to eliminate the 
Peasant Party. In the following years, internal party divisions, prompted in part by 
“the machinations of an increasingly authoritarian king”, created a fragmented and 
unreliable political system. By 1933, in Romania as in most of its neighbors, “the 
postwar democratic breakthrough seemed now to be leading toward a political 
breakdown.”125 
A number of philo-fascist authoritarian movements emerged in the early 1930s. 
The more significant included the radically anti-Semitic National-Christian Defense 
League (LANC) and the National Agrarian Party led by the poet Octavian Goga. 
The National Socialist Party of Romania, founded by Colonel Stefan Tatarescu in 
1932 was a direct attempt to emulate the Nazis.126 But the major new political 
movement to appear after the collapse of the Peasant Party was the fascist Legion of 
the Archangel Michael. It was led by  Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, who left the LANC 
for not being sufficiently revolutionary. In 1930 the group formed a youth 
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movement called the Iron Guard, and it was under this name that the group has 
become more commonly known. The Legion’s leadership “had a strong sense of 
affinity with (as well as differences from) the Italian and German movements and 
occasionally used the term fascist to refer to themselves.”127 The Romanian version 
of fascism embraced the Orthodox Church and declared it a crucial part of the 
national organism, while Codreanu himself took on the role of a mystic warrior 
who would lead the rebirth of Romania through spiritual and physical war. Other 
than this religious component, the Legion “is generally classified as fascist because 
it met the main criteria of any appropriate fascist typology,” while its leaders felt a 
“common identity and partially parallel goals with other fascists.”128 The exaltation 
of self-sacrifice in Codreanu’s theological heterodoxy brought it closer to secular 
fascist movements. The Legion pursued the replacement of parliament with a 
corporative assembly, and sought a more collective basis for the national economy. 
For several years after its founding in 1927 it remained “a tiny sect, a common 
experience for most fascist movements in the 1920s.”129 But 1932-33 brought 
increasing Nazi influence and popular support. After the rapid growth in the Nazi 
vote in Germany’s 1932 elections, links with Romania quickly increased. The 1933 
elections brought a wave of intimidation and assault from the Legion, and the party 
was banned by the government, its leaders arrested. But their popularity was now 
growing rapidly, and Payne estimates their support at two hundred thousand votes, 
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which would have made them the third largest political movement in the country. 
The following year the group reconstituted itself as the All for the Fatherland 
movement.130 
As in other states in the region, the threat of revolutionary fascism led the 
moderate, semi-liberal government to move to the right. Corrupt elections gave the 
government party a parliament majority, but the Romanian regime increasingly 
functioned “as a controlled polity with only limited representation.”131 In the mid-
1930s, the government attempted to co-opt the Iron Guard by forming a parafascist 
youth group, the Straja Tarii (Guards of the Fatherland), but its artificiality made 
popular support nearly impossible. By 1936 the government gave up trying to co-
opt Codreanu and dissolved all political militias in 1936, membership in the Legion 
continued to grow steadily, with over two hundred thousand members by the end 
of 1937. At that point “German influence reached a new level.” Though the 
Legion’s leaders noticed the differences between themselves and Nazism, they 
were convinced that both their country’s and their party’s future lay with the 
"national revolutions" of Hitler and Mussolini.”132 
In Romania’s last elections before the war, in December 1937, the Fatherland 
Front received nearly 16% of the vote, with unofficial counts at 25%, despite the 
corrupt and partially manipulated elections. This result would have entitled them to 
66 seats, but King Carol dissolved the parliament via a royal coup in February 
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1938.133 Other political parties were outlawed; Codreanu and his top Legionnaires 
were executed. The Legion’s new leaders hoped to inflame an insurrection against 
the king, but the Army’s loyalty held firm. The irony that had played out in Austria, 
Hungary, the Baltics, and other places repeated itself in Romania: “the Legion, 
which despised democracy, the bourgeoisie, and capitalism, required at least a 
degree of bourgeois democracy to have the opportunity to build greater support 
and/or to achieve power.”134 
The government’s victory was short-lived, however. In September 1940 the king 
appointed General Ion Antonescu to the position of prime minister, who quickly 
forced the king’s resignation and assumed control. Antonescu ruled as the head of 
the National Legionary State, a Legion-dominated regime in cooperation with 
prime minister Antonescu. At this point the Legion became the only legal political 
movement in the country, with key positions staffed by former members of the Iron 
Guard. Several months later, Antonescu suppressed an attempted coup and 
suppressed the movement, which became “a rump of voluble exiles squabbling 
over the causes of their failure.”135 Romania formally joined the Axis alliance in 
June 1941 and Antonescu continued to govern Romania until his arrest in 1944.136  
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For the first two decades of the twentieth century, Spain remained a feeble but 
stubborn institutional monarchy, with a parliament alternating between two major 
parties. Between 1909 and 1923 the country witnessed a succession of thirty-four 
governments, until General Primo de Rivera took power in a coup, inaugurating a 
military dictatorship that lasted for the next eight years. Lacking a clear program or 
a coherent response to the onset of the Depression, the dictatorship collapsed 
along with the monarchy in April 1931, resulting in the creation of the Second 
Spanish Republic. It was the only new European regime to move “against the tide 
of authoritarian and fascist politics” of the 1930s.137 Between 1931 and 1933 the 
governing alliance of middle-class Republicans and Socialist reformers introduced 
a number of controversial institutional reforms (such as the elimination of church 
subsidies and the constitutionally-permitted secession of Catalonia), prompting a 
conservative backlash. The election of 1933 produced a victory for the center-right, 
after which disillusioned Socialists undertook an abortive insurrection in 1934. In 
the elections of February 1936 a “Popular Front” of left-wing parties (including the 
much-resented Marxists and anarcho-syndicalists) won a clear victory, setting the 
stage for a civil war that began five months later.138  
Fascist movements had been percolating in Spanish political life several years 
before the war. Calvo Sotelo, the spokesman for the rightist opposition whose 
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murder triggered the start of the war, had been calling for an authoritarian 
monarchy, state regulation of the economy, and the replacement of parliament 
with a corporate chamber. He “admired Italian Fascism…and did not object if 
critics referred to his goals as fascist.”139 But the more successful and ultimately 
more durable fascist movement in Spain was the Falange Espanola (Spanish 
Phalanx). Hitler’s triumph in Germany stimulated interest among right-leaning 
businessmen, who “went shopping during the summer of 1933 for the leader of a 
potential counterrevolutionary, demagogic Spanish fascism.” The outcome was the 
emergence of Jose Antonio Primo de Rivera, oldest son of the former dictator. Over 
the previous few years, de Rivera had shifted away from conservative monarchism 
and toward Italian-style fascism, which served as “the vehicle for giving form and 
ideological content to the national authoritarian regime attempted so uncertainly 
by his father.”140  
The Falange’s program, released at the end of 1934, called for a thoroughly 
corporatist state and “exhibited all the main points of fascist doctrine”.141 De Rivera 
was occasionally ambivalent about the violence associated with fascism, and 
stopped designating himself as such in 1934; nevertheless, he represented a classic 
case of an interwar leader who rejected the fascist label yet “never renounced the 
fascist goals in [his] politics.”142 
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The outcome of the civil war led to the establishment of a nationalist military 
regime headed by Francisco Franco and based on Falangist principles; its 1934 
program now became official state doctrine. The choreography of Franco rallies 
imitated Hitler and Mussolini, as did a number of institutions and party agencies, 
such as the Auxilio de Invierno (Winterhilfe) or the Directorate of Popular Culture 
(MinCulPop).143 
The regime began to move away from categorical fascism as Hitler’s fortunes 
began to ebb, though Payne notes that if Hitler had succeeded, “there seems little 
doubt that Franquism would have become…more radical and overtly fascist in 
form.”144 After 1943 it increasingly resembled “a Catholic, corporative, and 
increasingly demobilized authoritarian regime.”145 By the 1960s it resembled less a 





Early interwar politics in Portugal were dominated by a series of attempted 
coups that succeeded in establishing a rightist authoritarian regime by the military 
in 1926. Dr. Antonio de Oliveira Salazar, a corporatist economist, became prime 
minister in 1932, four years after the military dictatorship installed him as finance 
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minister. He remained in office until 1968, after a stroke led to his retirement. 
Salazar introduced a corporative constitution in 1932, creating a chamber to 
represent economic interests. A directly elected national assembly was also put in 
place, with regular elections that were carefully controlled by the state.  
This sort of moderation frustrated the more radical elements in Portuguese 
politics, who formed a movement called Portuguese National Syndicalism in 1932. 
The Syndicalists (also known as the Blue Shirts from their adopted uniform) 
identified themselves with fascism and experienced a rapid growth in popularity 
after the Nazis ascent to power in 1933. In that same year, Salazar began his Estado 
Novo (New State) project, modeled after Mussolini’s Italy. He attempted to 
eliminate the Blue Shirts through a combination of coercion and co-option. He 
created his own student youth movement, the Accao Escolar Vanguarda (Student 
Action Vanguard, or AEV), closed the Blue Shirt newspaper offices and removed 
their leaders from government positions. At the same time, its moderate members 
were invited to join the regime, where for the rest of the decade they “constituted a 
sort of de facto fascistic pressure group within the state syndical system).”147 By 
1934 Salazar had succeeded in splitting the movement, and it was officially 
dissolved later in the year. Its remnants attempted a failed revolt against the regime 
in 1935, which led to arrests and general suppression of the movement. 
As in Austria, Hungary, and Romania, the governing regime outflanked a 
takeover by fascist radicals by adopting fascist institutions. By the mid-1930s, 
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Salazar “indicated a willingness to consider a few of the trappings of fascism”; the 
civil war that began in 1936 “carried his Estado Novo a little further in that 
direction.”148 Wartime radicalization led to the establishment of a youth movement 
and a paramilitary auxiliary, which both used the Nazi salute. Some scholars have 
argued that Salazar’s regime cannot be considered truly fascist because it avoided 
marches, rallies, and mass mobilization in general. But as David Raby argues, “this, 
in a sense, can be seen as the other side of the coin of fascism” – fascist regimes 
pursued intense mobilization when they faced a real threat from the radical left or 
were preparing for a mass wartime effort – neither of which applied to the Salzar 
regime.149 The Estado Novo persisted in an increasingly deteriorating form until a 




Between 1917 and 1936 Greece was “more similar to a Latin American country 
than to anything else in Europe,” alternating between short-lived civilian and 
military governments.150 This instability stemmed from the persistent polarization 
between conservative monarchism and liberal republicanism. The restoration of the 
monarchy in 1936 began a period of intensified discord, and after the main parties 
failed to reach an agreement the king appointed as prime minster the nationalist, 
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authoritarian General Ioannis Metaxas, who established a dictatorship in April 
1936.151 Metaxas had not been popular – his party had received only 3% of the 
votes in a national election three months earlier. His appointment led to a series of 
strikes that Metaxas used to issue an emergency decree and seize absolute power. 
He abolished parliament and proclaimed a “New State” in its place. Political 
parties were abolished; trade unions came under state control and a corporative 
structure was introduced, complete with price controls and extensive economic 
regulations. The economic reforms also included a number of social welfare 
measures, including unemployment insurance, minimum wages and limited work 
hours, maternity leave, and stricter work safety standards. In November 1936, 
Metaxas also created a mass youth movement called the National Youth 
Organization (EON). His regime employed the fascist salute and occasionally 
described itself as totalitarian (although it differed from traditional fascism in 
lacking mass mobilization, and Metaxas told a British official that Salazar’s Portugal 
rather than Nazi Germany provided the closest model for emulation). Nevertheless, 
Metaxas aspired to join the nationalist, anti-liberal wave of the period, loosening 
ties with Britain while moving closer to Italy and Germany.152 Nevertheless, Hitler 




 Fascist expression in Finland took the form of the Lapua movement, founded in 
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1929.153 This was a religious, anti-communist, anti-democratic movement that 
called for a more nationalist, pious, and authoritarian state, and a restructuring of 
the economy along corporatist lines. It employed political violence against 
opponents as a way to destroy communism by any means necessary. Between 
1929 and 1932, Lapua had an “enormous impact on the choices and strategies of 
the governmental parties.”154 It pressed the cabinet and the parliament to pass anti-
Communist legislation, and succeeded when communist groups were disbanded in 
1930. Lapua then moved on to attacking the more centrist Social Democratic party, 
and in its 1932 Tampere program declared itself ready to use violence to achieve 
this goal. While it did not compete in elections, it exerted a strong influence on the 
country’s main conservative party, the National Coalition (NC). The NC, a founding 
party of the Finnish republic, had always displayed a hesitant attitude toward 
parliamentary democracy and were enthusiastic supporters of Lapua’s goals. This 
support continued even while all other conservative parties distanced themselves 
from Lapua after its turn against the Social Democrats. As a result, between 1929 
and 1932 Lapua had “a substantial impact on Finnish democratic institutions from 
within, and more specifically on party interplay in parliament.”155  
The party was banned after a failed 1932 coup, but quickly reorganized itself as 
the People’s Patriotic Movement (IKL), which was similarly nationalist and anti-
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democratic. IKL modeled itself directly after Nazis, taking as its core tenet the idea 
of kansakokoinasuus, a literal translation of the German Volksgemeinschaft. IKL 
advocated the banning of political parties; individual freedoms and class interests 
would be replaced by a powerful central authority and subsumed into the organic 
body of the nation as a whole. Political representation would continue through a 
corporatist system rather than electoral democracy. IKL members wore military 
uniforms and had a youth organization modeled after the Jugend, but were careful 
to avoid political violence due to the very real risk of a government ban.156 
At its peak in the 1936 elections the IKL received 8.3 percent of the vote, but 
was never able to achieve mass popularity; by the end of the decade its vote 
percentage remained at 6.6%.157 Like its Lapua predecessor, however, IKL 
exercised a disproportionate influence on party politics through the National 
Coalition. In fact, it went further than Lapua in actually taking control of the NC 
shortly after its creation in 1932; the NC did not return to classical pro-
parliamentary conservatism until 1935. Until then, the IKL’s influence “went well 




In Poland, a center-right regime dominated by Josef Pilsudski persisted until his 
death in 1935. Pilsudksi had taken power in a 1926 coup after a period of 
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hyperinflation and short-lived coalition governments, but never intended to 
establish a full dictatorship. In 1928 he founded the the Nonparty Bloc for the 
Support of the Government, an umbrella organization that won a plurality of the 
vote in that year’s semi-free elections.159  
Like other multinational countries of the period, Poland experienced a growth 
in minority nationalist movements that displayed protofascist features. In the east, 
the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), formed in 1929, preached the 
need for political violence and a strong central leader. Its moderate members 
looked to Mussolini as a model, while the more radical (usually younger) members 
were influenced by Nazism.160 The OUN received material support from Germany, 
although extensive cooperation was precluded by the Nazis’ racial views of 
Ukrainians. The other significant fascist organization of the period was the Polish 
Falanga. Formed in 1935, the group advocated a catholic totalitarianism based on 
the Spanish model from which it took its name and influenced by the political 
theology of Romania’s Codreanu. The movement advocated the “radical 
subordination of the economy to a program of national socialism.”161 
After Pilsudki’s death in 1935, the government was controlled by the so-called 
“Colonels” - members of the Polish army and Pilsudski allies who emphasized 
authoritarianism and state control over the economy. Political repression increased, 
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especially toward ethnic minorities. The 1935 constitution gave the president 
increased powers while limiting the role of parliament. While direct elections were 
maintained, that year the opposition parties boycotted the regime. Meanwhile, 
government investment in the economy quickly increased - by the end of the 
decade the state owned 40% of the country’s banking capital and 20% of the 
industrial capital.162 
In 1937 the Colonels constructed another national unity party to replace BBWR, 
called the Camp of National Unity (OZN), a “crypto-fascist government party” that 
attracted nationalists and university students with its program of clericalism, anti-
Semitism, and nationalism.163 Colonel Adam Koc, placed in charge of building this 
party, was impressed by the Falanga and placed one of its leaders in charge of the 
League of Young Poland, OZN’s youth section. OZN also began to advocate a 
corporate authoritarian regime, but its increasing radicalism (which by 1937 
included the call for a one-party state and purge of opposition leaders) displeased 
some of the moderate Colonels, who forced Koc’s resignation and ended OZN’s 




In Lithuania, the main fascist movement was the Iron Wolf Association, the 
radical wing of the nationalist Tautinninkai movement. Tautinninkai’s leader, 
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Augustinas Voldemaras, was appointed prime minister in 1926, when a military 
coup brought to power president Antanas Smetona of the more moderate National 
Christian Democratic Party. After 1931 Smetona tried to co-opt the Wolves by 
nudging the government in an authoritarian direction and giving Tautinninkai 
increased power. But in 1934 Voldemaras and Iron Wolf members attempted an 
insurrection, leading to increased efforts at co-optation by Smetona. A new 1936 
constitution introduced a corporatist reorganization of the economy and strong 
presidential controls; Tautinninkai was given “a virtual monopoly” on political 
organization.165 The Iron Wolves had been suppressed, but as in other European 
cases, the state had achieved this only by adopting some of the institutional reforms 
they had advocated. 
Like Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia managed to avoid fascism through pre-
emptive authoritarianism that co-opted the corporatist features of fascist regimes. In 
Estonia, the elected president Konstantin Pats seized power in 1934 after an 
authoritarian-nationalist movement called the Estonian War of Independence 
Veterans League (EVL, a paramilitary holdover from the 1917-8 war with the USSR) 
won absolute majorities in major cities. Pats assumed emergency powers, 
disbanded the EVL and arrested its leaders. The following year political parties 
were replaced by a National Association, and the government introduced a number 
of corporatist institutions such as the Chamber of Labour, which took over the 
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functions of the labor unions, curtailed since 1934.166 After 1938 Estonia managed 
a partial return to democracy with a new constitution that limited presidential 
power and restored some civil liberties.167 
Likewise in Latvia, prime minister Karlis Ulmanis seized power in 1934, 
ostensibly to prevent a coup by the Thunder Cross, a fascist movement formed in 
the previous year. Ulmanis. Political parties were outlawed and opposition 
newspapers ordered to shut down.  Like Pats, Ulmanis introduced corporatist 
institutions based on the fascist model in Italy, but did not pursue the partial re-
liberalization that occurred in Estonia.168 Both regimes, which Georg von Rauch 
called “authoritarian democracies,” enjoyed popular support and maintained a 
high level of economic growth; according to Payne, “their preemptive strategies 
may indeed have averted worse ills,” but they did so through adapting the 




 In Yugoslavia, King Alexander established a personal dictatorship in early 1929, 
dissolving the parliament and abolishing the constitution. After his assassination in 
1934, the country returned to a semi-parliamentary regime under monarchist 
regency. Milan Stojadinovic, prime minister from 1935 to 1939, made an attempt 
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at authoritarian mass mobilization by forming the Yugoslav Radical Union in 1935. 
Its members wore green shirts and called Stojadinovic “Vodja”, or “Leader”. In 
1938 he assured Galeazzo Ciano, the Italian foreign minister, that his movement 
would develop along the lines of Italian fascism, although in general he tried to 
pursue a policy of neutrality.170  
 A number of nationalist groups operated in Yugoslavia in the 1930s, most of 
them catering to the specific interests of Serbs, Croats, or Slovenes (although a few 
attempted to promulgate a general Yugoslavian nationalism). Of these, the most 
radical group was Yugoslav Action, which called for a state-directed economy and 
authoritarian corporatism. It grew increasingly radical, was repressed by the 
government in 1934, and reconstituted itself the following year as Zbor 
(Convention). Like its predecessor, Zbor preached nationalism and corporatism, but 
received only about one percent of the vote in both the 1935 and 1938 elections. 
By the end of the decade it developed contacts with Nazi Germany, attempted 
several insurrections, and was again suppressed by the government at the end of 
1940.171 
 The most protofascist and consequential of the Yugoslav nationalist groups was 
the Ustasha (Insurgent) movement of radical Croat nationalists, formed in 1929. In 
partnership with Macedonian terrorists, the group was responsible for the 
assassination of King Alexander in 1934. It wished for an independent and 
authoritarian Croatia, and during the 1930s “developed increasingly ambitious 
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goals and protofascist characteristics”. Like Zbor, the movement was repressed by 
the Yugoslav government, but after the German takeover in 1941 it was given the 
reigns of power in Croatia and developed “into one of the most destructive of all 




 In postwar Bulgaria politics were dominated by the peaceful Agrarian 
movement until its overthrow by a military revolt in 1923. Until 1934, the country 
“lived under a nineteenth-century-style oligarchic parliamentary regime” in which 
land distribution promoted internal stability.173 That year, a radical right-wing group 
of military officers called Zveno (the Link) took power in a short-lived coup, but 
were soon thrown out by the royalists, who inaugurated “a controlled but still semi-
pluralist parliamentary regime” that lasted until the death of King Boris in 1943.174 
 Bulgarian fascist movements included the Nationalist Fascist Zadruga, the 
Bulgarian National Socialist Party, and the Bulgarian National Legions. But the only 
fascist group to achieve any measure of popularity was the Ratnitsi (Warriors), a 
quasi-military youth organization founded in 1936 and dissolved by King Boris in 
1939. Although the king moved to suppress both the Communists and the radical 
right, the rapid rise and menacing territorial ambitions of Nazi Germany forced him 
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to adopt a pro-German foreign policy by the end of the decade.175 In Bulgaria as 
elsewhere, a fascist movement was suppressed by an initially moderate 
authoritarian regime, but at the price of moving further to the right. Restrictions on 
Jewish economic activity appeared in 1939. When the Iron Guard took control of 
Romania the following year and instituted a number of anti-Jewish measures, the 
Bulgarian government adopted the Law of the Defense of the Nation, “so as not to 
be behind Rumania in the expression of loyalty to Hitler,” wrote socialist politician 
Dino Kazasov in scornful opposition.176 After early Nazi military victories in 
Europe, King Boris took to calling himself Vozhd (Leader) in imitation of the Fuhrer. 
All in all, the country was “unable to create an original and effective ideology that 
could mobilize the people, and had instead committed itself to following the fascist 
patterns more closely.”177 
 




 The new Irish Republic lacked a real fascist movement. One contender was the 
National Guard, a group formed in 1932, but this was “essentially a chowder and 
marching society pressure group that never went beyond a moderately 
authoritarian corporatism” and was quickly co-opted by the conservative party.178 
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In 1935 General Eoin o'Duffy, a former national police chief, founded the National 
Corporate Party (NCP, aka the Blueshirts) that was modeled more explicitly along 
Nazi lines. The NCP tried to establish links with continental fascists and even sent a 
pro-Nationalist battalion to fight in the Spanish civil war. For a time it even 
attracted the support of W.B. Yeats, who wrote a series of marching songs for the 
group.179 But the party never developed a durable following, and disappeared after 
o’Duffy’s retirement from political life in 1937. 
Switzerland 
 Switzerland had three philofascist movements, one for each of the country’s 
ethnic group: the Union Nationale for French speakers, the Lega Nazionale 
Ticinese for Italian speakers, and the National Front for German speakers. Of these, 
the latter was the most genuinely fascist, although it remained small. Its stronghold 
was the Schaffhausen district, where the party received 27 and 12.2 percent of the 
vote in 1933 and 1935, respectively (in 1935 it succeeded in electing a deputy to 
the Swiss National Council, the only time it was able to do so).180 Switzerland was 
officially neutral during the war, but remained friendly toward Germany and 
accepted German loot. 
Denmark 
 
Denmark never developed a popular fascist movement, although a Danish 
National Socialist Workers Party (DNSAP), modeled on Nazism, appeared in 1930. 
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Despite internal disputes, the party received 1.8 percent of the vote and three 
parliament seats in the 1939 elections.181 Denmark did not join the fascist wave 




The main Dutch fascist movement was the National Socialist Movement (NSB), 
founded in 1931. It developed “the full panoply of fascism, with elaborate rituals 
and a party militia,” but rejected racism and welcomed Dutch Jews into the party. 
“It proposed a corporate economic system and upheld freedom of religion as a 
Dutch national principle. The NSB was able to take advantage of the depression to 
gain nearly 8 percent of the vote in the Dutch provincial elections of 1935, the 
largest vote for a new party in Holland under universal suffrage.”182  
After this high point, the group began to acquire more fascist elements and its 
popularity went into decline. “Conservative supporters were alienated, while the 
democratic Dutch parties banded together to block any further growth. As 
economic conditions improved, the NSB went into steady decline, gaining only 4.2 
percent of the vote in the national elections of 1937 and losing most of that in the 




Since Iceland’s economy depended almost entirely on fish exports, the decline 
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of export prices brought about severe unemployment and social disruption. The 
Icelandic Nationalist Movement (INM), the country’s fascist party, saw itself as the 
solution to these problems. Established in 1933, it published a party platform that 
showed unambiguous Nazi influence. The INM demanded a powerful state to 
maintain order, protection of national health through racial selection and breeding, 
end of class warfare, compulsory labor duty for all citizens, and, above all, the 
elevation of the national interest above individual or group needs. Other political 
parties would be abolished, with the Icelandic Communist Party (founded in 1930) 
as its main target. The Allting, the country’s national parliament, would likewise be 
dissolved and replaced by a corporate state. This state would then provide full 
employment through industrial subsidies and loans and ensure a decent standard of 
living for each citizen. The INM used the swastika as its emblem, and its members 
frequently expressed their admiration for Hitler, “the poor common man who 
rescued Germany from her enemies.”184 
Despite the country’s economic problems, the INM failed to attract many 
followers. It received only 0.7 percent of the vote in 1934 (proportionally much 
less than even its Danish and Norwegian counterparts) and failed to gain a single 
seat. By 1937 it did not even bother to participate in elections; its quasi-military 
marching squad made their final appearance in May 1938, and in that year the 
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party’s official propaganda outlet was published only three times.185 
Norway 
Vidkun Quisling's Nasjonal Samling (National Unity) party in Norway, founded 
in 1933, was “by far the most important of the Scandinavian proto-Nazi 
movements.”186 It had a party militia, called the Hird, and called for a corporative 
system. The party received 2.2 and 1.8 percent of the vote in the 1933 and 1936 
elections, respectively. Throughout the decade it grew closer to Germany, which 
provided the party with financial support.187 Norway became part of the coercive 
phase of the fascist wave in April 1940, whereupon it remained a Nazi puppet 




“If I had a son,” Adolf Hitler told Leon Degrelle, the founder and leader of 
Belgian Rexism, “I would wish him to be like you.”188 The Rexists represented the 
major expression of fascism in interwar Belgium. Degrelle became disenchanted 
with the moderation of Belgian Catholicism, founding Christus Rex in 1935. It was 
a corporatist, authoritarian, and Catholic movement. As in other fascist movements, 
both communists and finance capitalists were its sworn enemies. Financial 
capitalism would be tamed, central banks tightly controlled; class solidarity would 
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be established via corporatist order founded on traditional Catholic values. Political 
parties, which had led to factionalism and corruption, would be outlawed; 
parliament’s functions would be severely curtailed and executive power 
strengthened. The Rexists advocated support for the middle and working classes 
and small businesses, and the establishment of new industries to fight 
unemployment.189   
Degrelle’s rhetoric was “its most fascistic characteristic…heavily male, bluntly 
frank and openly provocative.”190 His leadership led the movement to an early 
electoral success - in the 1936 elections his party “stunned the Belgian electorate” 
by winning 37 (of 202) parliamentary seats.191 This included about a third of all 
right-wing votes and a quarter of the votes in the Walloon cantons (its main source 
of support) and Brussels.192 This success was short-lived, however. The following 
year, an overly confident Degrelle lost his bid for prime minister by a humiliating 
margin. The movement never regained its previous popularity; the multi-ethnic 
nature of the Begian state precluded a national following, since Flemish nationalists 
drained off right-wing support. After 1936 Rexism moved increasingly toward 
fascism and received substantial foreign subsidies from Hitler and Mussoini; 
Degrelle visited Hitler and Germany and expressed support for the conservatives in 
the Spanish civil war. By 1940 Degrelle was an active Nazi collaborator and led a 
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volunteer brigade (the Volksführer de la Belgique) on the Eastern front.193 
 
Fascist Influence in Asia 
 
Japan represents the most familiar instance of non-European fascism, although 
scholars continue to debate whether the regime was truly fascist or simply a 
developmental dictatorship forged by emergency wartime expedients, some of 
which were fascist in nature. Gregory Kasza, a historian of Japanese 
authoritarianism, argued that “both the similarities and the differences” between 
European and Japanese fascism were “substantial, and whatever conceptual 
apparatus is employed, it should not lose sight of either.”194 One distinguishing 
characteristic of Japanese fascism, Kasza points out, is its inversion of goals. 
Whereas in Europe fascism’s significance was first as a political movement, second 
as an ideology, and third as an institutional regime, in Japan this equation was 
reversed – fascism, and particularly imitation of German institutions, shaped the 
country’s institutions to a much greater degree than its political movements or 
political thought. Given the institutional focus of my approach, and the instances of 
direct institutional emulation discussed below, it seems appropriate to safely add 
Japan to the roster of interwar fascist regimes and fascist imitators. 
Japan had greatly profited from World War I, when Allied munition contracts, 
demands for Japanese shipping, and the opening of markets previously accessible 
only to Western colonial powers combined to give the country a rapid boost of 
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industrialization.195 But after a period of democracy in the 1920s, Japan began on a 
steady path toward authoritarianism sparked by the Depression and the 
concomitant rise of nationalism. The Depression had led to the collapse of silk 
exports, and millions of farmers suffered from the decline in demand for their 
goods. Manufacturing was also affected, and by 1932 half of Japanese factories 
stood idle; working-class living standards fell accordingly.196 Nationalist groups 
proliferated - Lebow estimates their number at 750 by 1936.197 Like their European 
counterparts, Japanese intellectuals began to desert democratic principles in favor 
of a fascist solution. “These intellectuals were drawn to European fascist ideas 
because of their repugnance for contemporary party politics and the free market 
economy”, wrote Richard Ned Lebow. “They imagined that fascism would be more 
efficient, avoid debilitating clashes between unions and companies and strengthen 
Japan internationally.”198 Japanese theorist of fascism Nakano Seigo argued that 
democracy had “lost its spirit and decayed into a mechanism which insists only on 
numerical superiority without considering the essence of human beings," insisting 
that the Italian and German models offered “a form of more democratic 
government going beyond democracy.”199 
In 1931, a group of right radical army officers called the Land-Loving School 
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launched a wave of assassinations, hoping to trigger the collapse of what they saw 
as a corrupt state that was abandoning traditional Japanese principles. Though 
quickly repressed, this marked the beginning of the destabilization of Japanese 
democracy. Nationalism and militarism gained ground; parliamentary leadership 
was replaced by “national governments” ruling in coalitions.200 
After the 1936 assassination of Korekiyo Takahashi, a respected finance minister 
who rallied against imperial expansion, the militant nationalists’ hold on political 
and economic power was secure, and “the Japanese government took on many 
fascist features”201 Remaining democratic elements of the system were discarded, 
and the state began pursuing a policy of rapid industrialization and the 
consolidation of large-scale industry and finance.202 The beginning of full-scale war 
with China in 1937 was the last nail in democracy’s coffin. State authority was 
rapidly expanded; the National Mobilization Law of 1938 gave it unprecedented 
control over the economy and society.203 Thus, unlike its Italian or German 
counterparts, Japanese fascism did not sweep into power via a mass movement; 
instead, it was adopted by the state “from above”, and imposed upon the country 
by the “existing political forces, military organizations and the bureaucracy.”204 
Just as Prussia had served as a model of military reform after the Meiji 
restoration, Nazi Germany was “a major inspiration to Japanese bureaucrats and 
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ideologues” who wanted to regulate the economy and eliminate autonomous 
interest groups. Japanese trade associations were structured after German state 
cartels, as was the state women’s association, the state youth organization, and the 
state agricultural association. The German Ministry of Propaganda also provided a 




Chinese fascism was spurred by the Japanese invasion of 1931, which led to the 
emergence of several nationalist groups. The most prominent of these were the 
Blue Shirts (aka the Kai-tsu P’ai faction), who can be described as the fascist wing 
of Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang (KMT), a populist movement that governed China 
for most of the interwar period. Created in 1932, the Kai-tsu P’ai  were originally a 
left-wing group but came to admire Nazi economic and social policies. They 
sought to mobilize nationalist sentiment and accelerate the country’s 
industrialization, and thus they “admired European fascism and were influenced by 
it”.206 A Blue Shirt newspaper in 1933 welcomed Hitler’s rise to power, 
characterizing it as a response to international oppression and predicting (mostly 
correctly, as it turned out) the spread of fascism across the entirety of Europe.207 In 
1936 their leader, Wang Jingwei, visited Germany and upon his return wrote that 
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fascist states “have already expanded their national vitality and augmented their 
people's strength, and are no longer afraid of foreign aggression.”208 Another 
leading spokesman for the group argued in 1937 that "Whatever we may think 
about fascist and Nazi methods and policies, we must recognize the fact that their 
leaders have secured the enthuisiastic support of their respective nations, and while 
these regimes may have done "foolish, unwise, and even cruel things," Hitler and 
Mussolini had done “more in a few years than many countries have done in 
decades.”209 These sentiments found support among the general public - as early as 
1933 a newspaper editorial argued that “fascism is the only tool of self-salvation of 
nations on the brink of destruction…China cannot but imitate the fascist spirit 
of…Italy and Germany.”210 The Nazis’ organic view of the nation fit nicely with 
Chinese political tradition; as the Chinese newspaper People’s Tribune stated in 
1936, the country’s leadership ought to “do very much the same sort of work as has 
been achieved by Hitler” in terms of subordinating individualism to the communal 
interest of the nation.211  In 1937 the group helped mobilize resistance to the 
Japanese invasion of the mainland, but were soon dissolved by Chiang, who saw 
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Fascist Influence in the Middle East 
 
Radical Arab nationalists of the 1930s “were at least as much influenced by 
European fascism as movements in any other part of the world.”213 This was 
strongly encouraged by both Germany and Italy as a way to expand fascist 
influence in a region sympathetic to both anti-Semitism and western anti-
colonialism. Mussolini presented himself, ludicrously but sometimes successfully, 
as a “defender of Islam” in Libya, where a Libyan Arab Fascist Party had 
emerged.214 Both German and Italian propaganda machines were active in the Arab 
world. In Payne’s view, “European fascism was taken more seriously in the Middle 
East than anywhere else in the world” save for Japan, South Africa, and Bolivia.215 
In Saudi Arabia, King Abdul Aziz sought and received German arms and contacts. 
Syrian and Iraqi delegations attended Nurenberg party congresses. Mein Kampf was 
published in several Arabic translations.216 At least seven different “shirt 
movements” appeared in the region by the end of the decade (white in Iraq, tan in 
Lebanon, blue and green in Egypt, and white, gray and iron in Syria). The three 
most prominent movements in the region inspired by fascism were Syria’s Socialist 
Nationalist Party, Iraq’s Futuwa movement, and the Young Egypt movement. All 
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three believed in their nation’s superiority; all three stressed self-sacrifice, martial 
virtues, and territorial expansion; all three praised both German Nazism and Italian 
Fascism.217 
 
Syria and Palestine 
 
Interwar Syria saw a flowering of radical pro-fascist youth groups like the Syrian 
Socialist Nationalist Party (PPS) and the Iron Shirts. The PPS, founded in 1932, was 
a true anti-system party, rejecting parliamentarism in all forms and advocating 
totalitarianism with a strong leader at the helm. The party adopted the Hitler salute, 
a curved swastika (zawba’a) as their symbol, and even sang their anthem to the 
tune of "Deutschland über alles”.218 It’s worth noting that while the party’s founder, 
Antun Saadeh, professed admiration for Hitler, he argued that his was not a fascist 
organization. In a 1935 speech he proclaimed “The Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
is neither a Hitlerite nor a Fascist one, but a pure social nationalist one. It is not 
based on useless imitation, but is the result of an authentic invention.”219 Of course 
such rejection was incompatible with the party’s explicit adoption of Nazi 
symbolism, organizational methods, and political program. But like many of his 
contemporaries, Saadeh was motivated by two related needs - appealing to their 
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natural constituencies by shedding foreign links, and avoiding being portrayed as a 
tool of foreign influence, which would lead to attacks from the country’s traditional 
conservatives. Where fascist parties were banned by the country’s rulers, foreign 
infiltration was usually the pretext. 
In Palestine, pro-Nazi activity centered around Mufti aI-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, 
who founded the Palestinian national movement and supported the 1941 coup in 
Iraq. Amin al-Husayni fled to Nazi Germany and “actively assisted” the German 
war effort.220 In nearby Lebanon, the political leader Pierre Gemayel founded the 
Kataeb Party in 1936 after being inspired by the order and discipline of German 
political life, which he witnessed first-hand during that year’s Olympic games.221 
The country’s Tan Shirts (whose outfits were, confusingly, white, according to some 





In interwar Iraq, political conflict centered around the rivalry of the pro-British 
Hashemite group and a number of pro-fascist movements such as the White Shirts, 
who viewed Nazi Germany as the sole power capable of challenging British 
colonial rule in the region. This view was particularly strong among the Iraqi 
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military elite, culminating in the pro-Nazi coup of April 1941. Even before the 
takeover, the country’s radical youth movement al-Futuwwa was explicitly based 
on Hitler’s Jugend.223 In 1938 the movement sent a representative to the Nurenberg 
Nazi rally, and soon after hosted the Hitler Youth leader Baldur von Schirach.  
Leading Iraqi intellectuals like Sami Shawkat praised the success of martial 
patriotism instilled among the German youth; Shawkat himself advocated violence 
as a means to Arab unity, and was a leading force in al-Futuwwa.  The pan-Arabic 
al-Muthanna club in Baghdad hosted speeches that praised fascist ideology and 
institutions. In June 1941, members of al-Muthanna, together with al-Futuwwa, 
staged a pogrom in Baghdad that killed approximately 180 of its Jewish residents. 
Throughout this period, Germany made a concerted propaganda push among Iraqi 
outlets; Germany’s representatives had direct contacts with three of the country’s 
major newspapers, while two others subscribed to a German news agency.224  
The Iraqi regime itself established close ties with Nazi Germany; Rashi Ali al-
Gailani, the country’s prime minister between 1933-35 and again in 1940, was the 
country’s leading advocate for rapprochement with fascism and staffed his cabinets 
with extreme nationalists. In his first term as prime minister he undertook an 
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intense campaign of pan-Arab nationalization; in 1940 he attempted to establish 
direct links with Nazi Germany via Italian intermediaries. By this point Great 
Britain was concerned about al-Gailani strong anti-British views, threatened trade 
sanctions, and forced him to resigned in early 1941, although he recaptured power 
in a coup only two months later. Germany was now providing direct material 




Reza Shah’s regime in Iran shared numerous similarities with European fascism. 
Dubbed “the Mussolini of Islam” by the home press, he welcomed Hitler’s rise to 
power and undertook a wide-sweeping campaign of nationalization in 1935, 
changing the country’s name from Persia to Iran - “Land of the Aryans”. He praised 
the Nuremberg Race Laws of 1936, and the country witnessed sporadic pogroms in 
1938. In 1936 the Germany finance minister Hjalmar Schacht made a state visit, 
followed by the leader of the German youth movement the following year, which 
resulted in an exchange program between the Hitler youth and its Iranian 
counterpart. As the country began moving into the German economic sphere, 
relations with the previously dominant Britain quickly deteriorated. In 1937 Iran, 
along with Turkey and Afghanistan, signed the Saadabad Friendship Pact, which 
gave Germany preferential treatment in trade and access to Iranian raw materials; 
Iran in turn received German credits, trade concessions and (beginning in 1938) 
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weapons and military planes. A secret agreement in 1939 made Iran a provider of 
food and natural resources for the Third Reich. At the end of 1939 Iran also signed 
a Treaty of Friendship with Japan, although it remained officially neutral during the 





Egypt was another state where fascist influence was profoundly felt during this 
period. As Payne notes, “there was much pro-German sentiment in Egypt.”227 Egypt 
has also attracted the most attention from scholars of Arab fascism, possibly due to 
its vibrant intellectual life in the 1920s and 1930s. For this reason, and because it 
stands as such a representative case of fascist influence outside Europe, the rest of 
this section is devoted to a more detailed case study of Egyptian politics during this 
period. 
The historian Nadav Safran argued that 1920s Egypt experienced a “progressive 
phase” during the 1920s, when leading intellectuals advocated the social and 
political values of Western liberalism and democracy. 228 As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, the country had established a constitutional parliamentary regime 
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in 1923 and elected a prime minister the following year.  But a decade later, Safran 
argued, a “crisis of orientation” took place, manifesting itself in the rejection of 
parliamentary politics and a turn toward authoritarianism, religion and nationalism. 
By depressing agricultural prices world-wide, the economic crisis had severely 
undermined the country’s exports. In addition, the country felt a strong sense of 
disillusionment with the corruption and factionalism of parliamentary rule. In this 
Egypt mirrored the ideological evolution of many states between the wars. As 
Safran writes: 
The great depression had given credence to the claims of Fascism, 
Nazism, and Communism that liberal democracy was a decaying 
system. The contrast between the misery, despair, and social discord 
that pervaded the Western democracies and the discipline, 
orderliness, and aggressive confidence that appeared to characterize 
the totalitarian regimes made a deep impression on Egyptians, who 
had seen in their own country a record of unmitigated failures of 
democracy.229 
The historian P.J. Vatikiotis similarly argues that “the temporarily successful 
challenge Fascism and Nazism presented to the Western European democracies 
undermined constitutional government as a model of emulation by non-European 
societies….The echo in Egypt was quite resounding.”230 This echo was expressed 
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by the rapid rise of political groups that advocated the rejection of liberalism, the 
use of violence, and the adoption of a fascist regime to deal with democratic 
corruption. The most prominent of these was the Muslim Brotherhood and the 
Young Egypt movement. 
The Muslim Brotherhood manifested its fascist influence in a number of wars - 
the cult of a leader, the rejection of democratic divisiveness in favor of national 
unity, the demand for autocratic politics, a quasi-military and uniformed youth 
movement, a program of official anti-Semitism, and a general dedication to social 
discipline and class solidarity.231 Lest these features appear to be political 
conveniences that were only incidentally fascist, evidence of Germany’s influence 
can be found directly in the writings of its members. Hasan al-Banna, the group’s 
founder, wrote an essay praising the "militarism" and "masculinity" of the Nazis, 
which he argued would serve as a model for the Muslim Brothers. Banna was also 
impressed by the centralized nature of the Fascist and Nazi regimes, their 
obedience to a central leader, and their ability to impose order.232 Al-Banna 
rejected what he saw as the divisive partisan bickering of democracies. At the 
movement’s Fifth Congress, he argued that the country’s political parties were 
artificial creations that divided the nation and produced self-serving factions.233 He 
repeated  this view in an editorial, arguing that "the existence of the party system 
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has become an obstacle on the road of revival and progress.”234 
Nazi influence was also found in the movement’s direct links with its European 
counterparts. The Muslim Brothers’ involvement in the conflict over Palestine 
brought them into contact with Germany, which sought to influence the movement 
through financial support. Documents seized by the British in 1939 showed that 
the Brotherhood had received secret subsidies from the German News Agency in 
Cairo through Palestinian intermediaries.235 
Young Egypt, the country’s other prominent fascist movement, was also directly 
influenced by Nazi symbolism and quasi-military organizational structure. In their 
political outlook, use of public violence, and fealty to a central leader they “bore 
an unmistakable similarity to contemporary European Fascist movements.”236 
Although the two groups shared similar outlooks, Young Egypt went even 
further than the Brotherhood in its denunciation of parliamentary rule and embrace 
of dictatorship. In a representative essay, Hamada al-Nahil, a Young Egypt activist 
at the Egyptian University, portrayed democracy as a disease, the deadly malady of 
partisanship upon the body politic. The cure, for al-Nahil, was a dictatorship. This 
was "the medicine of salvation as represented by discipline, and as brought by an 
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excellent doctor.... This excellent doctor is the dictator."237 Al-Nahil gave the 
examples of Hitler and Mussolini as doctors par excellence who had restored 
national confidence after a period of weakness.  
After the tainted elections of March 1938, Young Egypt intensified their 
rejection of democracy. Three months later, Young Egypt’s Secretary-General Fathi 
Radwan wrote an essay titled ''Are We Propagandists of Dictatorship?" Radwan 
agreed with his contemporaries that the system had failed to provide for the 
nation’s needs: 
We despise the parliamentary system that prevents and hinders 
action that turns the country into a stage for oratory and theatrics…238 
If it is dictatorship that will place a limit on the anarchy that has been 
disclosed about our high officials, then we will be among the 
supporters of dictatorship.... If it is dictatorship that can instill the 
youth with strength and the nation with a militant spirit, filling the 
people with electricity, vigor, and dynamism, then we will be 
dictators to the bone.239 
 
The leader of Young Egypt, Ahmad Husayn, also expressed repeated and open 
admiration for the Fascist political system. In 1938, he referred to the “miracles” of 
Germany and Italy in glowing terms, as examples of national recovery to be 
emulated. Moreover, Husayn argued that fascism and Nazism “were the bearers of 
much the same values as those that Young Egypt was trying to instill in the Egyptian 
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people – faith and action.”240 Their miracles had been achieved because of "a 
creed, a faith, a belief in themselves; this is what Young Egypt summons you to 
emulate."241 By the late 1930s, the movement’s propaganda explicitly presented 
itself as following the political trajectory of its German and Italian counterparts.242 
While Young Egypt denied connections with outside fascist powers, British 
reports from 1935 state that the movement had accepted Italian money passed 
through a magazine that served as the outlet for Italy’s state propaganda in Egypt. 
The British also report that the group had accepted Italian money for a propaganda 
trip to Europe in 1935. When Egypt’s prime minister pursued a partial ban of the 
group the following year, he justified it on the grounds that the movement was 
working for foreign interests.243 
In short, fascist influence in interwar Middle East found many adherents among 
those frustrated with democratic incompetence and impressed with Germany’s 
economic revival, internal stability, and projection of national unity. Many of the 
leaders were forced to publicly renounce their connections to European fascism, 
which perhaps explains why historiography has generally downplayed its influence 
in the region. Nevertheless, the hegemonic transition of the 1930s was expressed 
here in a wave of popular movements that imitated fascist ideology. Emulation and 
influence (in the form of Nazi-sponsored subsidies and propaganda trips) were the 
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two mechanisms by which the hegemonic shock manifested itself in the region. 
 
Fascist Influence in Latin America 
 
 In Latin America, the decline of the export-import development model 
associated with the Depression allowed philofascist military dictatorships to 
replace traditional oligarchs.244 Within a year after 1929, exports fell on average by 
40 percent, and foreign investment declined sharply. As national incomes fell, the 
traditional Europeanized political classes suffered loss of support. Nearly all 
political regimes in Latin America fell between 1930 and 1934; between 1930 and 
1933 the continent experienced the largest number of coups, uprisings, and 
aborted insurrections since the wars of independence a century earlier.  The 
Depression “compromised liberal constitutional government as much in Latin 
America as in Europe.”245 In the 1920s, Latin America had fourteen semi-
democratic (though elitist) regimes and six dictatorships. By the end of the 
following decade, the region had fifteen dictatorships and five democracies.246 
 The fundamental causes of this authoritarian turn were the onset of the 
Depression and the growth of anti-democratic sentiment that followed it, 
intensified by the appearance of successful alternative models in Europe. The result 
was a wave of right-wing, anti-Communist, populist new dictatorships, headed by 
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military strongmen who rejected the liberal economic policies of agrarian 
oligarchies and landowners. A lack of territorial ambitions, the multi-ethnic 
composition of most states, and low levels of mass mobilization dampened the 
spread of fascist ideology. But as in other regions, leaders of Latin American states 
were able to borrow institutional elements of fascist and communist states without 
implementing their ideological or racial policies, although some of the new 
dictatorships of the 1930s “were favorably disposed toward Italian Fascism or 
Nazism and permitted or occasionally even encouraged pro-fascist propaganda.”247 
I hasted to add that the above-quoted Payne does not consider the similarities 
sufficient to consider these regimes fascist (with the partial exception of Argentina), 
but as with the rest of the chapter my interest is in sources of institutional 
inspiration and not nomenclature. 
 Like their European counterparts, the new caudillos rejected democracy and 
looked toward fascist solutions for their problems. Borrowing from Italian and 
German corporatism, they promoted import-substituting industrialization, which 
took the form of protecting domestic markets and, inevitably, a greater role for the 
state. 248 Although Soviet planning was also a source of admiration, its influence 
remained limited not only because the leaders were instinctively anti-Left but also 
because preventing a slide toward communism ensured the cooperation of the old 
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 After a decade of instability, Brazil underwent a military coup in 1930. For the 
next fifteen years, the country was ruled by Getulio Vargas, “a nationalistic dictator 
with semifascist leanings.”250 Vargas did not develop his own national party, but 
preferred to govern by balancing competing groups, among the most important of 
which were the Acao Integralista Brasileira (Brazilian Integralist Action or AIB). 
Founded in 1932, the Integralists were the country’s main fascist movement and 
the first popular mass movement in the country’s history. It was a highly centralized 
and hierarchical group headed by a charismatic leader named Plinio Salgado, who 
cultivated a Hitler-like appearance. Its members wore green shirts and used the 
Nazi salute; they advocated a corporatist (“integral”) and authoritarian state. The 
Integralists contained “most of the distinguishing characteristics of European 
fascism,” and in the mid-1930s they “generated more support than any other 
protofascist movement in Latin America,” numbering between two and four 
hundred thousand members.251 
Throughout the 1930s, Germany expanded its influence in Brazil by increasing 
trade ties with the country. In the five years after 1933, it became the second-
largest importer of Brazilian coffee and cocoa, and the largest market for the 
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country’s cotton. In 1937, Vargas announced the creation of an Estado Novo, 
modeled after the Italian and Portuguese regimes of Mussolini and Salazar. Vargas 
dissolved the parliament, curtailed presidential elections, abolished political 
parties, and substantially increased his decree powers. He also cultivated good 
relations with Nazi Germany.252 As in many European cases, the Integralists came 
to an end when a moderate authoritarian regime moved closer to fascism and 
suppressed its more radical competitors (as had been the case, for instance, with 
the Portuguese National Syndicalists after Salazar’s shift to the right). The 





General Jose Uriburu’s takeover of Argentina in 1930 marked the country’s first 
dictatorship of the century. He has been preceded by General Irigoyen, who came 
to power in 1928 and represented the export-oriented agrarian oligarchy. This 
meant opposition to any interference with free trade and a refusal to deal with the 
Great Depression through political measures. 254 His inaction allowed Uriburu to 
take control with the help of the far-right Argentine Patriotic League, a nationalist, 
anti-Semitic, and anti-Communist paramilitary movement. Uriburu launched 
reforms that included a corporatist regime and a state militia called the Legion 
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A profascist military group, the Grupo de Oficiales Unidos (GOU), brought a 
new regime into power in 1943. They imposed a dictatorship and pursued a 
foreign policy more favorable to the Axis; during the war, the government “was 
more sympathetic to Germany and Italy than was any other major government in 
the Western Hemisphere.”256 The defeat of the Axis two years later forced them to 
moderate their policies, and in the 1950s this moderation eventually took the form 




In Chile, fascist influence found expression in the National Socialist Movement 
(MNS, aka the Nacis). Founded by the half-German Jorge Gonzales von Marees in 
1932, the Nacis argued for a corporatist economy and a stronger, more centralized 
executive. In that year Chile began a return to liberal democracy after years of 
political unrest that followed the onset of the Depression. Rising unemployment 
and declining exports led to the resignation of dictator Carlos Ibanez del Campo in 
1931, after which the Nacis “became a small but important actor in the political 
development of the country.”258 Naci militias clashed with left-wing radicals and 
their political leaders successfully stood for public office; in the 1935 municipal 
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elections the party elected two candidates to city councils, and in the 1937 
parliamentary elections three of its candidates entered the parliament. In the 
following year, twenty-nine Nacista municipal council members were elected into 
office, mainly in large cities. Thus in just six years, the movement “became a 
political force to be taken into account, not only because of its electoral 
competitiveness but also because of its activism and violence “ which resembled its 
European counterparts.259 In April 1938 the Nacis attempted to overthrow the 
government through a violent insurrection and were harshly suppressed by 
parliament; the attempt mobilized anti-fascsit sentiment and helped the formation 




Mexico saw a number of violent nationalist movements emerge in the wake of 
the Depression. At the grass-roots level, the most important Mexican philo-fascist 
movement was Union Nacional Sinarquista (National Synarchist Union), which 
started in the 1920s as a peasant movement but began to attract middle-class 
supporters by the following decade. The Sinarquistas advocated non-violence 
(despite attacks from the state), land and income redistribution, and a corporatist 
state.260 At their peak in 1943 they reached a membership of over half a million, 
making them the country’s largest mass party.261 
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The most prominent fascist movement in Mexico were the Gold Shirts, founded 
in 1934 by General Nicolas Rodriguez, who were pro-authoritarian, anti-Semitic 
and anti-Communist, and who “directly aped German and Italian styles”.262 In this 
period Mexico itself was evolving into a one-party corporatist state and the 
leadership was thus able to co-opt much of the Gold Shirts’ support. In the early 
1930s, president Plutarco Elfas Calles “toyed with the idea of fascistizing aspects of 
the Mexican regime” and encouraged the creation of a quasi-military force, the 
Accion Revolucionaria Mexicana (ARM).263 President Lazaro Cardenas, who took 
office in 1934, pursued a program of social reforms that focused on employment 
programs and guarantees of living standards. In 1938 he nationalized foreign (that 
is, British and American) oil wells and placed the public sector at the center of his 
industrial policy. “[I]n part to defuse American concern, [he] invoked Roosevelt's 




The most prominent fascist movement in Peru was the Union Revolucionaria 
(UR), which used the fascist salute and developed a party militia called the Black 
Shirts. The UR, modeling themselves after Mussolini’s Italy, were anti-democratic, 
populist, and nationalist, but after a failed bid in the 1936 elections the party 
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gradually lost support.265 Following its demise, the Peruvian Fascist Brotherhood 
became the major outlet of Peruvian fascism, led by the former prime minister Jose 
de la Riva-Aguero y Osma. While the group initially received some support, it 




Bolivia was one of the least developed countries in the region, and had lost a 
war with Paraguay in 1935, making it one of the likelier candidates for supporting 
frustrated nationalists. The economic crisis led to a search for institutional 
alternatives, and the fascist option received increasing support. The influence of 
Italian and German ideas “was often admitted by Bolivian leaders” and a radical 
coalition came to power in 1936 advocating a corporative state.267  
The country had its own version of the Falange, the Falange Socialista Boliviana 
(FSB). The group was founded in 1937 and looked toward Spain and Italy as 
models; as a result, its fascist leanings were corporatist, anti-Communist, and 
Catholic in orientation. Another significant fascist movement was the Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionaria (MNR), founded in 1940 and open in its admiration of 
European fascism. It sought nationalization of industry and a corporatist state; in its 
foreign policy it leaned toward Germany and Italy, seeing them “as allies in 
revolutionizing the international division of power and wealth.” A military junta 
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that took power in 1943 “immediately adopted a pro-Axis policy and included 
three of the most fascistic leaders of the MNR in its cabinet.268  
 
Fascist Influence in the United States 
 
 As a country that has always posed itself as the antithesis of authoritarian 
values, the United States seems to offer a difficult case for the theory of hegemonic 
shocks. But as Kenneth Waltz argued in Theory of International Politics, because a 
social science theory can always find confirming instances, its real test is how it 
deals with the hard cases – that is, those cases where we would not expect the 
dynamics predicted by the theory to be present.269 (The classic case is the 1894 
Franco-Russian alliance conforming to the predictions of balancing theory.) If 
hegemonic shocks are an important factor in domestic institutional reforms, we 
should expect to see a growing acceptance of fascism in the United States, and the 
adoption of fascist or fascist-inspired institutions by American policy-makers. 
At the mass level, the increasing support for fascist ideas in the United States 
was reflected in the growth of pro-German organizations and the rise of nationalist 
movements like the Black Legion, an offshoot of the Klan. Anti-semitism was also 
institutionalized in university quotas and admission policies to social organizations. 
This sentiment reflected a major plank of the Nazi platform, the elimination of class 
conflict and the creation of an organic national community. A contributor the 
American Review, a major intellectual outlet espousing the virtues of fascism in the 
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1930s, wrote: “If the State as to be the symbol of an organic folk then it followed 
that divisive opposition within the nation could not be tolerated.”270 In practice this 
led to a strong undertone of anti-Semitism. The infamously anti-Semitic T.S. Eliot, 
writing in the Review about the dangers of “free-thinking Jews”, argued: “The 
population should be homogenous; where two or more cultures exist in the same 
place they are likely to be either fiercely self-conscious or both become 
adulterate….A spirit of excessive tolerance is to be deprecated.”271 
Populist pro-German discourse is reflected perhaps most clearly in the radio 
career of Father Coughlin. Coughlin, who blamed the Jews for the Depression and 
enjoyed the second-largest radio audience in the country (after Roosevelt’s fireside 
speeches), frequently quoted Goebbels and praised the Nazis’ quest for full 
employment and racial purity. He broke with Roosevelt in 1934, forming a 
National Union for Social Justice whose 1936 candidate received nearly 900,000 
votes. After the mid-1930s, Coughlin became the country’s foremost public 
apologist for Franco, Mussolini and Hitler, while his followers organized local 
Christian Front paramilitary groups. He was finally silenced by the Church in early 
1942.272 
The only other significant and ideologically fascist grass-roots movement in the 
United States was the German-American Bund, “which aspired to be a slightly 
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watered-down Nazi Party for the United States.” 273 Despite bizarre attempts to 
“cross over” by juxtaposing images of the Founding Fathers with swastikas, the 
movement failed to attract American nationalists. Its membership peaked at 
approximately fifteen thousand, made up almost completely of German immigrants 
and naturalized Germans. An Italian equivalent was the Fasci all'Estero, an even 
smaller and less significant group organized by Italian-Americans. 274 
While the anti-Semitic ideology prevalent in the 1930s contributed to the 
acceptance of fascism, policy-makers at the elite level tended to separate fascist 
ideology (seen as hateful and aggressive) from its institutions (seen as novel and 
effective), emphasizing their desire to discard the former while emphasizing the 
latter. The bulk of the evidence for fascist emulation comes from the openly 
admitted admiration of fascist reforms by the American political and social elite in 
the 1930s. During this period, fascist institutions attracted praise not only from 
American scholars and intellectuals, but also from policy-makers, government 
bureaucrats, and senior political leaders including Roosevelt himself. Although this 
admiration and desire for emulation was often tempered by the need to preserve 
American liberties, the influence of European authoritarians was crucial in shaping 
the reforms of the Roosevelt revolution. In tracing this influence, I will focus first on 
the scholars and intellectuals, and then discuss imitation of fascist institutions at the 
elite policy level. 
In 1933, the Chicago Daily Tribune published an article on the decline of 
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democracy around the world. “Democracy is waning before the steady stride of 
dictatorships,” it began, citing William Ogburn, a professor of sociology at the 
University of Chicago who until recently had been a member of Roosevelt’s 
consumer advisory board. More surprising than this oft-repeated observation was 
Ogburn’s reaction to it. “I look forward to the decline of democracy and to the rise 
of a system of government that will utilize some of its principles, but will 
nevertheless be an entirely different system of government,” he said. “I look 
forward to a system of representation in accordance with social and economic 
grouping.” Ogburn predicted “a greater intimacy” between business and 
government, and advocated price fixing boards to keep price increases from 
overtaking purchasing power. “The government that is speediest is the one that will 
survive,” he continued. “An executive with the power to act such as that given 
President Roosevelt will meet requirements of speedy action and will be able to 
cope with rapid changes. A dictator can represent better than a legislature…”275 
Surprising as these comments seem today, they represented a very common 
sentiment among American scholars and intellectuals of the 1930s. In his history of 
the discipline of American politial science, Ido Oren repeatedly demonstrates how 
US scholars and other intellectuals encouraged the US to borrow elements of Nazi 
and Soviet institutions during the 1930s. The reformist mood of the period, which 
“diagnosed America as seriously but not terminally ill” led political scientists to 
search for solutions in the authoritarian success stories. During the Depression, 
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Germany and the USSR represented “models of administrative efficiency and social 
planning,” and in a time of deep social and economic crisis, American intellectuals 
“were understandably curious about political and social forms emerging elsewhere 
in the world as they earnestly (though not always critically) searched for 
remedies…”276 These were not marginal radicals, but successful mainstream 
political scientists, APSA presidents, and journal editors. The vast majority were not 
actual fascists or communists – they did not call for a proletarian revolution or a 
nationalistic dictatorship, and often hastened to point out the regimes’ more 
objectionable aspects. Nevertheless, they sought to study these regimes in a 
scholarly, detached, value-neutral fashion, and to distinguish between efficient 
institutions and hateful ideology.277 They favorably portrayed Nazi and Soviet 
regimes as laboratories for economic, social, and political experiments, and urged 
the US to “emulate what they regarded as the more positive aspects of the Fascist 
and Communist states.”278  
These “positive aspects” commonly included administrative reform, centralized 
leadership, and greater state involvement in the national economy. An unwieldy 
administrative structure was one of the chief vices commonly attributed to 
American democracy of the period. Since German public administration had long 
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been held up as a model of effective a rational bureaucracy, scholars naturally 
turned to Nazi Germany as a model of emulation. At a 1934 philosophy 
conference, Columbia University professor William Pepperell Montague used the 
phrase “Fabian Fascism” to describe his proposals for the future of the New Deal. 
The “Fabian” component implied gradual and evolutionary reform, a “civilized 
version of Fascism”. Montague foresaw a dual system of “fascistic communism and 
democratic capitalism…capitalism for those who can afford it accompanied by 
communism for those who need it.”279 Professor Roger Wells, in a 1935 APSR 
article, “commended the Nazis for rescuing German municipal government from 
the “excesses of the multi-party [Weimar] system.”280 In a 1936 book, former APSA 
president W. F. Willoughby urged Americans to “make a searching examination” of 
the revolutionary institutions erected in Italy, Germany, and Russia, with an eye 
toward “the possible incorporation in popular government of the advantage of 
autocracy”. One such advantage, according to Willoughby, was the Nazis’ ability 
“at a stroke” to attain “the superior advantages of the unitary over the multiple 
[federal] form of government.”281 A 1936 APSR article, noting the shift in power 
from American states to the federal government, proposed that “this process of the 
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internal balance of power may be fruitfully examined in Nazi Germany today.”282 
The Nazis “have acted where others have merely planned and studied,” the author 
concluded. “They have converted Germany from a federal to a centralized unitary 
state.”283 Similarly, James Pollock, a prominent scholar of German politics, thought 
that adopting Nazi institutions would increase the effectiveness of American 
government. At its worst, he argued, America’s doctrine of the separation of power 
“simply means stopping action. One thing we can learn from the dictatorships 
which are springing up all over the Europe is that there are times and emergencies 
when we must have action,” he told a newspaper. “We have reached a stage in our 
government when we need a system a little more conducive to the development of 
leadership.”284 
Seward Collins, editor of the American Review, became one of the more 
prominent advocates of American-style fascism in the mid-1930s, and his 
publication attracted contributions from a number of scholars and intellectuals. 
“The question of politics,” he wrote in the inaugural issue, “resolves itself, broadly, 
into a discussion of the succession of Fascism to parliamentarism; or at least some 
form of authoritarian government supplanting pluto-democracy…”285 For Collins, 
fascism was “the revival of monarchy, property, the guilds, the security of the 
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family and the peasantry, and the ancient ways of European life.”286 His 
contributors, reflecting the mood of the times, expressed a profound 
disenchantment with liberal capitalism and democracy after the Great Depression. 
For them, the economic collapse was deeply connected to the “pluto-democratic” 
political order.287 New York University professor J.S. Hoffman, a frequent 
contributor to the Review, wrote: “Obviously there is no solution but a 
revolutionary solution, for the tottering American political system of today is 
perhaps the best demonstration of those anti-authoritarian principles which have 
brought about the wreckage of modern society. There must be a revolution – a 
constructive revolution in behalf of authority, order, and justice…”288 Centralization 
of government authority was a central component in such a revolution. “My aim 
right now is to get more and more power for the President, whoever holds the 
office,” Seward wrote. “I hope it may be Roosevelt for some time to come.”289 
American-style monarchy, in the words of another contributor, “would provide a 
continuing authority, within which tradition might grow. Democracy lives from day 
to day. Dictatorship thinks only of the immediate future. Monarchy can both guide 
the present and foresee what’s ahead.”290 
Related to the desire for monarchy was a need to limit suffrage, which was 
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portrayed as a return to the ideals of the Founding Fathers. “If we are to retain any 
sort of free, representative government that guarantees liberty and justice with 
decency and effectiveness in operation,” wrote a contributor in 1936, “universal 
suffrage will have to be abandoned in favor of some restricted, selective scheme 
such as was in force and held to be a desideratum by the statesmen of 1787.”291 
 Soviet ideas also found admirers during this period. Imitation of Soviet 
practices found fewer supporters than its German counterparts, since the country’s 
complete rejection of capitalism (in contrast to Germany’s attempts to tame it) was 
anathema to American political culture. Nevertheless, during the 1930s Marxism 
gained a significant following on U.S. college campuses, which have remained its 
strongest bastions to this day. Gabriel Almond, whose friends fought in the Lincoln 
brigades during the Spanish civil war, wrote his 1938 dissertation as a critical 
examination of America’s “plutocratic class”.292 Robert Dahl, David Easton, 
Seymour Martin Lipset, Herbert Simon, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and other scholars who 
rose to prominence after World War II displayed an interest in communism that 
ranged from brief flirtation to deep commitment.293 In a 1931 textbook on civic 
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engagement, Charles Merriam avoided mentioning the elimination of civil rights in 
the Soviet Union and noted with admiration that Soviet reforms had produced ”a 
form of democratic nationalism.”294 
 It was only after America’s entry into World War II and the onset of the Cold 
War that the discipline of political science discarded its infatuation with German 
and Russian models and shifted toward nationalist conservatism. Once these 
regimes became direct rivals to the United States, political scientists “developed 
amnesia regarding their past accomodationism and reached a consensus that these 
regimes were antithetical to American democracy.”295 As noted above, 
accomodationist reviews and articles were featured in APSR as late as the end of 
1939. The discipline’s flagship journal ceased publishing such items only after the 
outbreak of the war.296 
 An interest in emulating fascist institutions was not limited to scholars or 
public intellectuals. In seeking to break from the liberal orthodoxy of the past, the 
Roosevelt administration also looked toward solutions within Nazi Germany and 
Soviet Russia. Roosevelt came into office determined to reshape the structure of 
                                                
National Biography Online, www.anb.org. 
294
 Quoted in Oren 2002:61, citing Charles Merriam (1931) The Making of Citizens: 
A Comparative Study of Methods of Civic Training, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, p. 222. See also Peter G. Filene (1978) Americans and the Soviet Experiment, 
1917-1933, Harvard University Press. 
295 Oren 2002:18-19 
296
 Oren 2002:87. One consequence of this shift, Oren notes, was the subsequent 
stigma attached to the study of public administration, which entered “a prolonged 
period of institutional decline and estrangement from political science” after the 
war. (Oren 2002:88) After the 1930s, it was no longer possible to argued that an 
efficient bureaucracy could be studied in a value-neutral way, or that it would 
always lead to rational and positive outcomes. 
  
283 
American government. "The nation was more than ready,” writes the historian 
Arthur Schlesinger. “Many people had an anguished sense of crisis. For some, 
society itself seemed confronted by the specter of dissolution.”297 Many policy-
makers saw unchecked capitalist competition as the source of the country’s 
problems, and sought to use state planning and corporatist institutions as the 
logical solutions to the economic crisis. Both fascism and the New Deal relied on 
strong, charismatic leadership to pursue these reforms. To their contemporaries, 
“Hitler and Roosevelt were both charismatic leaders who held the masses in their 
sway – and without this kind of leadership, neither National Socialism nor the New 
Deal would have been possible.”298 Roosevelt wholeheartedly rejected the ideology 
of fascism, but his decision to breach the long-standing norm of presidential term 
limits was but one small manifestation of a growing acceptance of the need for a 
strong (and if necessary, long-lasting) central executive. 
 Beginning in 1933, the New Deal transformed a highly decentralized 
economy with limited social insurance into a regulated mixture of public and 
private programs, complete with massive public works, government deficit 
management, collective bargaining, and business regulation. Many of these 
reforms, particularly their corporatist elements, bore an unmistakable similarity to 
fascist and communist institutions, a fact that the administration did not seek to 
hide. They did stress, however, that this imitation was pragmatic and policy-
oriented, not ideological. In October 1933, Roosevelt told his Secretary of the 
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Interior, Harold Ickes: “What we are doing in this country were some of the things 
that were being done in Russia and even some things that were being done under 
Hitler in Germany. But we are doing them in an orderly way.”299 The racial and 
totalitarian aspects of Nazi policy did not find mainstream admirers across the 
Atlantic, but in politically more neutral areas such as a labor services and business 
cartelization, argued Gotz and Patel, “the USA was interested in Germany’s 
experiences.”300 
 Coming into office, Roosevelt quickly abandoned the orthodox policies of 
fiscal tightening. The dollar was taken off the gold standard and devalued. Within a 
hundred days, the new administration adopted programs to support agriculture, 
build large-scale public works, regulate industrial prices, and encourage businesses 
to cartelize and set prices. “These early measures smacked to many of fascism,” 
according to Frieden, and led to opposition in the Supreme Court, which declared 
the more controversial measures to be unconstitutional.301 Nevertheless, 
government regulation entered new spheres of business life, from electric utilities to 
banking and monetary policy. “The consensus among political scientists and 
economists of the time,” writes Schivelbusch, “was that the United States under 
Roosevelt in the spring and summer of 1933, had, in a process of voluntary 
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consolidation, transformed itself into a postliberal state.”302 The fixing of prices and 
production in the oil and airline industries; the establishment of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission, the Wagner Act of 1935, and the National Labor Relations 
Act of 1936 – all these were parts of an effort, according to Peter Gourevitch, to 
inject corporatism into a liberal political economy. “Agriculture, labor, and some 
elements of business were allowed to organize their markets, providing some 
shelter from unrestrained market forces.303 Arthur Schlesinger, in The Coming of the 
New Deal, recounts an anecdote about Roosevelt’s second fireside char, in which 
the president talked about “a partnership in planning” between government and 
business. While preparing the speech, an aide said to him, “You realize, then, that 
you're taking an enormous step away from the philosophy of equalitarianism and 
laissez-faire?” After a moment of silence, Roosevelt replied: “If that philosophy 
hadn't proved to be bankrupt, Herbert Hoover would be sitting here right now. I 
never felt surer of anything in my life than I do of the soundness of this passage.”304 
 Economic planning by the state thus became a major element of New Deal 
reforms. “By 1933 the advocates orderly planning, who had been gaining converts 
as the Depression worsened, were listened to with respect.”305 The Agricultural 
Adjustment Act (AAA) and the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933 
were two major elements of early New Deal recovery programs. Both sought to use 
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central planning to create a measure of stability that could not be accomplished 
through traditional capitalism. A 1933 study of American Agriculture concluded: 
“[T]he competitive system is breaking down ... The comfortable theory of the 
identity of mass prosperity with the unrestricted pursuit of private gain no longer 
serves.”306 Centralized planning could be used to curb destructive competition 
between businesses, balance supply and demand, and resolve problems of 
overproduction in industry and agriculture. The AAA thus introduced price and 
production controls to farmers, who “had always believed that their task was to 
grow as much food and fibre as possible.”307 The NIRA, AAA’s industrial 
counterpart, also sought to set prices, output and employment levels by 
encouraging special committees to draw up codes of “fair” competition.308 During 
the public unveiling of NIRA, “when Roosevelt referred to the industrial 
associations that had been reconstituted by the codes as ‘modern guilds,’ those 
fluent in the jargon may well have recognized the reference to the corporatist 
system associated with Fascism.”309 
 Many of these major reforms took Italy and Germany as a source of inspiration. 
James Whitman notes that “a startling number of New Dealers had kind words for 
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Mussolini” – as did, of course, a number of American conservatives.310 Rexford 
Tugwell, a member of Roosevelt’s brain trust, openly spoke out about the virtues of 
the fascist order, as did internal NRA studies.311 Decrying the ideological 
foundation of fascism, Tugwell nevertheless described it as “the cleanest, neatnest 
[sic], most efficiently operating piece of social machinery I’ve ever seen. It makes 
me envious.”312 An NRA bureaucrat wrote in 1935: “The Fascist Principles are very 
similar to those which we have been evolving here in America and so are of 
particular interest at this time.”313  
The similarities between the early New Deal reforms and fascist corporatism 
were widely noted by contemporaries. Fortune magazine declared that "[t]he 
Corporate State is to Mussolini what the New Deal is to Roosevelt…"314 Such 
comparisons were made not only by Roosevelt’s opponents (although they often 
sought to drawn unflattering parallels), but also by observers and policy-makers 
who considered themselves allies of the administration. Writing in the Spectator, 
liberal journalist Mauritz Hallgren noted: “We in America are bound to depend 
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more upon the State as the sole means of saving the capitalist system. Unattended 
by black-shirt armies or smug economic dictators – at least for the moment – we 
are being forced rapidly and definitely into Fascism…”.”315 A 1934 article in the 
North American Review noted: “The New Dealers, strangely enough, have been 
employing Fascist means to gain liberal ends. The NRA with its code system, its 
regulatory economic clauses and some of its features of social amelioration, was 
plainly an American adaptation of the Italian corporate state in its mechanics.”316 
Liberal journalist and civil rights leader Oswald Garrison Villard wrote in the 
Political Quarterly: “No one can deny that the entire Roosevelt legislation has 
enormously enhanced the authority of the President, given him some dictatorial 
powers, and established precedents that would make it easy for any successor to 
Mr. Roosevelt, or for that gentleman himself, to carry us far along the road to 
fascism or state socialism.”317 A 1934 article in Haper’s noted: “It is in the very 
nature of planned recovery, its methods and its objectives, that we find the 
tendency which, if developed to its logical conclusion, arrives at the fascist stage of 
economic control. Mild measures have failed and by their failure have prepared the 
way for accentuating the tendency toward fascist control.”318 And George Soule, 
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the liberal editor of The New Republic, wrote in his 1934 book The Coming 
American Revolution: “We are trying out the economics of Fascism without having 
suffered all its social or political ravages”319 
Beginning in about 1935, the administration also began a program of welfare 
expansion, sometimes called the second New Deal, which included social 
insurance and job-creating government programs. In that year Congress passed the 
Social Security Act, creating the country’s first system of national insurance. 320 It 
also approved a five billion dollar allocation for unemployment relief, the largest 
peacetime allocation in the country’s history. When Roosevelt described mass 
unemployment as “the greatest menace to our social order” in 1934, he was 
echoing the concerns of many political leaders around the world.321 And like many 
other leaders, Roosevelt was intensely interested in the German solution to this 
problem – Reichsarbeitsdienst, a labor service that organized the unemployed into 
work projects that required little or no skills. After 1933, “it was Hitler’s 
government in Germany that offered the prime example of a labour service in 
practice. Even more problematic was the fact that the Third Reich advertised the 
idea of the labour service as a true symbol of National Socialism…international 
perception of the German labour service was largely shaped by this 
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propaganda.”322 The Nazi success in quickly eliminating mass unemployment 
made the Reichsarbeitsdienst a focus of global interest throughout the 1930s, 
stimulating intense interest and discussion among policy-makers in other countries, 
who “scrutinized its various functions as a public works scheme, an educational 
institution and a pre-military organization. The German institution was regarded as 
influential, and some experts saw it as a model for other, similar organizations 
throughout the world.”323 As a result, the German labor service “left a deep 
imprint” on the minds of American policy-makers.324 When the administration 
sought to train air mechanics for the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), they 
looked to the Reichsarbeitsdienst and the Flieger-HJ, a branch of Nazi youth 
devoted to aviation, as organizational models. The New York Times reported on the 
administration’s interest in these institutions, and when aviation classes were 
introduced into the CCC, “the Nazi experience had obviously been a source of 
inspiration”.325 
All these measures dramatically increased the power of the federal government. 
By 1936, federal expenditures outweighed state and local spending combined, 
when they had been only a third of these in the late 1920s.326 The New Deal 
“provided the most important extension of the power of the federal authorities over 
                                                
322
 Gotz and Patel 2006:57, 59 
323
 Gotz and Patel 2006:59 
324
 Gotz and Patel 2006:59. They conclude (p.62-3) that “these developments show 
an unexpected willingness to study the Third Reich as a source for policy ideas.” 
325
 Gotz and Patel 2006:63 
326
 Frieden 2006:235 
  
291 
American society and the states that had ever occurred in peacetime and one that 
was to prove irreversible.”327 In their reliance on the power of the state, American 
policy-makers borrowed institutional elements from the rising authoritarian states. 
“Commentators freely noted areas of convergence among the New Deal, Fascism, 
and National Socialism. All three were considered postliberal state-capitalist or 
state-socialist systems, more related to one another than to classic Anglo-French 
liberalism.”328 Social planning, a state-directed economy, public works projects, 
and strong central leadership and a growing acceptance of collectivism were all 
common features of these institutional bundles, although the American version had 
retained far more individual civil liberties than its European counterparts. 
The reforms of the hegemonic transition of the 1930s demonstrated that 
democracy could still solve difficult problems of political and economic 
organization – but that it could do so only by adopting institutional elements of 
non-democratic regimes. When the Republicans returned to power in 1953, they 
continued to oppose the expansion of government power but preserved the major 
reforms of the 1930s, “a tacit admission that the New Deal had not intended to 
destroy capitalism but to preserve and revive it.”329 Democracy had survived only 
by imitating elements of successful authoritarian regimes, reflecting the institutional 
dynamics of the hegemonic shock of the Great Depression. 
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The Coercive Phase of the Fascist Wave, 1938-1943 
 
 The final phase of the fascist wave was characterized by territorial conquests, 
annexations, and the creation of satellites, puppets, and tutelary regimes. It was at 
this point that the wave reached an all-time peak. In the summer of 1942 the fascist 
order encompassed half the world’s population, or “virtually all of Europe and the 
Middle East and much of Asia and Africa.”330 Fascist territories in Festung Europa 
“stretched from the Mediterranean to the Arctic, from the English Channel to the 
Black Sea and almost the Caspian.”331 In Asia, Japan had established puppets in 
China and all over Southeast Asia. 
 Institutional waves that spread via coercion are the most dramatic and least 
theoretically interesting mechanisms by which hegemonic shocks create sweeping 
domestic changes. The coercive fascist wave spread via the sheer, newly-acquired 
power of hegemonic fascist states – Germany, Japan, and to a lesser extent Italy. It 
was the first such attempt since Napoleon’s bid for European hegemony, which had 
left a deep imprint on the institutions of affected states. Like other coercive 
authoritarian waves (for example, the postwar Communist wave in eastern Europe), 
its consolidation dynamics differ from those of democratic waves. Coercive waves 
tend to fail because other states eventually balance against the coercive hegemon, 
as was the case with the Napoleonic wars. The end of the fascist wave came not 
from failed consolidation but from external forces; namely, defeat by the Allied 
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forces. In the rare case where a coercive wave endures, as in postwar Eastern 
Europe, it must be continuously held together by the hegemon or risk falling apart 
from its sphere. Autocratic and democratic regime consolidations in the wake of 
shocks therefore proceed along different paths.332 
 Fascist Italy was the first to use direct annexation to spread its regime via 
coercion. Mussolini envisioned his regime as a return to the glory of Ancient Rome, 
complete with grand visions of territorial expansion. In October 1935 Italy invaded 
Ethiopia; the following year the new colony was merged with Somalia and Eretria 
(Italian possessions since 1889) to form Italian East Africa, an entity that lasted until 
1941.333 In April 1939 Italy took over Albania (until its liberation in November 
1944). With the onset of general war, Italy made attempts at Egypt, Tunisia, and 
Greece between 1940 and 1943. It added British Somaliland to its conquests in 
1940, only to have the British liberate it at year later. 
 Germany’s attempts were far more successful, in line with its far greater share of 
military power. At the peak of Nazi success in Europe, only Switzerland, Sweden, 
Finland, Britain, and Ireland remained free. Hitler’s victories between 1938 and 
1941 “gave him control of the greater part of continental Europe, something 
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unprecedented since the height of Napoleon's power.”334 The conquest was part of 
a plan to establish a fascist order all over Europe, with a dominant Germany greatly 
expanded to the east. 
 Direct expansion began with the Austrian Anschluss in March 1938. In 
September 1938, the Munich agreement gave Germany Sudetenland, the German 
region of Czechoslovakia. A few months later, Hitler offered Poland satellite status, 
and after a refusal signed the Nazi-Soviet Pact that carved up Poland and the 
Baltics between the two rivals. Poland was invaded and taken over in a matter of 
weeks in August-September 1939, setting the stage for the lull of the “phony war” 
that lasted until the following April.  
 In May 1940, Hitler invaded and defeated France. Norway, Denmark, Belgium, 
Holland and Luxembourg were also conquered that spring. Three small territories 
taken by Belgium in 1919 were re-annexed, as well as bits from western Poland 
and northwest Czechoslovakia. Luxembourg and French Alsace-Lorraine became 
incorporated into the Reich. In April 1941, the Germans over-ran Yugoslavia and 
Greece. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia were both dissolved, split between 
German and Italian military occupation, a puppet regime in Serbia, and a satellite 
state governed by the Ustashi in Croatia. Further east, in the Baltic states, Ukraine 
and western USSR, Nazi occupation led to the creation of “overarching military 
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occupation authorities, special German economic agencies, and the SS racial and 
police administration.” 335 The initially successful invasion of the Soviet Union in 
June of 1941 marked the apogee of Hitler’s power and the peak of the fascist wave. 
In November of that year Japan launched a series of its own invasions and a raid on 
Pearl Harbor.  
By the beginning of 1941 Hitler had “blackmailed or, by territorial concessions, 
cajoled” Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary into joining the Axis and became junior 
partners in the fascist coalition.336 Yugoslavia and Greece were occupied in April 
1941 after Italy’s troops were repelled in the latter.  
The Axis also pushed into North Africa. An Italian campaign eastward from 
Libya crossed into Egypt in September 1940, but a British counteroffensive swept 
them out a few months later; the British also took over Ethiopia and dismembered 
Italian East Africa. But the elite Afrika Korps under the command of General 
Rommel reversed Italian losses, attacking Libya and forcing their way through 
Egypt, where the British made a final stand with the Suez Canal at their back.337 
Hitler “recognized the need for certain allies, for acquiescent satellite states, 
and for friendly neutrals,” and this produced :a new configuration of states under 
German leadership and/or domination that the Nazi press sometimes hailed as the 
new "united states of Europe.” (see Table 4.2)338 
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Direct Annexation Austria 
Czech Sudetenland 
Danzig 
Polish West Prussia, Poznan, and Silesia 
Luxembourg 
Belgium (Eupen and Malmedy) 












Belgium and part of northern France 
Forward military districts in the USSR 
Tutelary Satellite or Puppet 
Regime 














Friendly Neutral Spain, Switzerland, Sweden 
Distant Neutral Portugal, Ireland, Turkey 
Table 4.1: The Fascist Order in Festung Europa. Adopted from Payne 1995:376 
 
 Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 inaugurated a new stage in 
the expansion of the war, aided by Romania, Hungary and Finland in the side of 
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the Axis. Bulgaria was friendly to Germany, providing economic cooperation and 
free transit for German troops, and receiving a slice of Yugoslavia as a reward. New 
fascist satellite states included Slovakia (1939), Vichy France (1940) and Croatia 
(1941).339 Of the five official neutrals, three collaborated with the Fascist regime in 
some capacity (Spain, Switzerland, Sweden). Spain could not be completely 
neutral, given Franco’s fascist sympathies. The Nordic countries received the most 
“lenient” treatment out of all occupied states – Denmark was permitted to retain its 
autonomy until later in 1943, and the Netherlands were governed by a civilian 
Nazi administration “who created a simulacrum of internal Dutch autonomy.”340  
Meanwhile, in the Pacific the Japanese bombed Pearl Harbor in December 
1941 as they launched a simultaneous attack on the Philippines, Guam, Midway, 
Hong Kong, and Malaya. Moving over land through Malaya, they captured 
Singapore two months later. By 1942 they conquered the Philippines, Malaya, the 
Netherland Indies, New Guinea, the Aleutians, and Burma. They controlled the 
Indian Ocean and threatened both India and Australia. The goal was the creation of 
a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Japanese leadership and without 
European interference, and “everywhere they found ready collaborators among 
enemies of European imperialism.”341  
But the defeat and unconditional surrender crushed any hopes for fascism as an 
alternative regime path. Not only had Germany’s share of relative power collapsed 
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in the wake of the defeat, but the decline was the result of a dramatic military 
confrontation. This was especially damaging since 
Nearly all fascist movements, with only a few minor exceptions, had 
appealed to war as the ultimate test, the nation's most validating 
mission. To have failed in the final test of what was largely even 
though not exclusively – a fascist war put the seal on the inviability 
and self-destructiveness of the fascist enterprise…the final defeat was 
so thorough and unconditional that fascism was itself discredited to a 
degree unprecedented among major modern political 
movements…342 
In the aftermath of the next hegemonic shock, the United States and the USSR had 
emerged as winners, while Germany was utterly defeated and its regime lost all 
legitimacy among former imitators. The century’s third hegemonic shock had left 
only two institutional bundles competing for influence – democracy and 
communism. Because both had proven victorious, both regimes experienced waves 
of domestic reforms in their favor in the years following the end of the war – a 
subject for the next chapter.  
Conclusion 
The rapid growth of Germany and the USSR in the 1930s was directly tied to 
their institutional innovations – the same innovations that vividly set them apart 
from the stagnating liberal democracies of the same period. As a result, the statist 
features of their economies became increasingly attractive to observers. As Sheri 
Berman observed: 
With economic collapse and social chaos threatening much of 
Europe, publics began to renew their demands for the stability, 
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community, and social protection that modern capitalist societies 
seemed unable to provide. At this point fascism and national 
socialism charged onto the stage, offering a way out of the downward 
spiral, a new vision of society in which states put market in their 
place and fought the atomization, dislocation, and discord that 
liberalism, capitalism, and modernity had generated.343 
 
The dynamics of the hegemonic transition of the 1930s were thus a direct 
influence on the timing and content of the wave of institutional transformations 
during this period. Even would-be liberals were persuaded by the seemingly 
miraculous German recovery. “In my view what China needs is an able and 
idealistic dictator,” wrote a Chinese political scientist in 1934. “There are among us 
some people, including myself, who have undergone long periods of liberal 
education. These people naturally find undemocratic practices extremely 
distasteful. But if we want to make China into a strong modern nation, I fear there is 
no alternative except to throw aside our democratic conviction.”344 
Besides attracting countless overt and covert imitators, fascism expanded its 
influence via increasing economic power, and coerced a number of territories into 
fascist rule. Under attack from both the extreme left and the extreme right, capitalist 
democracy survived by emulating the successful elements of both of its 
competitors. In doing so it demonstrated a degree of institutional adaptation 
unanticipated by either its critics or by many of its supporters. Democracy had now 
defeated its second great competitor of the twentieth century, after the triumph over 
monarchy failed to establish a stable democratic world. But another alternative still 
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remained, and in the wake of World War II this final challenger seemed poised to 
offer both a dangerous challenge and a legitimate alternative to democratic 













“At the present moment in world history nearly every nation must choose 
between alternative ways of life.”  
-- Harry S Truman (1947)1 
 
 
“Whether the Marxist situations all over the world become Communist 
preserves depends mostly on the relative strength and policies of the 
Western and the Soviet camps.”  





For Germans the year 1945 became known as stunde null – zero hour, the period 
when Europe’s history was fundamentally altered by forces outside of itself. 
Cleaved by the force of two messianic powers, Germany became the symbol of a 
struggle between competing visions that offered two mutually exclusive utopias. 
This chapter examines the aftermath of the largest military conflict of the twentieth 
century, the power transition that came in its wake, and the waves of institutional 
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reforms that flowed from that transition.  
 Alone among the hegemonic shocks of the twentieth century, World War II 
produced not one but two rising great powers, the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Each emerged with its military, economy and global reputation greatly 
strengthened by the joint triumph over the Axis. Reflecting this duality, the war’s 
aftermath witnessed two distinct waves of institutional reforms that embodied the 
competing visions proffered by the superpowers. Despite the profound differences 
in their content, both regime waves diffused through a mixture of coercion (through 
occupation and nation-building), influence (via the expansion of trade, foreign aid, 
grants, and newly-forged international institutions), and emulation (by outsiders 
impressed by the self-evident success of the two systems).  
 The aftermath of World War II also provided a dramatic illustration of how 
rising great powers can take advantage of hegemonic shocks to advance the 
construction of international institutions that act as conduits for their influence. In 
normal political life, the reform of institutional architecture is a slow, complex, 
inertia-laden process; hegemonic shocks, however, offer a temporary window of 
opportunity to wipe the slate clean. In the wake of the war, both the Soviet Union 
and the United States used their enormous power and influence to construct a new 
institutional architecture that helped them perpetuate control and influence over 
the states embedded within it. 
 This chapter first examines the power transition that took place in the years 
immediately following the war, and the resulting forces that promoted waves of 
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regime change in its wake. I then turn to the mechanisms of coercion, influence 
and emulation though which the Soviet Union and the United States pursued 
regime reforms and attracted regime imitators in countries around the world in the 
wake of the war. 
 
The Transition to Bipolarity 
 
 The war had profoundly altered the international distribution of power. Europe 
had ended the war shaken and defeated, even within the victorious allied 
members. Postwar per capita GDP among the continental Allies was less than 80 
percent of its 1939 levels, and in most it was lower than in the early 1920s.3 
“Morally and economically Europe has lost the war,” wrote the British writer Cyril 
Connolly in 1945. “The great marquee of European civilization in whose yellow 
light we all grew up…has fallen down; the side-ropes are frayed, the centre pole is 
broken, the chairs and tables are all in pieces, the tent is empty, the roses are 
withered on their stands…”4  
 France and Britain, first-rank European powers for centuries, were reduced to 
supplicants reliant on American intervention – financial in the case of Britain, 
physical in the case of France. The descent of the latter from the ranks of great 
powers was made clear by the humiliating defeat of June 1940, followed by four 
years of subservience and occupation. As late as 1938, British military strategy 
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positioned France as the continent’s pre-eminent military power, the bulwark 
against German aggression and perhaps even the Soviet menace further east. But, 
as historian Tony Judt writes in his history of postwar Europe, “in six traumatic 
weeks, the cardinal reference points of European inter-state relations changed 
forever. France ceased to be not just a Great Power but even a power, and despite 
De Gaulle's best efforts in later decades it has never been one since.”5 
 Britain fared little better. Its victory “revealed Britain's decline, and Roosevelt 
did nothing to halt it,” notes Francois Furet. “Britain emerged with honor but in a 
weakened condition, heroic but anemic, less and less sure of its mastery over the 
Commonwealth and lacking its traditional capacity as referee in Europe.”6 Alone 
among the former European powers it was perceived as something of an equal to 
the two superpowers, at least in the closing stages and immediate aftermath of the 
war.7 But fighting had left the country nearly bankrupt and no longer able to 
maintain its far-flung empire. Great Britain “emerged from six years of total war 
exhausted, impoverished, and numb.”8 It had become the largest debtor nation in 
the world, and in the process shed approximately a quarter of its national wealth.9 
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In doing so, it “fell to secondary status after World War II: America and Russia 
eclipsed her; she was shorn of empire; her economy suffered; and she no longer 
exrted decisive influence upon the structure of the international system,” write van 
Wingen and Tilemma.10 “Great Britain's moment was past,” writes Roberts. “Her 
eminence was illusory and temporary, though morally enhanced by recollection of 
her stand almost alone in 1940 and 1941.”11 
 For the defeated Axis states, feared conquerors only three years earlier, the 
decline was far more dramatic. Their industries were in ruins, their people 
scattered, the reputations of their regimes irretrievably damaged not only by their 
defeat but also by their conduct during the war. Per capita industrial output in the 
postwar Axis countries was less than half of its prewar levels; in Italy and Japan this 
set output back to its 1910 levels, in Germany to roughly 1890. German living 
standards, roughly equal to those of Great Britain before the war, were barely one-
third of British levels in 1946, on par with Peru.12  
 Nor were the conditions in western Europe propitious for recovery. Economic 
revitalization required imports of industrial equipment, food, and raw materials, at 
a time when Europe had lost its ability to pay for these imports. Its empires, which 
had provided access to markets and materials at favorable rates, were 
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disintegrating. At the same time, the Cold War had pushed them out of markets in 
central and eastern Europe. Compounding the damage was the fact that the 
continent had also lost the ability to raise money from foreign investments, which 
had been sold to pay for the war.13 By 1945, western Europe, the former locus of 
the international system, was dependent “on a dangerously contingent source to 
fund its imports” – UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) 
expenditures, lend-lease, and direct spending by American troops and government 
agencies.14 
 
The Rise of Soviet Power 
 The war’s outcome demonstrated that the attempt to modernize through fascism 
had failed.15 That regime, so recently a paragon of efficiency and order, was now in 
the words of a 1945 New York Times editorial “a beaten and discredited system.”16 
In its place stood two rival ideologies whose representative countries emerged 
victorious from the war. The United States and the Soviet Union began the postwar 
period with the strength and reputations greatly enhanced. Militarily, the Red Army 
had achieved a stunning victory over Germany. The defeat of Nazi Germany, a 
country that many pre-war contemporaries viewed as an industrial goliath, 
“suggested that the Soviet system had considerable real-world vigor.”17 This 
triumph played a key role in the attraction exerted by Communism in the years 
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following the conflict. Despite the importance of American participation, the war 
had been won on the Eastern Front – the graveyard of 506 Nazi divisions and 10 
million German soldiers (compared to 3.6 on the Western Front). With its victory, 
the Soviet Union annexed territory from Finland in the north, Poland in the center, 
and Bessarabia from Romania; Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were re-absorbed after 
a German-imposed interlude. The addition of Ruthenia at the expense of 
Czechoslovakia and the occupation of Sakhalin, Manchuria, and North Korea gave 
the USSR direct access to Hungary and China.18  
 More importantly, the Red Army dominated the continent and occupied an 
unbroken cordon sanitaire from the Baltic to the Black Sea. By the middle of 1945 
every country east of the USSR except Greece had governments led either by 
communists or coalitions in which communists shared power. The Red Army 
occupied Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, and Czechoslovakia; it was the first to enter 
Berlin. Only the quick advance of General Montgomery blocked the Red Army 
from moving north through Germany toward Denmark; by this point it “constituted 
the greatest military force Europe had ever seen.”19 The military triumph “had 
proved its military strength, its social cohesion, the patriotism of its population. It 
lent Stalin an unassailable negotiating position at the end of the war…. 
Communism had won the war and thus a new lease on history.”20 Its armies “had 
proved far better instruments for the extension of international communism than 
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revolution had ever been.”21 The end of the war “inaugurated the short period – a 
dozen or so years – during which Soviet Communism exercised its greatest 
fascination over the twentieth-century political imagination.”22 The collapse of the 
German juggernaut left a power vacuum in central and eastern Europe, which the 
USSR rushed to fill.  
 
Figure 5.1: Soviet share of hegemonic power, 1930-1960. Soviet power increased 
rapidly in the second half of the 1940s.  
 
  
The Soviet economy, though shaken by the war, was recovering rapidly; living 
standards improved (albeit from a very low point), and between 1945 and 1950 
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industrial production doubled, exceeding prewar levels.23 The economic trends 
were especially important since they signaled the viability of the system to 
audiences in the developing world. "The USSR now is one of the mightiest 
countries of the world,” declared Molotov in 1946. “One cannot decide now any 
serious problems of international relations without the USSR."24 The defeat of the 
Nazis “more than reversed the disastrous post-1917 slump in Russia's position in 
Europe,” writes Paul Kennedy. “Indeed, it actually restored it to something akin to 
that of the period 1814-1848, when its great army had been the gendarme of east-
central Europe.”25 Despite the devastation of the war, the Soviet Union emerged as 
the most formidable military power (in conventional weapons) on the European 
continent. At the end of the war it had four million active soldiers and the control 
of territories far larger than its pre-war or even pre-Soviet boundaries.26 Even 
skeptics who protested against the values of communism expressed begrudging 
admiration for its success. “No one can deny…[that] the ruthlessness of the Soviet 
leaders paid dividends,” wrote Granville Hicks, a lapsed Marxist who had 
renounced Communism after the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. “I grow impatient with 
those who argue that the Soviet regime must be virtuous because it triumphed in 
war, but there can be no argument about its power.”27  
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 The war had proven to be Communism's greatest challenge and, through the 
very magnitude of that challenge, its savior. The victory “combined the two gods 
that make or break historical times: power and ideas,” allowing the USSR to 
credibly present itself as a viable alternative to capitalist development.28 “The usual 
arguments against capitalism-the tyranny of trusts, the scandal of poverty in the 
midst of plenty – remain in the forefront of people's minds,” wrote Raymond Aron 
in 1944. “At the same time, the efficiency of the Communist regime's performance 
during the war has refuted some classical arguments on the inevitable decadence 
inherent in a bureaucratic economy.”29 A rise in power meant not only the power 
to coerce, but also the power to attract, both through the allure of communism and 
the perceived deficiencies of the alternative. “Millions of people do live in 
insecurity or downright poverty,” wrote Granville Hicks in 1946, “and whether 
capitalism is responsible or not does not matter so long as it is on capitalism that 
they put the blame.”30 If capitalism represented the past, communism held the 
promise of a bright future, particularly for European intellectuals who witnessed the 
decay of the old bourgeois order. It “excited intellectuals in a way that neither 
Hitler nor (especially) liberal democracy could hope to match,” writes Judt. It was 
“exotic in locale and heroic in scale”; it was “directed towards impeccably 
universal and transcendent goals. Its crimes were excused by many non-
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Communist observers as the cost, so to speak, of doing business with History.”31 
 This potent combination of material success and ideological appeal enabled the 
USSR to both coerce its neighbors and to attract admirers within them, sometimes 
at the same time. “Say what you will – the Communists were more intelligent,” 
wrote Milan Kundera, recalling how he, along with half the nation, cheered the 
Soviet takeover of Czechoslovakia in 1948 (the half, he writes, that was “the more 
dynamic, the more intelligent, the better half.”) Communism managed to capture 
the imagination through its promise of a universal utopia. It presented “a grandiose 
program, a plan for a brand-new world in which everyone would find his place. 
The Communists’ opponents had no great dream; all they had was a few moral 
principles, stale and lifeless, to patch up the tattered trousers of the established 
order.”32 This attraction was bolstered by its pronounced anti-fascist stance, 
exemplified by “the extraordinary prominence of communists in the resistance 
movements.”33 During the war years, communism had acquired a strong 
association with anti-fascism and partisan movements; with the exception of 
Poland, anti-fascist resistance politics leaned to the left.34 For that reason, the end 
of the war was “even more of a political victory for the Communist idea than for 
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the democratic idea.”35  
 More generally, as Raymond Aron pointed out shortly before war’s end, the 
appeal of communist ideology stemmed in part from its quasi-religious outlook on 
human destiny, cloaked in the scientific and bureaucratic patina required of 
twentieth-century faiths. The idea that “the postcapitalist economy would give birth 
to a new, egalitarian human order transcends knowledge and derives from an act of 
faith,” wrote Aron in 1944.36 He continued: 
As long as men see politics as the vehicle of their fate, they will 
actively worship the regimes that, dangling before them an illusory 
future, reflect their desires and console them for their 
disappointments. As long as troubled masses think themselves 
betrayed or exploited, men will dream of liberation, and the image of 
their dream will be the face of their god.37 
 
Communism embodied that dream in the image of the Soviet Union and its 
wartime triumphs. A decade after introducing the metaphor, Aron elaborated on 
the idea of communism as a “Christian heresy”: 
As a modern form of millenarianism, it places the kingdom of God on 
earth following an apocalyptic revolution in which the Old World 
will be swallowed up. The contradictions of capitalist societies will 
inevitably bring about this fruitful catastrophe. The victims of today 
will be the victors of tomorrow. Salvation will come through the 
proletariat, that witness to present inhumanity.38 
 
The United States held an undeniable advantage over the Soviet Union in 
economic and industrial development (more on that below). But when it came to 
cultural appeal, “the Communists did not even need to take the initiative,” wrote 
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Judt. “Fear of American domination, of the loss of national autonomy and initiative, 
brought into the 'progressive' camp men and women of all political stripes and 
none…America seemed economically carnivorous and culturally obscurantist: a 
deadly combination.”39  
 This element of the post-war Soviet appeal is often lost in the focus on Soviet 
coercion in Eastern Europe. The Soviet Union exerted its influence not only through 
the armies camped out on the banks of the Elbe, but also through the cultural and 
ideological prestige magnified by its victory. Communism “seemed to be imparting 
to all the secret of what made humanity divine after God had receded – namely, 
humanity's capacity to act in history while avoiding its uncertainties…” wrote 
Francois Furet. “To possess both liberty and knowledge of that liberty: now here 
was an intoxicating brew for moderns deprived of God…If the Soviet political 
economy evoked such infatuation, it was not only because it formed an almost 
providential contrast to the spectacle offered by the collapse of capitalism. It was 
because it revealed a moral idea, a regenerated humanity, delivered from the curse 
of profit.”40  
 Yet without the wartime triumphs, Communism might have shared the fate of 
other alluring and failed prophecies of modernity, and indeed seemed to be on the 
way to doing so in the 1930s. After all, the ideological attractions of communism 
were in place well before 1945, having been set down my Marx and Engels a 
century earlier. The appeal of these ideas had brought forth a swathe of Communist 
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parties and sympathizers across Europe even before 1917. But the expected wave 
of revolutions after the Bolshevik victory never materialized, despite Lenin’s 
expectations. As in the case of fascism, an ideological innovation alone was 
insufficient for catalyzing an institutional wave. Ideology required strength in the 
form of a hegemonic shock. “[T]he postwar years constituted exceptionally good 
vintages for the Communist idea,” wrote Furet, “because they were accompanied 
by the most powerful god in history – that of victory.”41 Despite initial setbacks, 
“the USSR had out-produced and out-fought the Nazi colossus, ripping the heart 
from the magnificent German military machine,” writes Judt. “For its friends and 
foes alike, the Soviet victory in World War Two bore witness to the Bolsheviks' 
achievement. Stalin's policies were vindicated, his pre-war crimes largely forgotten. 
Success, as Stalin well understood, is a winning formula.”42 In short, it was the rise 
of the Soviet Union and its ascent to superpower status after World War II that 
paved the way for a credible communist alternative around the world. This path 
was forged both by force and sincere, hopeful imitation. Stalin had “won the war, 
transformed the Soviet Union into an empire and a superpower, and made the 
Communist idea more influential than it had ever been,” wrote Furet. “His 
government gained the respectability conferred by victory and strength.”43  
 As Raymond Aron pointed out, “The divisions of the Red Army would inspire 
less apprehension if they were not seen to act in the service of an idea. It is the 
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combination of an empire risen suddenly on the ruins of the European nations and 
an apparently universal message that spreads a kind of terror throughout the non-
Communist world.”44 The post-WWII period was thus a moment when ideological 
and material power came together to give communism both an aura of normative 
attraction and the prestige of a triumphant victor. “The image of the Soviet Union, 
when decked out in all the prestige of power and ideology,” wrote Furet, “had 
never cast a more potent spell.”45  
 
The Rise of American Power 
 
 The other major beneficiary of the war was the United States. Spurred by vast 
increases in military expenditures, its gross national product rose from $88.6 billion 
in 1939 to $135 billion in 1945 (in constant 1939 dollars). Between 1940 and 
1944, U.S. industrial production expanded by over 15 percent per year, a faster 
rate than at any other period in its history.46 The continental United States had been 
untouched by the war, its oceans providing immunity from physical destruction; 
“America's fixed capital was intact, her resources greater than ever.”47 Output of 
goods grew by over 50 percent during the war, while the country’s manufacturing 
base expanded by nearly 50 percent.48 At the end of the war, the U.S. owned $20 
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billion of the world’s $33 billion of gold reserves. It was the world’s largest creditor 
country and biggest source of international liquidity, with the ability to provide 
capital to countries that needed it desperately.49 It was the home of over half of the 
world’s economic production, the globe’s biggest exporter, supplier of half of the 
world’s shipping, leader in advanced technologies, and held a surplus in both 
petroleum and food production.50 Its merchant fleet, a third of the size of Europe in 
1939, was more than twice as large by 1947.51Domestic standards of living actually 
rose during the war.52 “Economically,” Kennedy writes, “the world was its oyster.”53 
Of the three major winners of the war, the United States “remained far and away 
the most powerful economically.”54  
 Such economic might inevitably translated into military dominance: by 1945 
the United States had 12.5 million servicemen, 7.5 million of them abroad; sixty-
nine divisions in Europe and twenty-six in Asia and the Pacific. With the landing on 
Normandy, it had organized and executed “one of the most spectacular military 
operations in history.”55 After the occupation of Italy, American forces had liberated 
France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, and conquered half of Germany. Outside of 
the sphere of Soviet dominance, the United States possessed total command of the 
global commons, on the water and in the air. It maintained 1200 major warships, 
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significantly more than the Royal Navy. “In both its carrier task forces and its 
Marine Corps divisions,” writes Paul Kennedy, “the United States had amply 
demonstrated its capacity to project its power across the globe to any region 
accessible from the sea.”56 It also had an overwhelming command of the air, with 
over 2000 heavy bombers and over a thousand long-range B-29s. Most 
importantly, it had a monopoly on nuclear weapons, “which promised to unleash a 
devastation upon any future enemy as horrific as that which had occurred at 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”57 This image of superiority was “reinforced by the pleas 
of so many nations for American loans, weapons, and promises of military 
support.”58  
 In short, the power dynamic between European and American economies 
shifted dramatically over the course of the war. In 1939 the combined economies 
of Europe, Japan and the USSR were twice the size of the United States; by 1946 
the U.S. was larger than all of them together. The steel production of Germany, 
Britain and the USSR combined totaled less than half of the U.S., having been 15 
percent larger only seven years earlier.59 “The United States emerged from the war 
unusually powerful in relation to the European great powers and Japan,” writes 
Ikenberry: 
America's allies and the defeated axis states were battered and 
diminished by the war, whereas the United States grew more 
powerful through mobilization and war. The American government 
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was more centralized and capable, and the economy and military 
were unprecedented in their power and still on an upward swing. In 
addition, the war itself had ratified the destruction of the old order of 
the 1930s, eliminated the alternative regional hegemonic ambitions 
of Germany and Japan, and diminished the viability of the British 
imperial order.60  
 
 The American victory had proven democracy’s ability to triumph over a feared and 
heretofore successful autocracy. “When a convulsed humanity is beginning to find a new 
level of existence,” wrote the New York Times, “it becomes apparent that democracy has 
not only held its own, but is stronger than ever and carries a greater appeal to more 
people than ever before.”61 In his defeat Hitler joined the long list of those who had 
dismissed the ability of democratic states to effectively manage an economy and win 
sustained, large-scale wars. He “persistently, and dramatically, underestimated the 
capacity for action, not to mention the economic and technological potential, of the 
US.A.,” writes Hobsbawm, “because he thought democracies incapable of action.”62 As 
John Kenneth Galbraith noted: “During World War II it was widely believed that the 
ruthlessly exercised power of the German dictatorship was a major source of strength and 
one manifestation was its ability to command more than seven million workers from all 
the races of Europe…Closer examination revealed no advantage.”63 
 By demonstrating the efficiency of democracy, the American victory reinforced 
the lessons of World War I documented in Chapter 3, but in an even more 
convincing fashion. At the end of the Great War, German territory had never been 
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occupied by foreign troops. In 1945, military defeat was total, and widely 
acknowledged by both German citizens and outside participants. Unconditional 
surrender and lasting post-war occupation were accepted conditions for ending the 
hostilities. And unlike in 1919, the United States played a more visible and vital 
role in ending the war. “[I]ts resources and technology were vital for winning,” 
notes Ikenberry. “Its political leadership was more critical than it had been during 
World War I.”64 By providing crucial military assistance to both Great Britain and 
the USSR, it secured itself a position of strength in bargaining over post-war goals 
and reforms. Moreover, the expansion of American influence was encouraged by 
the very target of that expansion, Europe itself. European leaders were willing to 
pay the price of American hegemony in exchange for avoiding the perils of 
American isolationism that followed the Treaty of Versailles.65 American assistance 
to the Allies powers, its own military participation, its economic dominance and 
the threat of Soviet occupation all meant that it could dictate the terms of the post-
war settlement to a much greater degree than in 1919. Frieden writes: 
The fact that American power had grown and European flagged made 
it clear that the United States would have its way with the rest of the 
world. At Versailles and after, Woodrow Wilson and his colleagues 
had faced European intransigence on issue after issue and had been 
forced to conciliate on such important matters as German 
reparations. Now America's Western Allies were at the mercy of the 
United States.66 
 
 The rapid rise of American power and its defeat of Nazi Germany served as a 
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vivid demonstration of the efficiency and effectiveness of modern democracy. It 
“proved that America could defeat evil on a global scale….Victory in World War II 
was therefore a victory not just for an alliance, but also for the American way of life 
itself. It had outproduced and outgunned its enemies; now the time had come to 
transform both enemies and friends in one's own image.”67 Its position meant that it 
would be instrumental in deciding the future course of Europe and the developing 
world. “Europe and Japan were crushed or exhausted,” writes Frieden, “the United 
States was wealthy and powerful, and its involvement would determine the speed 
of recovery.”68 As America’s erstwhile rivals struggled under the weight of post-war 
recovery, their economies looked toward the United States as a source of capital, 
resources, and even food, leading to “a worldwide surge of indirect American 
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Figure 5.2: American share of hegemonic power, 1930-1960. U.S. relative power 
increased rapidly during the war, peaking in the late 1940s. 
 
 Both American policy-makers and outside observers recognized the 
extraordinary dominance of the U.S. position. "The U.S. is in the position today 
where Britain was at the end of the Napoleonic wars," wrote British Foreign 
Minister Ernest Bevin in June 1947.70 "Today literally hundreds of millions of 
Europeans and Asiatics know that both the quality and the rhythm of their lives 
depend upon decisions made in Washington,” wrote British scholar Harold Laski 
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that same year. “On the wisdom of those decisions hangs the fate of the next 
generation."71 U.S. policy-makers anticipated and actively planned for the post-war 
world. As a wartime policy memo put it: “The successful termination of the war 
against our present enemies will find a world profoundly changed in respect of 
relative national military strengths.... After the defeat of Japan, the United States 
and the Soviet Union will be the only military powers of the first magnitude.”72 In a 
1948 State Department review of American foreign policy, George Kennan wrote: 
"We have about 50% of the world's wealth but only 6.3% of its population.... Our 
real task in the coming period is to devise a pattern of relationships which will 
permit us to maintain this position of disparity without positive detriment to our 
national security."73 
 
Power Transition – Conclusion 
 
 In sum, the outcome of the war both transformed and clarified the distribution 
of power in the international system. “Their starting-point is different, and their 
courses are not the same,” wrote Alexis de Tocqueville of Russia and the United 
States in 1835, “yet each of them seems marked by the will of Heaven to sway the 
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destinies of half the globe.”74 A hundred and ten years later, his prediction was 
swiftly coming true. The Soviet Union and the United States were the only two 
states that had risen in stature because of the war, and now towered in strength and 
prestige above the rest of the world. “It became common to speak of the two 
countries as superpowers – continental land giants possessing enormous resources, 
overshadowing all other states, including the nations of western Europe long 
dominant in the modern centuries.”75 
 The nature of the power transition and the ensuing competition between the 
victors dictated active global involvement by the two emerging superpowers. Fear 
of economic decay and European instability required the United States to prop up 
capitalist export markets. Fear of future military invasions required the Soviet Union 
to establish a buffer zone of friendly communist regimes on its western border. 
Moreover, the internal legitimacy of both superpowers depended on successfully 
exporting their regimes to other countries, and their universalist and messianic 
visions further encouraged global involvement. According to historian and Soviet 
expert Adam Ulam, the best characterization of the competition between the 
United States and the USSR is “a race between the social and economic 
dynamisms of the two societies.”76 A key element of that race was each hegemon’s 
ability to convince outsiders of the value of their regimes, which led to an 
inherently expansionist, global, and interventionist foreign policy. The success of 
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communist regime expansion was uniquely tied to the welfare of the Soviet Union, 
both because it required the unceasing coercion of eastern European satellites and 
because only Soviet power and continued growth could credibly demonstrate the 
appeal and potential of communism.77 As a result, a major goal of Soviet policy, 
and a source of its aggressiveness, was “an assertive policy designed to illustrate 
the viability and missionary significance of Communism.”78 Likewise, the 
acceptance of American democracy depended on both the revival of bourgeois 
Europe from the destruction of the war and the ability to demonstrate its 
applicability as a path to modernization in the developing world. Both the United 
States and the USSR thus “needed to change the world in order to prove the 
universal applicability of their ideologies, and the elites of the newly independent 
states proved fertile ground for their competition,” writes Arne Westad. This 
compunction lent a messianic tinge to their foreign policies and further catalyzed 
the spread of regime waves in war’s wake: 
By helping to expand
 
the domains of freedom or of social justice, 
both powers saw themselves as assisting natural trends in world 
history and as defending their own security at the same time. Both 
saw a specific mission in and for the Third World that only their own 
state could carry out and which without their involvement would 
flounder in local hands.79 
 
 Both superpowers could make a convincing case to potential converts. Both 
had demonstrated military effectiveness and economic resilience in the face of a 
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crisis, and both offered a vision for political and social development that 
transcended national boundaries. The United States made a transition from the 
arsenal of democracy to the incarnation of its highest potential. “Though the 
international skies are still dark with the clouds of disagreement among the war’s 
victors, there is one encouraging sign which is unmistakable, and that is the 
continued strength and spread of democracy,” proclaimed a New York Times 
editorial in October 1945. “[W]hen a convulsed humanity is beginning to find a 
new level of existence, it becomes apparent that democracy has not only held its 
own, but is stronger than ever and carries a greater appeal to more people than 
ever before.”80 When Turkey ended a long period of single-party rule in 1945 and 
began a stormy transition to multi-party democracy, future premier Adnan 
Menderes explained the shift in terms that clearly revealed the demonstration 
effects of hegemonic shocks: 
The difficulties encountered during the war years uncovered and 
showed the weak points created by the one-party system in the 
structure of the country. The hope in the miracles of [the] one-party 
system vanished, as the one-party system countries were defeated 
everywhere. Thus, the one-party mentality was destroyed in the 
turmoil of blood and fire of the second World War. No country can 
remain unaffected by the great international events and the 
contemporary dominating ideological currents. This influence was 
felt in our country too.81 
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Figure 5.3: Average global level of democracy (1930-1970, using Polity IV). The 
graph shows the century’s second democratic wave. The global level of democracy 









Figures 5.4 and 5.5: Another measure of the postwar democratic wave. Figure 5.4 
shows the total number of democratic states (states with a Polity score of at least 7) 
while Figure 5.5 shows the number of democratic states as a proportion of all states 
in the international system. Both the absolute and the relative number of 







Figure 5.6: Communist share of global power. The chart shows the communist 
wave beginning in the mid-1940s. The dashed line represents total global power 
(measured in CINC) held by all communist states; the solid line below represents 
global power held by communist states excluding the Soviet Union. The communist 





















Figures 5.7 and 5.8: Another measure of the postwar communist wave. Figure 5.7 
shows the total number of communist states, while Figure 5.8 shows the number of 
communist states as a proportion of all states in the international system. Both the 





 The Soviet Union, meanwhile, offered a radically different and (to many) an 
equally compelling path to development and modernity. “Soviet society had 
suffered terribly from the war, but its military successes left it dominant east of the 
Rhine, and by the end of the war Soviet industrial plant was going strong,” writes 
Frieden. Communists “also emerged from the war with a vastly improved 
reputation. While many Socialists, Christian Democrats, and others had behaved 
nobly, there were enough exceptions to cast shadows on non-Communist 
movements and parties.”82 Thus in the period immediately after the end of the war, 
“Stalinist Communism, victorious over the Fascist dictators, reached its greatest 
influence.”83 Moreover, the Soviet economic system “seemed to deliver rapid 
growth, egalitarianism, and social improvements….the rise and consolidation of a 
socialist world of Communist-led countries gave hope to millions that there was 
indeed a way to avoid the impersonality of capitalism's market forces and their 
tendency to work against the interests of the poor and powerless.”84 It is the rise of 
this world that I examine in the next section.  
 
The Communist Wave 
 
 The coerced Sovietization of Eastern Europe was the most visible aspect of the postwar 
communist wave. It was a clear manifestation of newfound Soviet power and the direct 
result of Red Army occupation and control of the region. As such, this coercive aspect of 
the communist wave was both crucial in increasing the number of communist states 
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around the world and least interesting in terms of theoretical analysis. “It would be foolish 
to ask what secret affinity – perhaps it was the peasant majority or the Slav community, for 
example – predisposed the countries of Eastern Europe to follow in the path of the 
Communists,” wrote Raymond Aron in 1954. “Any country liberated by the Russian army, 
even France, Britain, or Spain, would have met the same fate.”85 Nevertheless, the forced 
conversion of Eastern Europe was not a monolithic or instantaneous process. The native 
popularity of communism varied widely from one country to the next, and in some places 
it was embraced by a substantial part of the population (as Kundera’s aforementioned 
memoirs testify). Even those who rejected communist ideology saw opportunities in the 
rapid growth of institutions of the state and the party. The creation of new jobs meant that 
“men from humble backgrounds suddenly had powers and privileges that they could not 
previously have dreamed of.”86 Even the postwar purges in Eastern Europe provided a 
macabre means of social advancement, as aspiring functionaries could outmaneuver 
potential rivals with denunciations both fantastic and readily accepted – a grim replica of 
USSR’s Great Purges barely a decade earlier. “Astonishing as it seems in retrospect, the 
period when communist rule in eastern Europe was at its most brutal was also the period 
during which many intelligent and well-meaning individuals thought that it was a good 
thing,” writes Vinen. “This partly explains how it was possible to bring about rapid 
transformations in the societies of eastern Europe…”87  
 And indeed the changes wrought in Eastern Europe between 1945 and 1948 
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(when Tito’s break with Stalin marked the end of the first stage of the post-war 
wave) were dramatic and all-encompassing. The reforms of this period, writes Gale 
Stokes: 
 
swept aside private property, wiped out the middle class, 
collectivized agriculture, brought millions of country people to work 
in the city, dramatically increased the number of working women, 
brought entirely new people to power, reorganized and repopulated 
all levels of government, created new systems of education and 
scholarship, eliminated freedom of expression, turned East European 
trade away from its natural partnership with Western Europe toward 
the Soviet Union, propagated a new public ethic, built a strong 
military, and, in general, seized control of all aspects of public life.88  
 
 About a hundred million people had passed into Soviet jurisdiction in the years 
following the war. The Soviet bloc, as it came to be known, included Yugoslavia, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet-
occupied half of Germany that became the German Democratic Republic. These 
rough replicas assimilated the salient features of the Soviet state: a one-party 
dictatorships constituted by a rigidly hierarchical authority structure; a centralized, 
state-planned economy (in this case doubly distorted by state-determined quotas 
and the requirements of Soviet import markets); obedience to an official ideology 
propagated by the political leadership; show trials and purges of local communists 
(in those states where the Red Army exercised direct influence); and “the most 
obvious relic of the Stalinist heritage, strongly profiled supreme leaders.”89 
 The political subordination of a territory began with the arrival of the occupying 
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army, so that the Red Army began exercising control over many of these states well 
before the end of actual hostilities.90 Nevertheless, in few cases did the communist 
come to power through sheer force and intimidation. Hobsbawm, for example, 
notes that while the regime transformations in Europe “all were made possible by 
the victory of the Red Army,” in only four cases – Poland, East Germany, Romania, 
and Hungary – were the reforms “imposed exclusively by the force of that army.”91 
In Yugoslavia and Albania, on the other hand, communist resistance fighters 
enjoyed widespread indigenous support (which later enabled them to break away 
from the Soviet sphere of dominance). 92 Nowhere did the communists constitute 
the majority of the electorate, “but what they lacked in numbers, they made up for 
in fervor.”93 The genuinely free 1946 elections in Czechoslovakia – the only 
country in the region with a large and organized mass of industrial workers – 
communists received 38 percent of the vote, while the Social Democrats received 
another 12 percent.94 Bulgarian communists, meanwhile, enjoyed widespread 
Russophile sentiment.95 Everywhere the old elites had been discredited, the upper 
classes removed from state bureaucracies; in the former Axis states of Hungary, 
Romania and Bulgaria the quisling and philofascist governments were overthrown; 
and in many countries around the region “the Soviet occupiers were at first 
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welcomed as liberators and harbingers of change and reform.”96 The youth and the 
intelligentsia drew inspiration from “building a new world on what was so visibly 
the total ruin of the old.”97 The arrival of Communist regimes, “whether they came 
mainly or partly with the support of the Soviet bayonets, were led by people 
who…were neither in a position nor in a mood to offer the slightest resistance to 
the Kremlin and were only too glad to avail themselves of the help, advice, and 
command of the Russians.”98  
 Moreover, the Soviets did not immediately appear to pursue hard-line policies – 
bound partly by his wartime alliances, Stalin had assured the West that the region 
would follow neither Soviet-style socialism nor Western capitalism, but a “people’s 
democracy” – a third way constituted by an alliance of workers, peasants, and the 
bourgeois who would build mixed economies.99 An echo of the social democracy 
model in the West, it sustained the hope of Soviet-American postwar cooperation, 
and made the initial push for reforms more palatable to both the West and cautious 
observers in Eastern Europe. This also meant that the early period of Soviet 
influence enjoyed the unspoken assent of the United States. And in many ways, its 
strategy “really was reassuringly moderate.”100 Just like inside Russia itself after the 
1917 revolution, the communists tread lightly at first – agrarian reforms focused on 
land redistribution to peasants rather than forcible collectivization. Private property 
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was for the most part left alone (except for the confiscation of “fascist” property, 
especially in eastern Germany) and the USSR did not pursue a policy of economic 
nationalization. Overall, “there was very little talk of 'Socialism' as a goal.”101  
 Even in countries where coercion played a greater role, and where a communist 
government was imposed by the army, “the new regime initially enjoyed a 
temporary legitimacy and, for a time, some genuine support. … However 
unpopular party and government, the very energy and determination which both 
brought to the task of post-war reconstruction commanded a broad, if reluctant, 
assent.”102 In addition, the Soviet emphasis on industrialization resonated with 
people in the backward agrarian states of the region who sought a quick path to 
modernity.103 “[T]he Soviet economic recipe also seemed to suit them, and their 
new rulers launched themselves into the task of economic construction with 
genuine enthusiasm,” writes Hobsbawm. “Indeed, the success of the new regimes 
in this task was hard to deny….Who could doubt that countries like Bulgaria or 
Yugoslavia were advancing far more rapidly than had seemed likely, or even 
possible before the war?”104 One of the paradoxes of postwar eastern Europe was 
that between 1945 and 1948, a time of great repression, political intimidation, 
show trials, and executions, was also the time when “enthusiasm for communism 
was most intense and in which some eastern Europeans, often those who had 
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suffered for their beliefs under earlier regimes, made the deliberate choice to attach 
the fate of their countries to that of the Soviet Union.”105 The dynamics that drove 
the expansion of communism into eastern Europe included an undeniable degree 
of coercion but (particularly in the earliest stages) also reflected the increased 
influence of the Soviet hegemon and an indigenous desire to emulate Soviet 
successes. “It is true that the Communist part dictatorship was brought to the small 
East European countries by the victorious troops of Stalin,” wrote Hungarian 
dissident Gaspar Miklos Tamas, “but we should admit that we were ready for it.”106  
 The consolidation of Soviet control over the region thus proceeded in steps. 
Elections in 1945 elections brought forward a communist majority only in Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia107; elsewhere, Communist parties entered into coalition 
governments. The standard tactic was to form an alliance with other left-wing or 
anti-fascist parties – a Worker’s Front, a People’s Front, a Unity Government, or a 
Fatherland Front. In cases where those parties refused to join a fictitious coalition, 
the communists allied with dissident factions, which could be “created, if 
necessary, by a process of infiltration.”108 This cautious approach echoed the 
Popular Front tactics of the 1930s in France, Spain and elsewhere. The coalitions 
“would exclude and punish the old regime and its supports but would be cautious 
and ‘democratic’, reformist rather than revolutionary.”109 Within a few months of 
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war’s end, such coalition governments ran every country in eastern Europe.  
Crucially, Soviet military occupation enabled local Communist leaders to dominate 
these ill-glued creations.110 This dominance enabled them to hold key positions in 
the army, the courts, and the policy, as well as the crucial ministries of justice and 
the interior. As opposition leaders realized too late, political control rather than 
specific policies would shape the outcome. “The Communists secure the critical 
positions in the united front and in the government that it organizes,” wrote 
Granville Hicks in 1946. “The ministry of the interior, for example, which usually 
controls the censorship, and the ministry of justice, which has charge of the police, 
are held by Communists in half a dozen countries.”111 Communists also gave 
themselves positions in the agricultural ministries (where control of land reforms 
allowed them to buy the loyalty of the peasants) as well as positions in trade 
unions, district commissions, and denazification committees.112  
 From the start, power-sharing was a tactical, temporary choice. As East German 
Communist leader Walter Ulbricht told his followers in 1945: “It's quite clear – it's 
got to look democratic, but we must have everything in our control.”113 Control of 
the security forces – the army and the police – enabled Communists to use political 
violence against their opponents; purges, intimidation and disfranchisement soon 
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“made a mockery of Stalin's pledge at Yalta to hold "free and unfettered elections" 
in eastern Europe.”114Command of Ministries of the Interior also meant control of 
electoral rules; in the January 1947 Polish elections, for example, Peasant Party 
candidates were disqualified in ten of fifty-two electoral districts.115 It quickly 
became apparent that coalitions governments “could, in fact, do little more than 
behave as Soviet puppets. Something like a communist bloc was already appearing 
in 1946.”116 By the middle of that year, an observer could write that the Soviet 
Union “can not only assert, as any great power might do, that it has a right to 
intervene in the affairs of neighboring states on grounds of national security; it can 
exercise direct control over certain of the individuals who rule those countries. 
That is to say, high-placed officials in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria and so on have 
long disciplined themselves to accept Soviet decisions as their ultimate 
authority…” 117 
 Regardless of indigenous support or tactical attempts at coalition-building, the 
Soviet need for a buffer zone meant it could not trust previously hostile East 
European states to set up their own regimes. “The only acceptable outcome for 
Stalin was the establishment…of governments that could be relied upon never to 
pose a threat to Soviet security.”118 By 1947, non-Communist parties were expelled 
from the governments of Hungary, Romania and Poland (all three had been 
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particularly unfriendly to Moscow during the war); a Communist regime was 
established in Czechoslovakia in March 1948. Covert pressure quickly morphed 
into outright intimidation and persecution. Between 1945 and 1947 political 
opponents were “maligned, threatened, beaten up, arrested, tried as 'Fascists' or 
'collaborators' and imprisoned or even shot.”119 In January 1945 the head of 
Bulgaria’s Agrarian Union, deemed insufficiently compliant, was forced from 
office. By the following summer, seven of the twenty-two members of the party’s 
Presidium and thirty-five of its eighty-member governing council were jailed.120 In 
Hungary, the secretary the Smallholders’ Party was arrested by Soviet authorities in 
February 1947.121  
 Non-socialist leftist parties were the easiest targets, since they could be always 
be smeared with pro-fascist or anti-national accusations. The last rivals to be 
eliminated were the socialist and social-democratic parties, whose agendas 
overlapped with the communists and who had also suffered under fascist rules. 
These parties could not be credibly accused of fascist collusion and enjoyed the 
allegiance of the region’s working class, and so had to be handled in more delicate 
ways. They were urged to join communist-socialist “union” governments under the 
direction of the communists. “In the circumstances of post-liberation eastern 
Europe this seemed to many socialists a sensible proposition.”122 Many of these 
leftist unions came to power in 1948: Romania in February, Hungary and 
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Czechoslovakia in June, Bulgaria in August, and Poland in December. Even coming 
into the fold did not protect the socialist partners from criticism – during Romania’s 
February congress marking the fusion of the two parties, the Communist leader 
denounced the Socialists of sabotage, cooperation with reactionaries, and anti-
Soviet smears. By the end of year, the Socialist parties were hopelessly divided, “so 
that long before they disappeared they had ceased to be an effective political force 
in their country.”123 Between 1945 and 1948 Communist parties replaced coalition 
governments throughout the region. 
 Elections during the following two years were increasingly characterized by 
voter fraud and political intimidation. Policies shifted to reflect more hard-line 
communist policies. Soviet-style constitutions were hoisted upon the countries in 
the region, the first in Bulgaria, in December 1947 and the last in Poland in July 
1952. They were turned into police states, ruled by local Communist parties under 
the control of their Moscow equivalent. In economic policy, “the irrational, 
occasionally surreal quality of Soviet economic practice was faithfully reproduced 
throughout the bloc.”124 The countries adopted Five-Year plans, with wildly 
ambitious goals. By 1948 the state had nationalized large firms and companies, 
took total control over economic planning (which emphasized heavy industry), 
restricted external trade, and took over (through force or taxation) any private 
business employing more than fifty people.125 Starting in 1949, the policy of land 
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redistribution that had briefly mollified the peasants was replaced by land 
collectivization, complete with attacks on “kulaks” that echoed Stalin’s forced 
collectivization of the Russian and Ukrainian countryside two decades earlier.126 
The establishment of Comecon (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) in 
January 1949, itself a response to the Marshall Plan, further speeded up the 
Sovietization of eastern economies. By 1952, “only traces of private enterprise 
remained outside agriculture.”127  
 In a few short years, Stalin succeeded in populating the region with what 
Kenneth Jowett called “geographically contiguous replica states”.128 This 
transformation was driven primarily by the enormous power of the Soviet Union, 
manifested most directly by the lengthy occupation of the region by the Red Army. 
Aiding these reforms in the beginning was a measure of indigenous pro-Soviet 
sentiment that drew upon the successes of the Soviet regime in liberating the region 
from Nazi occupation. But the heavy hand of the occupation was bound to alienate 
native Communist supporters, just as German cruelty a few years earlier drove off 
potential allies in Ukraine and elsewhere. Defaulting to the use of force was 
ultimately counter-productive to Soviet purposes. Adam Ulam notes: 
The disproportion in power between the European satellites and the 
USSR, the fact that their Communist leaders had nowhere to look for 
support against the West or their own peoples, would have 
undoubtedly secured their general following of the Russian wishes, 
provided they had been given some leeway and opportunity to 
dictate themselves the tempo of economic and social transformation 
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of their countries.129  
 
 Often these desires for transformations ran parallel with Soviet goals. The 
Yugoslavian Communists, for example, were initially even more committed to 
industrialization, agrarian collectivization, and communist social policies than the 
Soviet Union had intended. But the spread of communist regimes in the region 
entailed “a boundless belief in the power of coercion,” writes Ulam. While 
overwhelming Soviet power prevented the defection of all satellites except 
Yugoslavia, “the general tenor of Soviet policies toward Tito was having a 
discouraging effect, especially on pro-Soviet radical movements in Asia.”130 The 
consolidation of Soviet regimes was accomplished by continuous coercion, 
occasionally reinforced by popular protests and Red Army interventions. Once the 
source of that coercion was removed in the late 1980s, communist regimes 
disappeared from the region in a wave as swift as the one that installed it in the first 
place. 
 In a pattern typical for hegemonic shocks, communist ideology enjoyed a 
heightened but temporary period of influence and approval. The period offered a 
window of opportunity for increased influence and emulation, some of which was 
squandered by an over-reliance on coercion in eastern Europe. “The respect and 
admiration, gained from the Red Army's victory over Hitler, that haloed the 
Communist idea immediately after World War II did not long remain intact,” wrote 
Furet. “That moment of confused respectability so foreign to Communism was 
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merely ephemeral capital with uncertain returns; the history of Communism was 
soon to enter a new phase.”131  
 
Communism and the Developing World 
 
 While the communist wave in Eastern Europe advanced largely through 
coercion, the appeal of communism and its subsequent spread in the developing 
world was based to a much larger degree on the desire to emulate Soviet success 
and to benefit from the superpower’s largesse and expanded influence. The Soviet 
story – the modernization and industrialization of a backward, agrarian state, the 
dramatic defeat of a feared military juggernaut, the swift rise to the status of an anti-
imperialist, anti-Western superpower – was particularly alluring to people in poor 
rural countries who had just thrown off the shackles of colonial bondage. Soviet-
style communism offered “a harsh method of industrialization especially suited to 
the needs of so-called underdeveloped countries.”132 The USSR’s dramatic rise 
“exemplified a historical short circuit that promised the non-European world a 
rapid catching up,” writes Furet. “It furnished a body of Western ideas capable of 
unifying antibourgeois emotions in Europe and beyond...In our century, no 
European doctrinal corpus would be so avidly adopted outside of Europe than 
Marxism-Leninism.”133  
 In most places this adoption took place without the support (albeit often with 
the tacit or explicit encouragement) of the Soviet Union. Communist ideas found 
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fertile ground in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East – regions in which nationalism, 
wrote Raymond Aron, was “weak against the attraction of a universalist ideology 
like that of communism.” He contrasted the spread of communism in Eastern 
Europe, which proceeded “thanks to advances by the Red Army” with China, 
where the communist party won with very little direct Soviet support – less than the 
Kuomintang had received form the United States. “In Southeast Asia and in the 
Middle East, China and the Soviet Union, respectively, are capable of eliminating 
Western influence, inflaming nationalist feeling, and putting Communist parties in 
power without any direct intervention.”134  
 The communist wave outside Europe achieved its most visible successes in 
Asia. A communist, Soviet-occupied zone was established in North Korea in 1945 
(while the Americans occupied the south of the country, recreating the division of 
Germany in an Asian setting). The People’s Republic of China was created in 1949, 
following years of fighting between the Kuomintang and the communists, led by 
Mao and supported by Soviet arms. The First Indochina War (1946-1954) created a 
communist-led North Vietnam after fighting by Ho Chi Min with the support of the 
Soviets and the Chinese. The Hukbalahap (Huk) communist-led rebellion in the 
Philippines made a serious bid for power during the late 1940s before being 
defeated in 1954. In Indonesia, the local communist party staged a rebellion in 
1948 that was put down by the nationalists. In Malaysia, communist forces fought a 
war with the colonial government from 1948 until 1960. And all over the region, 
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the appeal of communist parties surged as national liberation movements waged 
anti-colonial battles against a weakened West. Ideologically, the leaders of these 
movements “tended to see themselves as socialists, engaged on the same sort of 
project of emancipation, progress and modernization as the Soviet Union.”135 
Democracy, on the other hand, came with the baggage of history and colonial 
yoke, as Laqueur noted in 1955: 
Capitalism is identified with imperialist rule and democracy is 
something the imperialist powers allegedly practice at home. 
Democracy has not been a militant creed and it has not provided the 
answers to many questions of Asia. Democracy could not inspire the 
masses and has not given firm spiritual support to the elite. It has not 
been able to promise a much better life in the immediate future, or 
make a spectacular effort in which everybody was to be told what to 
do; on the other hand, Communism has had all the force of a secular 
religion – in Asia even more than in Europe.136 
 
 In the Middle East, too, communist ideology began to attract a much greater 
degree of support after the war, especially among nationalists and intellectuals. 
Communist parties made large gains in Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and 
to a lesser extent in Turkey.137 At the founding conference of the Cominform in 
September 1947, while welcoming Indonesia and Vietnam into the “anti-
imperialist camp,” Chairman of the Union Soviet Andrei Zhdanov labeled Egypt, 
Syria and India as “sympathizing” with it.138 For the secular intellectuals within the 
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region, communism provided an appealing promise of the future. “The power of 
attraction of Communism as a creed should never be underrated,” wrote Laqueur 
in 1955, “and it is nowhere so strong as in underdeveloped countries, such as those 
of the Middle East.”139 Explaining its draw for Arab intellectuals, the Lebanese 
foreign minister Charles Malik listed the following in a 1957 interview: "Its social 
vision, its total character, its total interpretation of life – its messianic idea, namely, 
that it is the wave of the future. Also, the promises it holds – that it will solve all 
these economic and social injustices.”140  
 For similar reasons, the communist creed resonated with the masses in 
developing nations far more than democratic or capitalist ideals. “Without having 
read a word of Marx or Lenin,” wrote Adam Ulam, “an illiterate peasant who is 
being squeezed economically…experiences almost instinctively the feelings that 
Marxism formulates in a theoretical language: a sense of alienation springing from 
his loss of property and status, and an antagonism toward the people and authority 
personifying the mysterious forces that have made his previous social existence 
impossible…” To them, Ulam wrote, communism was not an intellectual exercise 
or an abstruse theory, but “a systematic expression of their own feelings and 
reactions, something which again makes sense out of an apparently senseless 
world.” On the other hand, Western democracy, “the product of a long industrial 
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development and a consequent democratic habituation appears to them, in 
contrast, as something infinitely more complicated and unnatural.” Communism 
offered, in Ulam’s felicitous phrase, “a convincing demonology” of a modernity 
whose evils could be attributed to the impersonal forces of capitalism. But it also 
offered something in exchange beyond a bête noire: “Just as it exploits the nostalgia 
for a past ruined forever by the capitalists, it appeals to the impatience for the 
future, which cannot be appeased by democratic and liberal phraseology.”141  
 The appeal of communism in the developing world thus depended on a mass of 
disenfranchised, poor, bewildered proletariat. As countries developed 
economically, Aron argued in 1954, communism’s ideological base would shrink 
accordingly: “Professional agitators will raise more recruits among the poverty-
stricken crowds of Asia than among the workers of General Motors. The 
Bolsheviks' technique, born in Tsarist Russia, is naturally better adapted to Far 
Eastern societies shaken by the influence of industrial civilization….The less 
capitalistic a society is, and the less developed its productive forces, the more 
favorable are the conditions it offers to Bolshevism.”142  
 An ideological panacea for the masses and the intellectuals, communism also 
provided the elites of the developing world a convincing justification for 
absolutism. “Fortified by the Soviet precedent, the tyrant of the second half of the 
twentieth drew his legitimacy from an emancipatory ambition,” wrote Furet. “He 
led his country to socialism via a new version of modern democracy freed of its 
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capitalist liabilities.”143 Through this unusual conjunction of mass emancipation 
and elite domination, communism found resonance among a large swath of social 
groups – the public, the intelligentsia, and the political elite – in the developing 
world. It became, Ulam wrote, “the natural ideology of underdeveloped societies in 
today's world.” By contrast, “liberalism as practiced and preached in the West can 
appeal to a much narrower range of interests and sentiments and is at a 
disadvantage in competition.” He concluded: “In large areas of the world, 
Communism has proselytizing powers superior to liberalism.”144 Democracy, 
Laqueur noted in 1956, “could not inspire the masses, and it did not give firm 
spiritual support to the elite".145 
 And yet, the ideological attraction of communism in the developing world, as in 
Eastern Europe, had been in place well before 1945. The surge of communist 
influence and emulation in the developing world could take place only once 
ideology had become coupled with power and success. Noting that World War II 
“brought a great upsurge in Middle Eastern Communism,” Laqueur noted that “one 
of the main reasons for this growth in influence appears to be, in retrospect, the 
emergence of the Soviet Union as one of the two great world powers and the 
downfall of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.”146 In the Middle East as elsewhere, 
“Communist support has been further strengthened by the example of the Soviet 
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Union, which has demonstrated that a backward and underdeveloped country 
could transform itself within a single generation into a world power of great 
industrial strength.”147 
 Alone, ideas could inspire movements and set the groundwork for changes to 
come, but were less successful in transforming regimes and upending institutions in 
countries around the world. As the case of fascism between 1922 and 1933 and 
communism between 1917 and 1945 demonstrated, ideas were more than 
abstractions – they could introduce new regimes and set very real-world precedents 
(in the form of the Bolshevik Revolution and the March on Rome) – but, crucially, 
in isolation they did not lead to institutional waves. The immense impact of 
hegemonic shocks on domestic institutional reforms, in the case of World War II as 
in others, stemmed from a potent combination – the strength of ideas combined 
with the strength of example. An example that was recent and dramatic, one that 
led to the collapse and ruin of some great powers while uplifting others, held that 
much more sway. The power shifts that accompanied the aftermath of hegemonic 
shocks served as indisputable proof that some examples were worth following 
more than others, and fundamentally (if temporarily) transformed both the 
opportunities and incentives for domestic reforms. For the developing world of the 
postwar era, the hegemonic shock of the war transformed communism from an 
appealing if abstract vision to a concrete, viable model for economic and political 
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 This was particularly true in the case of economic reforms. The post-war 
economic climate favored the adoption of state planning and government 
intervention in industrial development. Central planning ceased to be a Russian 
curiosity; elements of state intervention in the economy, driven partly by 
government expansion during war, diffused into the politics of much of the 
developing world, notably in France but also in Britain and the United States. In 
offering a new option for development, it had replaced the fascist alternative which 
found some adherents among populists and nationalists but was discredited by the 
outcome of the war. The western European option of social democracy, with its 
promise of “incremental” reform, was “too modest for those looking for a radical 
solution to the grinding poverty of the poor regions...” The people of these nations 
could now “examine the differences between centrally planned socialism and 
market capitalism to see which better suited their conditions. Up to then the 
principal division of the world had been rich industrial countries and poor agrarian 
countries. Now there was a second dimension and two possible paths toward 
advanced industrial status: capitalist and Communist.”149  
 Beyond ideological and spiritual deliverance, then, communism also offered a 
path to economic transformation – and to many in the developing world, this path 
was superior to the one offered by capitalism. “Moscow was not only a more 
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attractive model than Detroit or Manchester because it stood for anti-imperialism, 
but it also seemed a more suitable model, especially for countries lacking both in 
private capital and a large body of private and profit-oriented industry.”150 The 
economic appeal of communist institutions in the developing world thus drew from 
some of the same sources of strength as its ideological appeal. Leaders in newly-
formed nations “believed only public action could lift their economies out of 
backwardness and dependency,” Hobsbawm notes. “In the decolonized world, 
following the inspiration of the Soviet Union, they were to see the way forward as 
socialism.”151 For them communism served as a model for emerging out of an 
agrarian past through state planning – a process that, moreover, had been stamped 
with the imprimatur of science and rationality. The adoption of communist-style 
planning did not even require a full-fledged belief in the political ideology of 
Marxism. Both central planning and the import-substitution model required a 
strong government hand in the economy. Import-substituting industrialization (ISI) 
was adopted first in Latin America during the 1930s and later in newly liberated 
colonies in Asia in the 1940s, the Middle East and North Africa in the 1940s and 
1950s, and sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1950s and 1960s.152 This strategy implied 
protection of infant industries from outside competition, discouragement of foreign 
direct investment, and an active industrial policy that promoted domestic markets. 
In Asia and Africa, with little native manufacturing, local industries needed even 
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more protection and encouragement from the state than in Latin America. In these 
regions, ISI “was commonly promoted as part of a local form of socialism. 
Supporters of Indian socialism, Arab socialism, Burmese socialism, and African 
socialism all presented them as a combination of central planning and social 
democracy, bundled together with rapid industrialization and nation building.”153 
Governments nationalized major industries and developed a large public sector 
that approached the Soviet Union in its scope. India, for example, “emulated 
aspects of Soviet planning, using a series of five-year plans to guide the country's 
industrialization.”154 Jawaharlal Nehru, who governed the country between 1947 
and 1964 and had spent time in the USSR during the 1920s, encouraged extensive 
state investment in manufacturing. Between 1951 and 1966, during the country’s 
three five-years plans, the state accounted for half of all industrial investment. In 
Egypt, after Nasser’s socialist government took control in the 1952 revolution, the 
state nationalized the country’s banks and insurance companies as well as most 
industry (the state owned ninety percent of factories employing more than ten 
workers, and accounted for nearly half of industrial output and a third of the labor 
force.155  
 In Europe, as described above, the appeals of communism were limited by its 
coercive nature. “Incapable of being associated with liberty, Communism's only 
chance for survival lay in coexisting with the nationalist sentiment,” wrote Furet. 
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But by the late 1940s, “it had exhausted the credit it had drawn from the 
generalized hatred of Germany. It was all very well for Soviet propaganda to 
denounce the allegedly vengeful West Germans, but the time had passed when 
anti-Germanism could serve to make people in the liberated territories accept or 
like the Red Army.”156 Just as Communist expansion rolled to a stop in Eastern 
Europe against the borders of American infuence, the developing world “now 
became the central pillar of the hope and faith of those who still put their faith in 
social revolution,” wrote Hobsbawm. “It seemed to be a global volcano waiting to 
erupt, a seismic field whose tremors announced the major earthquakes to come.”157  
 The spread of non-European communism achieved its greatest triumphs in the 
years following the war. But as the attraction of Communism faded, and the Soviet 
Union’s capacity to coerce more governments into its mold had been contained, 
the wave crested. The communist bloc “showed no sign of significant expansion 
between the Chinese revolution and the 1970s,” by which point China had split 
from the Soviet Union.158 There were several more expansions of the communist 
world, notably in Cuba in 1959 and Africa in the 1970s, “but substantially the 
socialist sector of the globe had taken shape by 1950.”159  
  
The Democratic Wave  
 
 The postwar expansion and consolidation of democratic regimes in Western 
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Europe served as an example of how a rising hegemon can take advantage of the 
post-shock window of opportunity to exercise its influence through economic 
incentives and international institutions. “The single biggest extension of 
democratic liberties in the history of the world,” argued Samuel Huntington, “came 
at the end of World War II.”160 
 As in Eastern Europe, the wave proceeded through a combination of coercion, 
influence, and emulation – but in the case of Western Europe direct coercion 
played a much less prominent role. This did not necessarily imply a more benign 
motivation on the part of the United States. First, its economy was in far better 
shape than the Soviet Union’s, giving it more room to use financial incentives to 
convert countries into its camp. Second, it faced a different set of motivations in 
doing so. Both superpowers sought followers to legitimize the universalist nature of 
their respective regimes. But beyond that basic goal, they had a very different set of 
concerns and priorities. Unlike the Soviet Union, the U.S. did not seek a protective 
security buffer, within which the incentives of the populace would take a back seat 
to the necessity for a cordon sanitaire governed by pliable, unquestioning and loyal 
regimes. The United States emerged from the war with a large and competitive 
economy; exports were twice as important to American manufacturing compared 
to the 1930s, and in Europe it saw a large potential market for its wares.161 Its 
physical security was assured; but its economic well-being depended on securing 
export markets. A European dollar shortage prevented the continent from buying 
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American goods, endangering the recovery and opening the way to Communist-led 
discontent.162 America’s turn outward after 1945 can thus be explained as much by 
its rise in power (and the corresponding decline of its former rivals) as by the 
determination to avoid the turmoil of the interwar years or fear of Soviet power. 
The price for its unmatched dominance was a danger of diminished export 
destinations. American officials agreed, noted the historian Melvyn Leffler, that 
“long-term American prosperity required open markets, unhindered access to raw 
materials, and the rehabilitation of much-if not all-of Eurasia along liberal capitalist 
lines."163 
 Coercion, of course, was not entirely absent from the spread of democracy. The 
U.S. occupied Germany, and Japan. Particularly in the latter two cases, the U.S. 
played a crucial role in designing and overseeing the installation of democratic 
institutions. As the title of a 1957 book declared, these countries were “forced to be 
free.”164 With the partial exception of South Korea, Huntington writes, “where 
American armies marched, democracy followed in their train.”165 Army occupation 
was the most direct way in which the United States wielded its influence. The U.S. 
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established bases and stationed military personnel throughout Western Europe. Its 
military authorities made crucial decisions about institutional reforms and policies, 
including forcibly opening the former Axis countries to global trade.166  
 Other means of influence were less direct. The CIA, for example, funded the 
Christian Democrats in the 1948 Italian election to help ensure their victory over 
the left-wing Popular Democratic Front and the Italian Socialist Party.167 While 
emphasizing the generally non-coercive nature of American influence in post-war 
Europe, Ikenberry notes that the U.S. “did attempt to use its material resources to 
pressure and induce Britain and the other industrial democracies to abandon 
bilateral and regional preferential agreements and accept the principles of a 
postwar economy organized around a nondiscriminatory system of trade and 
payments.” Aid was tied to specific conditions that conformed to policies pursued 
by the U.S. For example, an (ultimately failed) 1946 agreement “obliged the British 
to make sterling convertible in exchange for American assistance….The United 
States knew it held a commanding position and sought to use its power to give the 
postwar order a distinctive shape.”168  
 Still, outside of Germany and Japan, influence rather than coercion was the 
                                                
166 Even so, Vinen argues, its power to coerce was self-limited. “Even in Germany 
in 1945, the American army was subject to the constraint of a civilian government 
and the rule of law.” (Vinen 2000:259) 
167 “We had bags of money that we delivered to selected politicians, to defray their 
political expenses, their campaign expenses, for posters, for pamphlets," a CIA 
operative told CNN in a 1998 documentary. The New York Times (2006) “F. Mark 
Wyatt, 86, C.I.A. Officer, Is Dead”, July 6. A secret CIA report detailing these 
activities was presented to the Pike Committee in 1975 and appeared in their 
report, published two years later. 
168 Ikenberry 2001:200 
  
357 
order of the day in Europe. “The United States spent little of its hegemonic power 
trying to coerce and induce other governments to buy into American rules and 
institutions,” notes Ikenberry. “It spent much more time and resources trying to 
create the conditions under which postwar European governments and publics 
would remain moderate and pro-Western.”169 The Truman Doctrine and the 
Marshall Plan were the two primary instruments for creating these favorable 
conditions. Both were announced in the spring of 1947, and both sought to assert 
American leadership while rolling back the spread of communist regimes. (Other 
American agencies also supported democratic institutions in Europe on a smaller 
scale; these included the CIA, private corporations, and U.S. trade unions.)170 
Officially, only Turkey and Greece would receive American assistance, but 
Truman’s address committed the United States to helping all “free peoples” of the 
world fight communist influence, “primarily through economic and financial 
aid”.171 Following the announcement of the Truman doctrine, the U.S. used foreign 
aid to provide anti-Soviet military assistance to the developing world, intended to 
help national elites resist Communist pressure (military aid comprised 95 percent of 
all Third World aid in 1954.)172  
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 The Marshall Plan, proposed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall after a 
visit to Europe, became the most prominent way in which the United States 
exercised its influence and promoted liberal democratic regimes in the years 
following the war. It was an unprecedented use of post-shock economic 
dominance to secure the consolidation of regimes that followed the American 
institutional model. By the end of the program in 1952, the United States had spent 
$13 billion, more than all previous American foreign aid put together. Germany, 
Britain and France received the largest absolute amount, but for smaller countries 
like Italy and Austria it amounted to a larger relative share of the economy 
(between July 1948 and June 1949, 14 percent of Austria’s income came from 
Marshall Aid).173 In some of these smaller states, the aid amounted to more than a 
tenth of national income.174  
 The largest impact of the Marshall Plan resided not with the amount of the 
disbursements but with the conditions attached to them. Along with collaborators 
in western Europe, U.S. aid officials sought to prevent national politicians “from 
being tempted to fall back on state intervention, planning, and closed 
economies.”175 In doing so, Marshall aid nudged center-left parties toward social 
democracy rather than communism. As State Department official Charles Bohlen 
argued in 1946: "It is definitely in the interest of the United States to see that the 
present left movement throughout the world, which we should recognize and even 
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support, develops in the direction of democratic as against totalitarian systems.”176 
Through financial assistance, Ikenberry argues, American officials hoped to create 
“a socioeconomic environment in Europe that would be congenial to the 
emergence and dominance of moderate and centrist governments.”177 The postwar 
disorder created a palpable fear of Soviet encroachment beyond the occupied 
zones. “U.S. policymakers knew the Kremlin was not the cause of postwar 
turbulence, but they feared that Moscow would exploit it,” writes Christopher 
Layne. “In particular, Washington feared that Communist parties would come to 
power by taking advantage of Western Europe's postwar malaise, and that 
nationalists in colonies throughout the world would harness Communist ideology 
to throw off Western rule.”178 
 The push for democratic regimes in Western Europe was never explicitly 
presented as a program for imitating American institutions. An ostentatious display 
of American influence was neither productive nor necessary for achieving its goals, 
since “post-war Europeans were so aware of their humiliating dependence upon 
American aid and protection that any insensitive pressure from that quarter would 
certainly have been politically counter-productive.”179 As a State Department 
document from 1946 put it, pro-American policy in Italy “would be a judicious 
mixture of flattery, moral encouragement and considerable material aid...It could 
not be a one-shot cure, but should consist of a kind word, a loaf of bread, a public 
                                                
176
 Quoted in Ikenberry 2001:202 
177 Ikenberry 2001:202 
178 Layne 2006:56 
179 Judt 2005:97 
  
360 
tribute to Italian civilization, then another kind word, and so on, with an 
occasional plug from the sponsors advertising the virtues of democracy American 
style.”180 As befitting the purposes of the plan, countries with strong communist 
parties received the most generous financial assistance. The attempts by Ireland to 
secure Marshall aid funds, on the other hand, were “undermined by the fact that 
Ireland was the most right-wing democracy in Europe.”181 
  In short, the Marshall Plan “was an economic program but the crisis it averted 
was political.”182 As Kennedy notes, “it took no genius to see that the raison d'etre 
for the plan was to convince Europeans everywhere that private enterprise was 
better able to bring them prosperity than communism.”183 Indeed, the impact of 
Marshall aid on the consolidation of democracy in western Europe was both 
immediate and long-lasting. In Austria, for example, local communists (supported 
by Soviet forces, who still occupied the eastern half of the country) “never made 
any dent in the popularity of Americans and their aid,” notes Judt. “[T]he latter put 
food in people's mouths and this was what mattered most.” In Greece, the $649 
million in aid extended in the spring of 1948 “made the difference between 
survival and destitution.” It “supported refugees and staved off hunger and disease,” 
and provided half of the country’s gross national product in 1950.184 Across Europe, 
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it reduced the attraction of Soviet-style reforms and communist institutions by 
providing a means for general economic recovery. Economic growth surged in the 
second half of the 1940s, inaugurating a golden age for western Europe that lasted 
for the following two decades. Dutch industrial and agricultural production 
surpassed 1938 levels by 1948, while France, Austria and Italy reached the same 
milestone in 1949, and Greece and West Germany in 1950.185 
 The democratic wave in western Europe was built on a desire for postwar 
stability and (in some cases) a history of democratic government, but it was made 
possible by the rare combination of American influence and commitment (both 
political and economic) in the years immediately following the war. In pursuing the 
consolidation of democratic reforms in the region, the United States achieved 
several goals simultaneously: it created markers for American exports, secured 
European commitment to democratic institutions, and stopped the spread of 
communism beyond the Elbe. But the economic and geopolitical success of the 
United States extended beyond Western Europe, leading to a wave of 
democratization (however short-lived) in Latin America, Asia, and other countries 
around the world whose leaders sought to capture a piece of American largesse, 
ingratiate themselves into the emerging institutional infrastructure, and emulate the 
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Spread of Democracy outside Western Europe 
  
 Outside of Western Europe, the spread of democratic institutions extended to 
Latin America and (to a lesser extent) to Asia. In neither region was 
democratization an unqualified success. Much like in Europe after World War I, 
democratization was in some cases short-lived, lacking the structural domestic pre-
conditions or U.S. support for democratic leaders. As the Cold War went into full 
swing, democratic institutions took a back seat to stability and loyalty to U.S. 
interests.  
 In the few years immediately following the war, however, a number of states 
adopted democratic institutions and underwent democratic reforms. As in western 
Europe, coercion was an element of the wave, most prominently in Japan but to a 
lesser degree is South Korea. The American occupation of Japan, which lasted from 
1945 to 1952, resulted in a number of fundamental democratic reforms. In October 
1945, General MacArthur ordered the abrogation of the Peace Preservation of Law 
of 1925, which had been used to arrest and silence critics of the government. 
Restrictions on political expression and assembly were eliminated; the Special 
Higher Police (sometimes known as the “thought police”) was dissolved, and 
political prisoners were released from jail. The Japanese cabinet resigned in protest, 
but a week later the new premier Shidehara Kijuro, “met MacArthur for the first 
time and received a succinct order that made the previous directive seem mild.” 
The government was ordered to promote liberal education in schools and labor 
unions in industry, to extend suffrage to women, to dismantle monopolistic 
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industrial controls “and in general eliminate all despotic vestiges in society. 
Suddenly, abstract statements about promoting democracy had become 
exceedingly specific.”186 The first general election under universal suffrage 
(including female suffrage) took place in April 1946.187  
 After 1947, gnawing fear of communist influence in Japan led U.S. occupation 
forces to curb some of the more radical pro-democracy measures undertaken 
immediately after the end of the war. While democratic institutions survived, in this 
pattern Japan mirrored the trajectory of many developing states in the postwar 
years. As long as cooperation with the Soviet Union was possible, democratization 
became the first priority. But as the confrontation hardened, “protecting” countries 
from communist influence (whether foreign or domestic) became more important 
than maintaining a fragile, messy, potentially disloyal democratic regime. As 
Harvey put it, when forced to choose between democracy and stability “the US 
always opted for the latter.”188 Less than two years after his election in July 1948, 
South Korean president Syngman Rhee began assuming dictatorial powers in a fight 
against communism, backed by the United States. The Korean War allowed him to 
consolidate his grip on power, and a democracy was not introduced in South Korea 
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until 1987.189 As Fareed Zakaria notes, “after brief flirtations with democracy after 
World War II, most East Asian regimes turned authoritarian.”190  
 The same scenario was played out in Latin America with a marginally better 
rate of success. In fact, the postwar wave of democracy in Latin America represents 
a classic example of the model presented in Chapter 1. Scholars of Latin American 
democratization generally distinguish between two phases in post-war Latin 
American development. The first stage, which took place between 1944 and 1946, 
was marked by democratization – the collapse of dictatorships, mass mobilization, 
and elections with high levels of participation. In the second phase, which spanned 
the years between 1946 and 1948, democracy suffered setbacks as the upper 
classes and military leaders, alarmed by the political gains made by the lower and 
middle classes as a result of political liberalization, began pushing back. By 1947, 
the onset of the Cold War made stability and anti-Communism a higher priority 
than democratization. 
 The initial period of 1944-46 saw the introduction of a number of democratic 
reforms, via both popular rebellions and elite reforms. Suffrage was expanded in 
Colombia, Brazil, and Peru. Though it was not always universal, since literacy 
qualifications excluded people in poor rural areas, postwar suffrage was in general 
more democratic than in the 1920s. Ecuador and Costa Rica also turned to 
democracy in the late 1940s, as did (briefly) Bolivia. In Argentina, Colombia, Peru 
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and Venezuela, elections in 1945-6 brought in, according to Huntington, 
“popularly chosen governments.”191 Venezuela held the country’s first free election 
in 1947, won by the centrist Accion Democratica candidate Romulo Gallegos, 
inaugurating the country’s first experience with democracy (until a military coup 
d’etat a year later.) A popular uprising in Guatemala in July 1944 brought the 
removal of the thirteen-year dictatorship of Jorge Ubico. Brazil carried out its “first 
relatively democratic elections in the country’s history”192 in December 1945, after 
Getulio Vargas announced electoral reforms earlier that year. In the same year, 
Argentina witnessed growing opposition to the military regime of Edelmiro Farrell 
and Juan Peron, a large (several hundred thousand strong) demonstration in the 
capital, followed by democratic elections in February 1946. In Bolivia, a mass 
revolt removed the nationalist military government in the summer of 1946 and 
scheduled democratic elections for January 1947.  
 In short, as one observer noted in 1946, the last year of the war and its 
immediate aftermath “brought more democratic changes in more Latin American 
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countries than perhaps in any single year since the Wars of Independence.”193 By 
mid-1946, only five governments in the region “could not claim to be in some 
sense popular and democratic in their origins” – Paraguay, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, and the Dominican Republic.194 Of these, both Honduras and El 
Salvador experienced upheavals in the spring of 1944; an uprising in May 
succeeded in overthrowing El Salvador’s authoritarian ruler, General Martinez, but 
a dictatorship was restored seven months later. 
 Scholars of Latin America frequently point to the changing international context 
as the driving force for the region’s postwar democratization. After 1944, “the 
redistribution of international power was the general framework in which many 
Latin American countries undertook democratizing institutional reforms”, argues 
Soledad Laoeza.195 “The second democratic wave across South America was 
essentially the result of the Allied victory in the Second World War,” argues George 
Philip.196 The American victory in the war and its dramatic rise to superpower status 
encouraged democratization in a number of wars. Countries like Mexico pushed to 
accommodate themselves to America’s foreign policy of promoting democratic 
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institutions, an example of “emulation as bandwagoning” described in the first 
chapter. (During the war Washington began to withdraw its support of authoritarian 
governments in the region – support that returned with the onset of the Cold War.) 
Countries also hoped to profit from America’s increased economic influence, 
leading to “the widespread hope for a postwar bonanza.”197 Finally, the democratic 
victory, the postwar settlement, and U.S. emphasis on democratization encouraged 
a general spirit of political liberalization. As Hal Brand notes, starting with the 
Atlantic Charter in 1951 the notion of a New Deal for the world “had a 
pronounced ideological impact in Latin America….Latin America’s movement 
toward democracy was inextricably linked to the broader democratic optimism of 
that period. Internal pressures and external encouragement came together between 
1944 and 1946 in a remarkable wave of democratization.… The degree of 
ambitiousness varied from country to country, but the general trend was 
unmistakable.”198  
 As in Asia, however, these democratic gains were not consolidated. “The new 
order was fragile, though, and as it turned out, temporary.”199 Not a single country 
in South America experienced uninterrupted democracy after 1945.200 In the 
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decade following 1946, anti-democratic domestic forces violently pushed back any 
gains made in the wake of the war. The region’s economic and military elites felt 
severely threatened by reforms that tended to empower the lower and middle 
classes, and by the end of the decade “the conservative classes mobilized to check 
the progressive tendency.”201 Democratic movements were smashed in Bolivia, 
Paraguay, El Salvador, Peru, Venezuela, Panama, Cuba, Haiti, Colombia, and 
Argentina. In Brazil and Chile the civilian government drifted in a conservative 
direction without coups. 
 The political evolution of Mexico between 1944 and 1949 provides a typical 
example. Between 1944 and 1946 the government of Avila Camacho introduced a 
number of major reforms. The military was pushed out of politics and electoral 
reforms were introduced that seemed to signal the emergence of a multi-party 
system and “the beginning of a new age for Mexico, characterized by civilian 
governments, political stability, sustained growth, and international prestige.”202 
These reforms were taken to “prepare the country to meet the challenges of a new 
distribution of world power….They sought to accommodate the country to the post 
war transformation of the United States” to superpower status.203 But as the Cold 
War ramped up, U.S. priorities shifted toward encouraging domestic stability. 
Mexico’s anti-democratic forces no longer needed to fear possible American 
intervention, and began to re-assert themselves. The PRI re-institutionalized itself as 
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the nation’s official party. The single-party state had returned, and the moment of 
democratization had passed. 
 Chile offers another clear example. As historian Corinne Antezana-Pernet 
argues, Chilean women’s movements experienced sudden growth immediately 
after the war as part of the general trend of democratization in the region. Given the 
conservative nature of the country’s domestic politics, it was World War II that 
acted as a “necessary catalyst” for creating “a broad, ambitious women’s 
movement committed to the defense of democracy and its extension to women.”204 
But the later years of the decade marked a period of reversal for the women’s 
movement, which experienced the disintegration of women’s associations and the 
exclusion of their progressive elements. With Chile’s lurch to the right in 1947, “the 
progressive wing of the women’s movement came to be viewed as a political 
liability by the centrist and right-wing women’s groups. They now began to exclude 
the leftist feminists. These internal conflicts eventually led to the dissolution of the 
women’s movement.”205 
 The rise and decline of the Chilean women’s movement was thus intimately 
linked to shifts in the international system. As elsewhere, the end of the war led to a 
swell of democratic reforms and the empowerment of pro-democracy movements, 
while the onset of the Cold War and the reassertion of power by right-wing elites 
ruptured the fragile alliances that were forged in the early period. 
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 In sum, the postwar reforms in Latin America, driven by the American victory 
and the spirit of democratic optimism, created a democratic overstretch. Changing 
internal dynamics, the reassertion of power by the region’s elites, and the onset of 




 The postwar redistribution of power, while not the only catalyst for domestic 
transformations, influenced many of the regime reforms that took place in the war’s 
aftermath. The hegemonic shock that discredited the fascist alternative and 
replaced an ailing multipolar system with a bipolar one also had a momentous 
impact on the evolution of regimes in many countries around the world. The 
dramatic Soviet victory allowed it to impose communist regimes in Eastern Europe 
and spurred a number of followers, most notably in China but also in a number of 
developing countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East. In Latin America, too, 
communist and socialist powers temporarily increased in popularity after the war, 
participating in leftist democratic governments before being driven out by the 
region’s rightward turn later in the decade. “Stalin had emerged from his victory 
over Hitler far stronger than ever before,” writes Judt, “basking in the reflected glory 
of ‘his’ Red Army, at home and abroad.”206 As Raymond Aron noted in 1944, 
communism “profits from and will go on profiting from the enormous prestige 
reflected on the Soviet regime and people by the victories of the Russian armies.”207 
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 The United States also greatly increased in influence and prestige in the years 
immediately following the war. It used its unprecedented wealth to secure 
democratic institutions in Western Europe, and inspired a wave of democratization 
in Latin America. Both countries used its military might to impose their own 
regimes on others through coercion (though the Soviet Union came to rely on force 
to a greater extent than the United States). Both countries used their economic 
influence to exert political pressure and encourage other states to copy their 
institutions (and here the roles were reversed, with the U.S. relying on its economic 
prowess more than the recovering Soviet Union). Both countries benefited from the 
prestige endowed to them by their victory and the emulation it inspired in leaders 
and movements around the world. Both created and used international institutions 
to shape and direct their power.  
 Where the outcomes differed was in the consolidation of their respective 
regimes. Here the record was mixed. The communist regimes in eastern Europe 
were maintained through communist control, usually implicit but periodically 
manifesting itself in brutal invasions to put down attempts at reform – “tanks before 
teatime” in the case of the 1968 Prague Spring. When the source of that coercion 
was removed with the changes in Gorbachev’s foreign policy, the regimes 
collapsed like a house of cards. In the case of the United States, democratic 
institutions were successfully consolidated in Western Europe. In contrast to the 
aftermath of World War I, an intense and long-term commitment by the U.S. 
ensured economic revival and political stability. Yet states in Latin America failed 
  
372 
to sustain their brief move toward democracy in the mid-1940s. Once again, the 
dynamics of consolidation differed between democratic and non-democratic 
waves. In the latter, consolidation was secured through continuous military force; 
in the former, a democratic overstretch produced a wave that was bound to roll 
back as the incentives and opportunities associated with the hegemonic shock 













“We see long dim vistas stretching in many directions of the forest,  
but of none can we descry the end.”  
 
-- James Bryce (1921)1 
 
“There was no certainty; only the appeal to that mocking oracle they called 
History, who gave her sentence only when the jaws of the appealer  
had long since fallen to dust.” 
 
-- Arthur Koestler (1941)2 
 
“So two cheers for Democracy: one because it admits variety  
and two because it permits criticism. Two cheers are quite enough:  
there is no occasion to give three.”  
 






As this dissertation has argued, the twentieth century has been shaped by a series of 
confrontations between great powers, and the competing visions of the state 
embodied by these great powers. Hegemonic shocks challenge and transform 
accepted notions of legitimate regimes and institutions. They change perceptions of 
                                                
1 James Bryce (1921) Modern Democracies Vol.1, p.11 
2 Arthur Koestler (1941/2006) Darkness at Noon, transl. by Daphne Hardy, New 
York: Scribner 
3 E.M. Forster (1951/1976) “What I believe” in Two Cheers for Democracy, 
Penguin Books, p.84 
  
374 
what a modern state ought to look like. In this they are, to borrow Marx’s 
description of revolution, the midwives of history. The period between 1919 and 
1991 marked a series of struggles between the three modern conceptions of the 
state. Each culminated with a shock to the political landscape, each shock leaving 
in its wake a wave of domestic transformations. These transformations were 
piecemeal and often unsuccessful, but the very undertaking showcased the brief 
power of the rising hegemon in the immediate aftermath of the shock. World War I 
set the stage by marking the last breath of the monarchical empires of eastern and 
central Europe. Around the world, the war’s outcome signaled the end of monarchy 
as a model for development, and – for a brief moment – thrust democracy into the 
spotlight as a panacea for nationalism and other vices of modernity.  
 But the disappointing and tentative aftermath of the war led to a search for new 
alternatives. Its outcome displayed a “total lack of consensus among the three great 
victors about the new international order they were imposing,” writes Furet. “At 
Versailles, the Allies imposed a Carthaginian peace without a consensus as to its 
ends, or even its means.”4 The Great War not only opened an opportunity for a 
Communist ascent in one of the ailing empires, but also planted the seed for a 
fascist revolt against the shortcomings of liberal democracy. Democracy was the 
war’s short-lived offspring, but communism and fascism were its enduring progeny. 
These challengers – the two “great totalitarian temptations” of the century, in the 
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words of Fritz Stern5 – offered alternative paths to modernity that at various points 
seemed poised to overtake an ailing, stagnant, and corrupt democracy.  
 Yet less than five decades after helping democracy expunge the fascist 
alternative, communism itself left the world stage with a quiet implosion. Both 
challengers exited from the world stage defeated, discredited, and ready to adopt 
the institutions of their former rival. Neither fulfilled its self-appointed destiny to 
forge a new world on the ruins of the old. “Today it is hard to realize that they are 
such recent ideologies,” writes Furet, “for they seem outmoded, absurd, deplorable, 
or criminal, depending on the case. Nonetheless, they permeated the twentieth 
century.”6 
 
The Work Ahead 
 The study of hegemonic shocks and institutional waves offers a number of 
enhancements and extensions of the theory. The most obvious is expanding the 
universe of cases to include the last hegemonic shock of the twentieth century – the 
Soviet collapse. The analysis of this shock can help shed some light not only on the 
wave of democratization in the mid-1990s, but also on the rise of hybrid regimes 
since that period. As the post-Soviet democratic wave crested and subsided, a 
number of states settled into a pattern best described as a competitive or electoral 
autocracy. The dynamics of failed transitions inherent in democratic waves can 
offer a new perspective on the proliferation of these hybrid regimes. These 
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competitive autocracies are characterized by the formal institutions of democracy, 
particularly multi-party elections, but as Levitsky and Way put it, these are 
elections in which "incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the 
opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their 
supporters, and in so7me cases manipulate electoral results.”8 In such regimes, 
rulers faced real electoral challenges, “despite the opposition contesting a lopsided 
political arena.” 
Such institutional fusion is not an entirely new development. As Larry Diamond 
pointed out, some autocratic regimes in the 1960s and 1970s also incorporated 
elements of democracy, including multiparty elections. But the new competitive 
autocracies, Diamond argued, differed from these predecessors by using methods 
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more subtle than banning and imprisonment to outmaneuver opposition groups.9 
As Schedler noted:  
Since the early days of the ‘third wave’ of global democratization, it 
has been clear that transitions from authoritarian rule can lead 
anywhere. Over the past quarter-century, many have led to the 
establishment of some form of democracy. But many others have not. 
They have given birth to new forms of authoritarianism that do not fit 
into our classic categories of one-party, military, or personal 
dictatorship.10 
 
 The sheer number of these regimes is also unique in the history of political 
development. By 2001 more than two-thirds of all autocracies held multi-party 
elections.11 By the end of the century it was becoming clear that these hybrid 
regimes were a new and stable form of modern autocracy rather than a transitional 
stage.12 
 The Soviet collapse created a powerful motivation for autocrats to adopt the 
formal institutions associated with democracy. As Levitsky and Way note, “Western 
liberalism’s triumph and the Soviet collapse undermined the legitimacy of 
alternative regime models and created strong incentives for peripheral states to 
adopt formal democratic institutions.”13 But in many places domestic conditions 
could not sustain actual democratization. A history of authoritarianism, lack of a 
middle class, poverty, and absence of civil society all contributed to these 
incomplete democratizations. From this perspective, competitive autocracies are 
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the results of failed democratic transitions sparked by the Soviet collapse. A study 
of the post-Soviet wave could help illuminate the dynamics that led to emergence 
and continued existence of competitive autocracies. 
 The universe of cases need not be confined to the twentieth century. I have 
chosen to focus on this period because hegemonic shocks propagate through 
systems of states. A system is a connected network of political actors that have, in 
Hedley Bull’s definition, “sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient 
impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave – at least in some 
measure – as parts of a whole.”14 By these criteria, Bull argues a world system did 
not really emerge until World War One. “Throughout human history before the 
nineteenth century there was no single political system that spanned the world as a 
whole.” But since the late nineteenth century, “order on a global scale has ceased 
to be simply the sum of the various political systems that produce order on a local 
scale; it is also the product of what may be called a world political system.”15 
English geographer Halford Mackinder proclaimed the birth of a “closed political 
system” of “world-wide scope” a decade before World War I.16 “From World War I 
onward,” writes Tilly, “it becomes increasingly difficult to separate the European 
                                                
14
 Hedley Bull (1977/2003) The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World 
Politics, 3rd ed, Columbia University Press, p.9 
15
 Bull 1977/2003:19-20 
16 Harold Mackinder (1904) “The Geographical Pivot of History” The Geographical 
Journal 23.4, p.422. “Every explosion of social forces,” he wrote, “will be sharply 
re-echoed from the far side of the globe…” Mackinder 1904:422 
  
379 
system from the world system of states that was forming rapidly.”17 
 But even if the world was not a unified system until World War I, the study of 
hegemonic shocks does not require a global unit of analysis. By the earlier 
definition, Europe had become its own state system at the end of the 17th century if 
not before. The hegemonic shock of the Napoleonic Wars and its reverberations 
throughout Europe thus offers another case study of an early institutional wave. As 
Furet notes, the clash between revolutionary France and monarchical Europe 
“initiated the era of democratic war”.18 For decades before the French revolution, 
statesmen warned that it would become necessary to bring the majority of the 
population under the control of the state, to replace patronage with centralized 
authority mediated by the rule of law and financed by a far-reaching tax system. 
The revolution confronted European rulers with these facts. At its peak, Napoleonic 
France “looked like a country where modern representative institutions, the rule of 
law, and universal military service had engendered an unprecedented level of 
patriotism and effectiveness on the battlefield,” writes Hosking. And while this 
dominance was partly illusory, “contemporaries were impressed.”19 The spread of 
republican institutions during the wars was partially reversed by the Holy Alliance, 
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but the lessons of popular mobilization for democratic reforms remained in place. 
After a century of relative peace during which European energy was directed 
toward industrialization and colonization, 1914 brought both mass mobilization 
and democracy to new levels. 
 The analysis of shocks and their effects on domestic reforms can also be 
extended to non-Western regional systems, such as the Chinese Period of Warring 
States (481-221BC) or pre-Meiji Japan.  
*** 
 
 At the end of the twentieth century democracy appeared to have decisively 
defeated its challengers. The number of democracies around the world stood at an 
all-time high. Yet since 1995, and despite occasional outbursts, the level of 
democracy in the world appears to have reached a Great Plateau. And after a 
period of unchallenged unipolarity during the 1990s, the hegemon that has 
embodied democracy around the world once again finds itself facing the prospect 
of a new ideological struggle over the prevailing archetype of a modern state. The 
Great Recession that began in 2008 revived the possibility of a search for 
alternatives. A slew of observers began to suggest that democratic capitalism was in 
the process of being replaced by state capitalism – an institutional bundle 
embodied by China and characterized by a capitalist system of production 
undergirded by state ownership and guidance.20 If the lessons of past hegemonic 
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shocks can tell us anything about the future, it’s the fact that a gradual Chinese 
ascent poses a much lesser challenge to liberal democracy than a sudden rise of 
relative Chinese power. The greatest danger facing the future of democracy is 
therefore a sudden decline in American power, influence, and prestige. For better 
or for worse, the future of democracy is tied to the future of American power. 
 Far from being buried in the old struggles of the past century, the lessons of 
hegemonic shocks continue to resonate today. Understanding the causes and 
dynamics of democratic waves is crucial for understanding the effectiveness of 
regime promotion by external means. As the case of World War I demonstrates, the 
lack of U.S. commitment in promoting democratic institutions throughout postwar 
Europe contributed to the collapse of new democracies and paved the way for the 
rise of fascism in the 1930s. Those mistakes were corrected in the settlement 
following World War II. Yet during the Cold War American foreign policy had an 
ambivalent relationship with democracy, often preferring reliable autocrats over 
unpredictable democrats. Whatever direction future U.S. policy takes toward 
promoting democratic development, understanding how changes in the 
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international system shape this development will remain an important aspect of the 
success of these policies. Given the importance of external democracy promotion 
in contemporary foreign policy, the causes and dynamics of democratic waves can 
provide important insights into the effectiveness of these policies, whether they are 
pursued through sanctions, foreign aid, or forced regime change.  Policies that 
attempt to influence democratization should keep in mind that democracy has 
often moved in cycles of transnational advances and retreats. It may be insufficient 
or even counterproductive to focus on the needs and preferences of domestic 
actors inside any single country if domestic reforms are embedded in a larger 
framework of global or regional power shifts. 
 The lessons of hegemonic shocks also warn against the triumphalist reading of 
modern history as one of steady democratic progress. Though the metaphor of 
waves suggests a powerful inexorable force, democracy’s success has been 
predicated upon the ability of powerful democracies to weather military and 
economic crises and to emerge triumphant in their wake. When democracies fail to 
do so, as during the Great Depression, the tide of popular and elite opinion shifts 
just as readily and just as naturally against democratic institutions. The 
consecration of democratic triumph is forged by the outcomes of grim struggles. 
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